REVIEWS
"Godfrey-Smith presents a clear, comprehensive, and accessible introductory survey of the major problems and movements in the philosophy of science. It is an excellent book to use on its own in a lower-level philosophy of science course or as a supplement to some anthology of primary texts in a more sophisticated upper-level course. It would also suit anyone who has interest in the subject but little patience for jargon-heavy professional philosophy. . . . His exposition is accented by insightful commentary and criticism, and by examples from the history of science all with a keen sense of humor."
— Science Education
"A stimulating introduction to nearly every department of general philosophy of science. . . . Godfrey-Smith’s attempt to inject new vigor and liveliness into philosophy of science is quite successful, as evidenced by the charmingly opinionated style of presentation and the ease with which he ties latter-day perspectives on science back to the classic positivist tradition and the history of science. . . . A very fresh and well-conceived book."
— Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences
"Godfrey-Smith displays consistent clarity. It is truly refreshing to read a text that is thorough, clear, and penetrating. Students with little or no background in philosophy or philosophy of science will find this book to be extremely worthwhile. Professionals in other fields and other disciplines will appreciate the breadth and depth. . . . Whether you teach philosophy of science, or whether you are simple interested in issues relating science, philosophy, history, and other fields, I am confident that you’ll find Theory and Reality an accessible and rewarding read."
— James Sage, Metapsychology
"An excellent overview of the philosophy of science from the early 20th century onward. . . . Recommended."
— Choice
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1: Introduction
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226771137.003.0001
[Science;philosophy;scientific revolution]
An introduction to the themes of the book, to the projects of philosophy of science, and to some of the ways the distinctive features of science might be understood. The chapter ends with a historical sketch of the scientific revolutionand its consequences.
Chapter 2: Empiricism
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226771137.003.0002
[Empiricism;logical positivism;logical empiricism;verifiability;testing]
This chapter discusses the empiricist tradition in philosophy, from the seventeenth century onwards but with a special focus on the twentieth century developments seen inlogical positivism and logical empiricism. Those empiricist views set the stage for twentieth and twenty-first century philosophy of science.
Chapter 3: Evidence and Induction
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226771137.003.0003
[Nelson Goodman;grue problem;new riddle of induction;ravens problem;confirmation;evidence]
This chapter looks at problems around confirmation, induction, and testing in science, especially as they were approached in the first half of the twentieth century, a period when these issues posed significant problems for empiricism. The ravens problem and Goodman's new riddle of induction (or "grue" problem) are discussed in detail.
Chapter 4: Popper: Conjecture and Refutation
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226771137.003.0004
[Karl Popper;falsification;demarcation;induction]
This chapter examines Karl Popper's philosophy of science, especially his use of the idea of falsification to solve the problem of the "demarcation" of science from other intellectual activities, and to give an account of scientific change. Popper's rejection of the possibility of the confirmation of theoriesby observation is criticized.
Chapter 5: Kuhn’s Revolution
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226771137.003.0005
[Thomas Kuhn;scientific revolutions;scientific change;social structure of science]
This chapter discusses the account of scientific change given in Thomas Kuhn's influential 1962 book "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,"and the debates that followed. As well as offering a dramatic new account of scientific change, based on change within andbetween "paradigms,"Kuhn's book reoriented discussions of evidence, observation, realism, and how scientific language works.
Chapter 6: Theories and Frameworks
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226771137.003.0006
[Framework;Thomas Kuhn;Imre Lakatos;Rudolf Carnap;Larry Laudan;Paul Feyerabend;research program;anarchism]
This chapter discusses philosophical work that followed Kuhn's "TheStructure of Scientific Revolutions,"focusing on Lakatos and Laudan's alternative pictures of large-scale change in science, and Feyerabend's "anarchist" view of change and theory choice. It also discusses the general role of conceptual frameworks in science, where these include Kuhn's paradigms, Lakatos's research programs, and Carnap's linguistic frameworks.
Chapter 7: The Challenge from Sociology of Science
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226771137.003.0007
[sociology of knowledge;Robert Merton;Relativism;Bruno Latour;credit in science]
The chapter discusses several stages in the development of sociology of science, beginning from Robert Merton's view (and his treatment of credit in science), through the "strong program" of the 1970s, and the view developed by Bruno Latour in the later part of the twentieth century. It also includesa discussion of Shapin and Shaffer's highly influential book about seventeenth century science,"Leviathan and the Air Pump."
Chapter 8: Science Is Political
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226771137.003.0008
[feminism;postmodernism;science wars;values in science]
The chapter looks at the development of politically oriented critiques of science in the late twentiethcentury, focusing especially on feminist philosophy of science. It then looks at the rise of postmodernism and the "science wars." The chapter concludes with a general discussion of the role of values in science.
Chapter 9: Naturalistic Philosophy
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226771137.003.0009
[Quine;naturalism;normativity;observation;theory-ladenness]
Naturalistic philosophy is a movement that emphasizes the continuities between philosophical and scientific inquiry, and rejects the search for philosophical "foundations"for scientific knowledge. This chapter looks at some varieties of naturalism and at the relation between anaturalistic understanding of science and normative or evaluative questions. It also discusses the problem of the alleged "theory-ladenness" of observation in science.
Chapter 10: Scientific Realism
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226771137.003.0010
[realism;metaphysics;constructivism;pessimistic induction]
This chapter discusses debates over "scientific realism." Does science sometimes succeed in describing the structure of the world as it is in itself? Is it reasonable to even hope for such an outcome from scientific work? This problem combines metaphysical questions about the notion of an objectively existing world with questions about the capacity of scientific inquiry to uncover the world's structure. Empiricist and constructivist alternatives to realism are discussed.
Chapter 11: Explanation, Laws, and Causes
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226771137.003.0011
[explanation;causation;law of nature;covering law theory]
Does science sometimes give us explanation for why things happen, as well as what happens and what the world contains? Are "why-questions" properly part of science?This chapter looks at theories of scientific explanation from the early twentieth century onwards, including the rise and fall of the "covering law" view, the development of theories of explanation based on the idea of causation, and others. The chapter also includes a general discussion of causation and scientific laws.
Chapter 12: Bayesianism and New Theories of Evidence
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226771137.003.0012
[Bayesianism;evidence;degree of belief]
This chapter looks at the development of theories of evidence and rationality in science based on the use of Bayes's theorem and the idea ofdegrees of belief. The Bayesian view is the most influential account of evidence in the philosophy science at the moment, and it has many strengths. The chapter also revisits some earlier debates about evidence and induction in the light of both Bayesian views and another "procedural" approach.
Chapter 13: Truth, Simplicity, and Other Problems
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226771137.003.0013
[truth;correspondence;model-building;consensus;simplicity;Occam's razor]
The first part of the chapter is about the nature of truth, and whether it makes sense to see truth as a goal of scientific inquiry. What is the link between truth and success? The rest of the chapter then looks at model-building in science, the formation of scientific consensus, and Occam's razor – the idea that simpler theories are to be preferred over more complex oneswhenever possible.
Chapter 14: The Future
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226771137.003.0014
[empiricism;naturalism;scientific realism;funding of science;pure inquiry]
This final chapter looks first at how some of the ideas advocated in individual chapters of the book might be combined into a coherent overall position. Those ideas are empiricism, naturalism, and scientific realism. The final section then looks at trends and developments affecting the future of scientific inquiry. These include changes to the funding of science and the demand that scientific work be justified in terms of foreseeable practical benefits. Godfrey-Smith argues that the history of science shows there have been many benefits coming from fairly "pure," unconstrained forms of inquiry.
