A Refined Simple Power Analysis Attack on ECC with Countermeasures

DOI

10.2991/iset-15.2015.29How to use a DOI?

Keywords

ECC, Cryptography, SPA, Scalar multiplication

Abstract

Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is becoming widely deployed in embedded cryptographic devices. However, simple power analysis (SPA) attacks may retrieve secret keys by exploiting the power consumption of ECC devices. To resist the SPA attack there appear a number of countermeasures and the most widely used methods are Montgomery ladder and double-and-add-always algorithm. This paper proposes a refined simple power analysis attack to these countermeasures. Experimental results on smart cards demonstrate that this attack method can retrieve secret keys by distinguishing the power consumption of different jump instructions if the implementation of ECC’s countermeasure is not carefully designed. The experiments also demonstrate that the proposed countermeasure in this paper can resist this kind of SPA attack.

Copyright

© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Download article (PDF)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Lihui Wang
AU  - Qing Li
AU  - Zhimin Zhang
AU  - Weijun Shan
AU  - Davidwei Zhang
PY  - 2015/03
DA  - 2015/03
TI  - A Refined Simple Power Analysis Attack on ECC with Countermeasures
BT  - Proceedings of the First International Conference on Information Science and Electronic Technology
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 111
EP  - 114
SN  - 2352-538X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/iset-15.2015.29
DO  - 10.2991/iset-15.2015.29
ID  - Wang2015/03
ER  -