REVIEWS
"The Rise of Common-Sense Conservatism is a highly innovative examination of how neoconservative intellectuals applied Scottish Enlightenment ideas about common sense to late-twentieth-century American problems such as the family, crime, and multiculturalism. How did intellectuals who previously detected cultural problems among most Americans come to argue that the culture of the very same people was not the problem but rather the solution to a crisis created by elites? By answering this important question, Antti Lepistö helps us understand the forces that gave rise to Donald Trump."
— Andrew Hartman, author of A War for the Soul of America
“Fascinating and compelling. Lepistö argues that neoconservatives’ misreadings of Scottish Enlightenment thinkers were part of a sustained effort to prove ‘average Americans’ right and liberal elites wrong, which thus paved the way for the right-wing populism that dominates both American and global politics today. This book will appeal to both lay and scholarly readers interested in the origins of our current political predicament.”
— Michael L. Frazer, author of The Enlightenment of Sympathy: Justice and the Moral Sentiments in the Eighteenth Century and Today
“How did American conservatives go from mistrusting the mob to taking up the language of common-sense populism? Lepistö answers that question by exploring the hold Scottish Enlightenment moral philosophy had on late twentieth-century neoconservative thinkers. This is the kind of history writing that helps us make sense of our own moment.”
— Sophia Rosenfeld, author of Common Sense: A Political History
"Lepistö presents an engaging study of neoconservatism’s influences which challenges scholarship to look at its intellectual substance, and to go beyond traditional preoccupations with foreign policy and debates regarding its origins. In doing so, he provides an original approach to the comprehension of neoconservatism and makes essential reading for those interested in it."
— U.S. Studies Online
"A fascinating and well-written intellectual history of the American Right."
— Ad Fontes
"Eloquent. . . This book undoubtedly provides a very novel and unique framework for analysis and interpretation of the ideological origins of contemporary American right-wing populism. The book's arguments are all the more interesting given some of the potential divergences between the Scottish Enlightenment and the political traditions of England."
— The Paper
"A history of the origins of neoconservatism, The Rise of Common-Sense Conservatism is therefore timely, and one of its claims is quite delicious. Finnish scholar Antti Lepistö pops one of the great conceits of contemporary politics: that the refined rightists of DC policy circles have nothing whatsoever to do with the populism of truckers, anti-vax folks, and, of course, Donald Trump. The Rise of Common-Sense Conservatism shows that neocons, reacting to the malaise of 1970s America, strategically crafted a “popular epistemology” by relying on the Common-Sense philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment. Neocons are populists, even if they were horrified when the boorish Donald Trump rode their tiger into the White House."
— Law and Liberty
"The Rise of CommonSense Conservatism makes a solid contribution to the scholarship on developments in the modern conservative movement."
— Journal of American History
"In this fascinating and original book, Timothy Shenk reorganizes the familiar narrative of American political history. Instead of chronicling great presidents or ideological turning points, he spotlights a succession of political figures he calls ‘realigners’. . . . By focusing on these men and women and their times, Shenk shines new light on broader dynamics of American history."
— Survival
"Well-researched. . . a handy reference guide for anyone who is interested in the social and intellectual history of the American neoconservatism."
— New Political Science
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction: Speaking for the People in Culture Wars–Era America - Antti Lepistö
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226774183.003.0001
[neoconservatism;the Scottish Enlightenment;culture wars;Irving Kristol;Gertrude Himmelfarb;James Q. Wilson;Francis Fukuyama;Adam Smith;David Hume;right-wing populism]
The introduction argues that the moral philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment has been overlooked as a significant intellectual resource for American conservative thought. In the final quarter of the twentieth century, a group of neoconservative intellectuals introduced to American political discourse a figure of the virtuous “common man,” and thus significantly contributed to the rise of right-wing populism. The neoconservatives’ embrace of a populist epistemology was a result of a serious engagement with, and reinvention of, the Scottish Enlightenment philosophies of common sense, the moral sense, and moral sentiments. In the eighteenth century, thinkers such as Adam Smith, David Hume, Francis Hutcheson, and Thomas Reid contributed to the emergence of naturalistic, secular ethics by arguing that all humans—not only sophisticated individuals—were capable of distinguishing between right and wrong because of certain characteristics of human nature. Two centuries later, four eminent neoconservative theorists—Irving Kristol, Gertrude Himmelfarb, James Q. Wilson, and Francis Fukuyama—reinvented the Scottish tradition to serve conservative needs in the culture wars environment. Neoconservative intellectuals must be seen not merely as foreign policy hawks or critics of the welfare state but as shapers of the Scottish intellectual tradition—common-sense populists in a fractured post-1960s America. (pages 1 - 19)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
1. The Coming of the Neoconservative Common Man - Antti Lepistö
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226774183.003.0002
[Irving Kristol;Gertrude Himmelfarb;neoconservatism;common man;moral sense;the Scottish Enlightenment;populism;Adam Smith;David Hume;Thomas Reid]
Chapter 1 asks how and when the neoconservative figure of the common man entered American political discourse. In doing so, it examines the evolution of neoconservative thought from the future neoconservatives’ social engineering approach of the Great Society years to the demanding civic republican moral vocabulary that characterized their response to the New Left in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and finally to the Scottish Enlightenment-informed moral populism of the 1980s and 1990s. The chapter reveals a serious engagement with eighteenth-century Scottish moral philosophy by Irving Kristol and Gertrude Himmelfarb, who turned to Adam Smith’s economic and moral ideas during the mid-1970s economic crisis. Based on their study of Smith’s theory of “moral sentiments,” Kristol and Himmelfarb introduced to political discourse an Americanized figure of the common man with an intuitive moral sense. In doing so they laid the foundation for more explicitly populist neoconservative texts of the later culture wars era. The chapter also discusses the moral theories of Smith, David Hume, Francis Hutcheson, and Thomas Reid, and shows how Kristol and Himmelfarb shaped the Scottish philosophies to take American conservatism to a populist direction. (pages 20 - 55)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
2. James Q. Wilson and the Rehabilitation of Emotions - Antti Lepistö
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226774183.003.0003
[James Q. Wilson;Adam Smith;David Hume;neoconservatism;moral sense;moral sentiments;emotion;Scottish Enlightenment;culture wars;populism]
Chapter 2 examines how James Q. Wilson, perhaps the most distinguished neoconservative social scientist, drew from sentimentalist Scottish Enlightenment philosophy to raise the status of popular moral emotions in American public debate during the culture wars of the 1980s and 1990s. Relying heavily on previously unused archival material, the chapter argues that Wilson added considerable force to a neoconservative, populist reading of Adam Smith’s and David Hume’s ideas of the “moral sense” and “moral sentiments.” Wilson took it as his task to explain to the American people why their moral sentiments on contemporary moral issues were justified and that the moral sense of the so-called average American was a viable alternative to the American intellectual elite’s morally silent, social scientific way of knowing. Neither one of Wilson’s greatest Enlightenment heroes—Smith and Hume—ever used their ideas on human moral nature to launch an attack on contemporary cultural “elites.” While Wilson clearly admired Smith’s and Hume’s philosophical works as such, as a culture warrior, he applied their concepts and perspective to public issues that would have been alien to them. The chapter argues that Wilson’s borrowing from the Scottish philosophers was a reinvention of their thought in populist terms. (pages 56 - 68)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
3. Family Values as Moral Intuitions: Neoconservatives and the War over the Family - Antti Lepistö
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226774183.003.0004
[family norms;culture wars;neoconservatism;Irving Kristol;James Q. Wilson;anti-intellectualism;moral sentiments;common sense;the Scottish Enlightenment]
Chapter 3 examines the neoconservative contribution to the culture wars battles over the family, sexuality, and gender issues. It shows how Irving Kristol and James Q. Wilson responded to the liberalization of family norms in the 1980s and 1990s by reintroducing and reshaping the moral language of the Scottish Enlightenment—common sense, the moral sense, and moral sentiments. The chapter suggests that in the hands of the neoconservatives, the eighteenth-century Scottish moral vocabulary became a political tool intended to delegitimize and marginalize the increasingly widespread liberal views of many family experts and intellectuals. Wilson, for example, criticized the landmark Roe v. Wade abortion decision for being at odds with the “moral sentiments” of ordinary Americans and Kristol called for “common sense” in the debate over sex education. The neoconservatives also applied similar anti-intellectual rhetoric in the debates over same-sex marriage and child raising. By appealing to the moral sentiments and common sense of imagined ordinary Americans, Kristol and Wilson defined the boundaries of an acceptable—moral and democratic—discourse on family matters. Such rhetoric had a powerful appeal in a country with deep passion for democracy, but the moral sentiments of Americans were always more varied than the neoconservatives suggested. (pages 69 - 104)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
4. Moral Sentiments of the Black Underclass: Race in the Neoconservative Moral Imagination - Antti Lepistö
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226774183.003.0005
[neoconservatism;underclass;race;scientific racism;colorblindness;James Q. Wilson;Gertrude Himmelfarb;welfare state;the moral sense;the Scottish Enlightenment]
Chapter 4 explores the racial and class dimensions of neoconservatism. It examines how James Q. Wilson’s and Gertrude Himmelfarb’s Scottish Enlightenment-inspired ideas on human moral nature—the “moral sense” of “ordinary people”—relate to their conceptions of the black underclass. The chapter argues that the neoconservatives relied on a logic of colorblindness that both distinguished them from scientific racists and supported their crusade against welfare statist and relativist elites. Himmelfarb consistently emphasized that the moral sense—understood as a willingness and a capacity for self-improvement—ought to be understood as an attribute of the poor and rich alike, and suggested that the proponents of a generous welfare state did not appreciate the moral sense of underclass individuals. Wilson, in turn, underscored the value of the “ordinary citizen’s” moral perspective as a cure for the troubles of the black underclass that was a victim of relativist white elite culture. While the neoconservative language that highlighted the moral capacities of “ordinary people” seemingly embraced democratic ideals, it simultaneously fell short as a language of national solidarity, for it encouraged the exclusion of welfare-statist liberals and—especially in the case of Wilson—the underclass from the idealized group of morally pure “ordinary citizens.” (pages 105 - 135)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
5. Retributive Sentiments and Criminal Justice: James Q. Wilson on Crime and Punishment - Antti Lepistö
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226774183.003.0006
[James Q. Wilson;crime;criminology;criminal justice system;penal populism;moral sentiments;Adam Smith;1994 crime bill;colorblindness;Michelle Alexander]
Chapter 5 explores the criminological thought of James Q. Wilson, the foremost neoconservative authority on crime. It studies Wilson’s response to such events as the 1992 Los Angeles riots, Bill Clinton’s 1994 crime bill, and the era’s sensationalized court cases such as the O.J. Simpson case and the Menendez brothers case. It suggests that Wilson’s arguments on the proper role of popular retributive moral sentiments within the criminal justice system ought to be seen as an expression of penal populism. Wilson invoked Adam Smith’s vocabulary of “moral sentiments” to illustrate and give credibility to the tough-on-crime views of many late twentieth-century Americans, and to delegitimize and marginalize liberal experts’ seeming tendency to explain rather than to judge criminal behavior. The chapter also shows that although Wilson used Smith’s moral vocabulary in the context of the 1990s crime debates, he distanced himself from Smith’s actual ideas on punishment and an “impartial spectator’s” possible sympathy for the offender. The last part of the chapter argues that the history of neoconservatism lends some support to Michelle Alexander’s much-discussed argument that “colorblindness,” instead of providing the solution, is in fact part of the problem of lingering racial inequality in America. (pages 136 - 154)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
6. Elite Multiculturalism and the Spontaneous Morality of Everyday People: Francis Fukuyama’s Culture Wars - Antti Lepistö
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226774183.003.0007
[Francis Fukuyama;Straussianism;the Scottish Enlightenment;neoconservatism;cultural pessimism;neoliberalism;neoliberal order;Adam Smith;moral sense;spontaneous order]
Chapter 6 studies the evolution of Francis Fukuyama’s moral and civic thought from the late 1980s to the early 2000s, charting his intellectual journey between two poles of neoconservative thought—namely, Straussian cultural pessimism and the guarded optimism of Scottish Enlightenment-inspired moral sentimentalism. Toward the end of the chapter, a discussion on Fukuyama’s late 1990s work on the relation between ordinary people’s natural moral sense and “spontaneous order” extends into an analysis of the relevant links and notable differences between neoconservatism and neoliberalism, two conflicting yet intertwined ideologies of the late twentieth century. Neoliberalism’s principal intellectual proponents (such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek), like the neoconservatives, claimed Adam Smith’s legacy, yet the notable differences in the reception of Smith, the chapter suggests, reveal essential aspects of the nature of these two mentalities. Still, Fukuyama, in using Adam Smith’s ethics to construct a morally reassuring view of the American people and bourgeois capitalist society, helped reinforce the moral foundations of the post-1970s neoliberal order that otherwise lacked a proper moral perspective. (pages 155 - 181)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
Epilogue: Neoconservative Culture Warriors and the Boundaries of the People
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226774183.003.0008
[neoconservatism;sentimental education;common sense;anti-intellectualism;Donald Trump;Adam Smith;David Hume;James Q. Wilson;Irving Kristol;Gertrude Himmelfarb]
The epilogue asks whether the neoconservatives’ systematic efforts to speak in the name of common-sensical “ordinary Americans” included some helpful building blocks for a unifying national vision, one that transcends identity attachments and provides something in the way of a shared glue of “we-ness” in a fractured America. It draws attention to those aspects of neoconservative thought that might provide inspiration for those seeking to combat the spreading of anger and contempt: James Q. Wilson, Irving Kristol, and Gertrude Himmelfarb spent much of their careers writing and talking about the importance of self-control and other social virtues. Moreover, Himmelfarb criticized the increasingly rude language used by some factions of the American right years before Donald Trump’s presidency. Yet the epilogue argues that as a cure for contempt, the neoconservative discourse on common sense and the shared moral sentiments is flawed because of its confrontational anti-intellectual aspects. Instead, it might be best to consult the works of the eighteenth-century Scottish sentimentalists—David Hume and Adam Smith. The neoconservatives, in their populist celebration of everyman’s moral sentiments, largely ignored Hume’s and Smith’s ideas on sentimental education, which seem particularly relevant as guidelines for those seeking to build solidarity and understanding across difference.
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
