Ion Pohoață ; Delia-Elena Diaconașu ; Ioana Negru - The independence of central banks: a reductio ad absurdum

jpe:12256 - Journal of Philosophical Economics, March 11, 2024, Volume XVII - https://doi.org/10.46298/jpe.12256
The independence of central banks: a reductio ad absurdumArticle

Authors: Ion Pohoață ORCID1,2; Delia-Elena Diaconașu ORCID1,2; Ioana Negru ORCID3

  • 1 Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași [Romania]
  • 2 Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași = Universitatea Alexandru Ioan Cuza din Iași
  • 3 "Lucian Blaga" University

This paper testifies to the fact that the proclaimed independence of central banks, as conceived by its founders, is nothing more than a chimera. We demonstrate that the hypothesis ‘inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon’ does not substantiate the case for independence. Further, the portrayal of the conservative central banker, the imaginary principal-agent contract, the alleged financial autonomy, along with the ban on budgetary financing, amount to flawed logic in arguing for the independence of the central bank. We also highlight that the idea of independence is not convincing due to the absence of well-defined outlines in its operational toolbox and the system of rules it relies upon.


Volume: Volume XVII
Section: Articles
Published on: March 11, 2024
Accepted on: February 6, 2024
Submitted on: September 12, 2023
Keywords: inflation,conservative banker,Principal-Agent contract,financial autonomy,budgetary financing,[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

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