STEPHEN BLANK

SOVIET POLITICS AND THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION OF 1919-1921

Iran's attraction to Russian rulers is centuries old. Tsarist rulers and statesmen looked to Iran for geographical and political reasons. Later, economic factors of trade and eventually of oil came into play as factors of influence. The October Revolution, which transformed world politics, also added two new dimensions to Russian interest in Iran: the siren call of world revolution and the increasingly urgent aspirations of radical Moslem nationalities and Pan-Islamists on both sides of the border. Though both forces emerged more or less simultaneously their relationship was not smooth. To some degree one force's aspirations complemented the other's; but also their inner logic was essentially violently incompatible and essentially contradictory. The complex relationship of nationalist, radical, economic, and geopolitical considerations in Soviet foreign policy towards Iran manifested itself in the still obscure Soviet intervention during its Civil War and the Iranian revolutionary period of 1919-1921. This article seeks to clarify both the nature of that involvement by different Soviet forces and the profound repercussions it had upon Soviet politics.

The Soviet intervention in Iran of this period both revealed and resulted from the unresolved dialectic of conflict among these forces. They marked the similarly unresolved antinomies of Soviet nationality policies. The failure of this intervention to secure ultimate Soviet goals prompted a thorough réévaluation of Soviet policies in many key areas with important consequences for future domestic and foreign policies. It caused the regime to reappraise and change nationality policies after 192 1. It forced the leadership to perceive anew the potential for eastern rather than western revolutionary upheaval as a policy goal. This réévaluation played no small role in stimulating an overall shift in Soviet tactics and aims abroad. Yet the linkage between domestic and foreign policies is still obscure today. That is because we have overlooked how set-backs abroad affected domestic political calculations. In this instance it seems clear that only partial success in Iran led those elements, who possessed the necessary acumen, to realize that the politics of bureaucratic manœuvre and consolidation were the paths to socialism at home and abroad.

As previously stated Soviet interest in Iran arose from a combination

Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique, XXI (2), avril-juin rg8o, pp. IJ3-IÇ4.