检察机关非自侦案件侦查监督的博弈论分析
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Game Theoretical Analysis of Prosecutorial Supervision of Non-self-investigation Cases
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    摘要:

    检察机关依法对侦查机关行使侦查监督权,既要解决因侦查机关抵触和内部动力不足而导致的监督不力的局面,又要解决因信息不畅导致的监督不到位的困境。充分运用博弈理论能够较好地处理监督者与被监督者的互动,引入第三方即当事人及其诉讼参加人的力量介入可以实现博弈方的最大收益,实现监督实效的最大化。

    Abstract:

    In accordance with the law, prosecutorial organs supervise investigative organs' exercise of investigative rights, which should not only fix the weakness in supervision resulting from the opposition from investigative organs and lack of inner motivation as well, but also improve the lack of efficacy in supervision because of unsmooth information communication. A thorough analysis with the game theory may better deal with the interaction between the supervisor and the supervisee. Bringing in the third party, that is, parties involved and other litigation participants in specific cases may realize the maximum benefits for both game players and maximize the efficacy of supervision.

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彭志刚.检察机关非自侦案件侦查监督的博弈论分析[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2013,19(2):103-108. DOI:10.11835/j. issn.1008-5831.2013.02.016

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  • 在线发布日期: 2013-03-28
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