Open Access

Simply Finding Answers, or the Entirety of Inquiry While Standing on One Foot

   | Dec 08, 2020

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I argue that inquiry can be defined without reference to the attitudes inquirers have during inquiry. Inquiry can instead be defined by its aim: it is the activity that has the aim of answering a question. I call this approach to defining inquiry a “naive” account. I present the naive account of inquiry in contrast to a prominent contemporary account of inquiry most notably defended by Jane Friedman. According to this view of inquiry, which I call an attitude-centric view, inquiry is appropriately defined not by the aim of the activity but by the attitudes that inquirers have during inquiry. After developing the naive view, I defend it against the objection that it collapses into the attitude-centric view.

eISSN:
0873-626X
Languages:
English, Portuguese
Publication timeframe:
4 times per year
Journal Subjects:
Philosophy, Selected Philosophical Movements, Analytical Philosophy