Abstract
Findings from two experiments indicate that probability matching in sequential choice arises from an asymmetry in strategy availability: The matching strategy comes readily to mind, whereas a superior alternative strategy, maximizing, does not. First, compared with the minority who spontaneously engage in maximizing, the majority of participants endorse maximizing as superior to matching in a direct comparison when both strategies are described. Second, when the maximizing strategy is brought to their attention, more participants subsequently engage in maximizing. Third, matchers are more likely than maximizers to base decisions in other tasks on their initial intuitions, suggesting that they are more inclined to use a choice strategy that comes to mind quickly. These results indicate that a substantial subset of probability matchers are victims of “underthinking” rather than “overthinking”: They fail to engage in sufficient deliberation to generate a superior alternative to the matching strategy that comes so readily to mind.
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This research was funded by a grant from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada to the first author.
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J. Koehler, D., James, G. Probability matching and strategy availability. Memory & Cognition 38, 667–676 (2010). https://doi.org/10.3758/MC.38.6.667
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/MC.38.6.667