Strategic Exploitation by Higher-Status People Incurs Harsher Third-Party Punishment
Abstract
Abstract. It is widely documented that third parties punish norm violations, even at a substantial cost to themselves. However, little is known about how third-party punishment occurs in groups consisting of members who differ in status. Having a higher-status member promotes norm enforcement and group efficiency but also poses threats to collective goods when they strategically exploit people’s trust to maximize self-interest. Two preregistered studies consistently revealed a punitive mechanism contingent on target status and strategic exploitation. Third-party observers generated harsher punishment when high- but not low-status targets transgressed after publicly endorsing cooperation (Study 1) or procedural fairness (Study 2). The findings elucidate third-party punishment as a feasible mechanism to counteract exploitation and maintain social norms in interactions with status asymmetry.
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