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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 June 2017
Ever since J. H. Plumb published his Ford Lectures, The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1679-1725 (1966), the topic of political stability has gripped the attention of England’s early modern historians. In particular Plumb’s characterization of the politics of 1679-1722 as “The Rage of Party” was refined by Geoffrey Holmes, whose British Politics in the Age of Anne ushered in a variety of studies of political warfare in what has come to be known as The First Age of Party. These and succeeding works have elaborated and confirmed the existence of deep and severe differences between Whig and Tory partisans, differences renewing animosities extending back to the Civil Wars and generating a self-perpetuating struggle for power. The consequences of this “rage of party” for the formation and execution of policy were daunting. In particular party rage placed three important restrictions on the executive’s room for maneuver. By rendering all political alliances unstable, partisanship limited the ability of the governments of William and Anne to operate as combinations of the parties. Partisanship also put all government servants under the constant threat of defending their conduct from year to year. And partisanship dictated certain policy options while frustrating others.
Parts of this article were given as papers at meetings of the Western Conference on British Studies. I wish to thank Michael Moore, Dennis Showalter, Marianna McJimsey and two anonymous readers for their valuable suggestions.
1 Plumb, J. H., The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1678-1722, Penguin edition (London, 1967).Google Scholar Speck, W. A., Stability and Strife, 1658-1760 (Cambridge, Mass., 1977).Google Scholar Holmes, Geoffrey, British Politics in the Age of Anne (New York, 1967).Google Scholar Roberts, Clayton, The Growth of Responsible Government in Stuart England (Cambridge, 1966).Google Scholar DeKrey, Gary S., A Fractured Society: London in the First Age of Party, 1688-1715 (New York, 1985).Google Scholar
2 Beckett, J. V., “Introduction: Stability in Politics and Society, 1680-1750,” in Britain in the First Age of Party, 1680-1750: Essays Presented to Geoffrey Holmes, Clyve Jones, ed. (London, 1987), pp. 1–19.Google Scholar The contributions of Clayton Roberts, Norma Landau and Stephen Baxter to a symposium on Plumb’s thesis demonstrate the variety of approaches to an evaluation of Plumb’s themes and the difficulties involved in assessing his conclusions. “Political Stability: A Symposium,” Albion 25 (Summer 1993): 237-78.
3 Examples: The Whig Bank of England vs. the Tory land bank (1694); The Tory Treason Trials Bill vs. Whig opposition (1696); the Whig support of “No Peace without Spain” vs. the Tory campaign to end the war (1710-1714); the preference of the politicians for a war policy protecting trade and favoring a “blue-water” strategy. An endemic problem was the ministers’ need to deal with Parliament with sufficient openness to gain support for policies. This apparent accountability to Parliament gave the impression that Parliament was in fact more capable of directing policy than was the case. What the parliamentary opposition could accomplish was to make the ministers’ control over foreign policy appear to be weak and unreliable in the eyes of allies and opponents. Black, Jeremy, “Parliament and the Political and Diplomatic Crisis of 1717-1718,” Parliamentary History: A Yearbook 3 (1984): 77–78.Google Scholar
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10 A point of my article “A Country Divided? English Politics and the Nine Years’ War,” Albion 23 (Spring, 1991): 61-74.
11 Brewer, , Sinews, pp. 143–51Google Scholar. Downie, J. A., “The Commission of Public Accounts and the formation of the Country Party,” The English Historical Review 91 (January, 1976): 33–51.Google Scholar Early in William’s reign the committee experienced considerable frustration in gaining access to these records. By 1692-1693 access had become full. Not until Sidney Godolphin’s Treasurership during Queen Anne’s War did coordination of war finance and parliamentary accountability come under executive control.
12 For a discussion of the importance of the formation of a ministry around a party see Roberts, Clayton, Schemes & Undertakings: A Study of English Politics in the Seventeenth Century (Columbus, Ohio, 1985)Google Scholar.
13 Holmes, , British Politics, p. 365.Google Scholar
14 Hattendorf, John B., “English Governmental Machinery and the Conduct of War, 1702-1713,” War and Society 3 (September 1985): 1–23Google Scholar. Gibbs, G. C., “Laying Treaties before Parliament in the Eighteenth Century,” in Studies in Diplomatic History: Essays in Memory of David Bayne Horn, eds., Hatton, Ragnhild and Anderson, M. S. (New York, 1970), pp. 116–37.Google Scholar Gibbs describes Parliament’s role in terms of “consultation and advice.” I prefer to use consultation and review because Parliament’s post hoc investigations had to be counted into ministerial thinking.
15 Horwitz, , Parliament, pp. 103–04.Google Scholar These were the recommendations of the earl of Rochester and Carmarthen. Dalrymple, Sir John, Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland from the Dissolution of the last Parliament of Charles II until the Sea-Battle off La Hogue, appendix, part ii, II (London, 1873), pp. 241–42.Google Scholar Nottingham made a similar assessment to Portland on August 27. Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on the Manuscripts of the late Allan George Finch, Esq., ed., Francis Bickley, 4 vols. (London, 1965) 4: 427-28. (hereafter cited as HMC, Finch). Horwitz, , Parliament, ch. 5. Aiken, William A., The Conduct of the Earl of Nottingham (New Haven, 1941).Google Scholar Russell’s correspondence with Nottingham can be followed in HMC, Finch, pp. 427-28. A good account of the descent’s troubles and of the strategy of which it was a part is A. N. Ryan, “William III and the Brest Fleet in the Nine Years’ War,” in William III and Louis XIV: Essays by and for Mark A. Thomson, eds., Hatton, R. M. and Bromley, J. S. (Toronto, 1968), pp. 49–67.Google Scholar A summary of these events is given in Horwitz, , Revolution Politicks: The Career of Daniel Finch, Second Earl of Nottingham, 1647-1730 (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 130–33Google Scholar.
16 P[aul] F[oley] to Robert Harley, September 17, 1692, British Library, Add. MS. 70225 [unfoliated].
17 The course of the debates can be followed in The Parliamentary Diary of Narcissus Luttrell, 1691-1693, ed., Horwitz, Henry (Oxford, 1972), pp. 213–333Google Scholar (hereafter cited as PD). Grey, Anchitell, Debates of the House of Commons from the year 1677 to the year 1694, 10 vols. (London, 1763), 10: 244–65. “Admiral Russell’s Letter to the Earl of Nottingham: Containing an exact and particular Relation of the late happy Victory and Success against the French Heet” (1692), in The Harleian Miscellany: A Collection of Scarce, Curious, and Entertaining Pamphlets and Tracts as well in Manuscript as in Print,Google Scholar eds., Park, T. and Oldys, W., 10 Vols. (London, 1808) 4: 550–53.Google Scholar
18 C[harles] Hatton to Christopher Hatton, September 10, [1692], Correspondence of the Family of Hatton, being chiefly Letters addressed to Christopher First Viscount Hatton, A. D. 1601-1704, ed., Edward Maude Thompson, The Camden Society, vol, 23, ns (London, 1878), 2: 185 [Spelling has been modernized].
19 F[oley] to H[arley], September 17, 1692. B. L„ Add. Ms. 70225.
20 “Admiral Russell’s Answer to Lord Nottingham’s Paper…received from the Admiral’s own hand.” B. L., Harleian MS. 6867, ff. 23-26. The paper is endorsed with Harley’s signature.
21 HMC, Finch, , pp. 348–51. Journals of the House of Commons, 10: 721–22.Google Scholar
22 PD, pp. 221, 223-24. Bodleian Library, Rawlingson MS D1362.
23 Francis Bickley’s introduction to the documents in HMC, Finch, pp. xi-xvii, xxx-xxxvi is more critical of William III and emphasizes the problem of resources for the descent.
24 Moreover, this record omitted correspondence between June 9 and July 24, the period during which Russell had disputed with Nottingham over the number of troops needed for the descent and over the technical problems of attacking St. Malo. For this period the Lords had only Nottingham’s “Narrative” to go on. Historical Manuscripts Commission, Fourteenth Report, Appendix, Part VI, The Manuscripts of the House of Lords, 1692-1693 (London, 1894), p. 213. There is a table of Nottingham’s submission to the Lords in the Leicester County Record Office, HMC, Finch Manuscripts, Naval and Military Papers 29. This file also contains in Nottingham’s hand a “List of Papers delivered to the House of Lords.” Aside from one item relating to a Council of War of March 27, these papers are entirely ex parte Russell, consisting entirely of letters from Russell to Nottingham. Nottingham’s narrative appears to be all he chose to offer in his defense. There is another copy at Nottingham University, The Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland, PwA 1091 (hereafter cited as Portland MS.). Apparently Nottingham was doing his best to keep his case against Russell before the king and queen.
25 Horwitz, , Parliament, p. 108.Google Scholar
26 William III to Heinsius. February 14/24, 1693. Archives ou correspondence inédite de la Maison d’Orange-Nassau, F. J. L. Kramer, ed., Third Series, 3 vols. (Leiden, 1907) 1: 313. Mark. Thomson, A., “Louis XIV and William III, 1689-1697,” in William III and Louis XIV, pp. 30–31Google Scholar.
27 Sunderland to [Portland], June 27, [1693]. Portland MS., PwA 1218. “Memorial by the earl of Sunderland” [June, 1693]. Ibid. PwA 1219.
28 Horwitz, A., Parliament, pp. 115–16.Google Scholar
29 Johnston, J. A., “Parliament and the Protection of Trade, 1689-1694,” Mariner’s Mirror (1971) 57: 399–113Google Scholar. Ehrman, John, The Navy in the War of William 111, 1689-1697 (Cambridge, 1953), p. 502Google Scholar. Horwitz, , Parliament, p. 116.Google Scholar
30 Ibid., p. 118. “That the Turkey fleet was sold is true,/and not a sham:/You may find it out, by searching/as far as Nottingham.” [Dr. Richard Kingston] to Nottingham. August 24, 1693. H.M.C. Transcripts of the HMC, Finch Manuscripts, 1693 (hereafter cited as Transcripts).
31 Horwitz, John, Parliament,, p. 125.Google Scholar
32 The Commons’ investigation into the failures of the Victuallers foundered upon the difficulties understanding their record keeping. Ehrman, Navy, p. 506.
33 C., H.M., The Manuscripts of the House of Lords, ns, 11 vols. (London, reprint 1964)Google Scholar 1: 101 (hereafter cited as Lords MS.).
34 “Correspondence of Sir John Trenchard and the Admirals, 1693.” B. L., Add. MS. 35,855. The inevitable time lag between the reception of this intelligence and its transmission to the fleet accounts for its ineffectiveness.
35 A conclusion persuasively made by Ryan, , “William III and the Brest Fleet,” in William III and Louis XIV, p. 62.Google Scholar
36 Lords MS., pp. 175-76, 95, 100.
37 Ibid., pp. 96-97, 101.
38 Dorset County Record Office, Lane Manuscripts, D. 60/X 4,
39 Plans to convoy the merchants began in December of 1692. On December 18 it was decided to lay before the king weekly reports of the progress and readiness of the convoy. Public Record Office, Admiralty Records, 1/5248 (Orders in Council), entry for December 18. Nottingham to Blathwayt, April 18, 1693. Transcripts. Nottingham to Blathwayt, May 12, 1693. Ibid., Lane MS., D. 60/X 4, entry for May 12. Ibid, entry for May 16.
40 Grey, H.M., Debates, 10: 324 [emphasis added].Google Scholar
41 Ibid., 10: 319-47
42 When naval matters were discussed, Admiral Russell, who replaced the Tory admirals, attended Council meetings regularly before sailing. Trenchard’s minutes (February 8-April 22, 1694). P. R. O., State Papers 32/5, ff. 22, 26, 39, 51, 72, 83, 93, 107 (hereafter cited as S.P.).
43 Quoted in Ehrman, Navy, pp. 521-22. The letter is dated August 6, 1694. Before this time the Council had begun inquiries to marshal supplies to sustain Russell over the winter. Trenchard’s minutes (July 31-August 2, 1694). S. P., 42/3, ff. 74, 76.
44 Davies, G., “The Fall of Harley in 1708,” English Historical Review 66 (1951): 246–54Google Scholar. Holmes, G. S. and Speck, W. A., “The Fall of Harley in 1708 Reconsidered,” English Historical Review 80 (1965): 673–98.Google Scholar Snyder, Henry, “Godolphin and Harley,” Huntington Library Quarterly 30 (1966–67): 241–77Google Scholar. Speck, W. A., The Birth of Britain: A New Nation, 1700-1710 (Oxford, 1994)Google Scholar, ch. 7. These writers attribute Harley’s fall to political infighting rather than problems resulting from the Almanza defeat. A different tack comes from Hill, Brian, Robert Harley: Speaker, Secretary of State and Premier Minister (New Haven, 1988), ch, 8.Google Scholar
45 James Stanhope to Secretary of State Sir Charles Hedges. 14 December 1706. B. L., Add. MS. 61511, f.29. Same to same. 15 January 170[7]. Add. Ms. 61511, f.35. [J. Milner to James Milner] 3 January 1707. Add. Ms. 61510, f.26-26v. Milner was Consul General in Lisbon.
46 It is clear for example that Peterborough undertook his journey into Italy under direct orders from Charles III. Orders dated August 11, 1706. B. L., Add. MS. 61515, ff. 52-53. In addition to Peterborough’s complaints about Charles III and the Emperor, James Stanhope, who followed Peterborough in command in eastern Spain, expressed similar concerns. Peterborough to Marlborough. June 5, 1707. B. L., Add. MS. 61164, f.114-116. Same to same. June 7, 1707. Add. MS. 61164, ff. 118-120. Stanhope to Sunderland. April 27, 1707. Add. MS. 61511, f.59. Same to same. December 30, 1707. Add. MS. 61511, f. 163v. On problems dealing with Charles III and his advisors see Francis, , The First Peninsular War, 1702-1713 (London, 1975), pp. 202, 216.Google Scholar The Emperor also did little to support the British plan to coordinate an attack on Toulon with Savoyard and Imperial forces, sending troops to Naples and Sicily instead.
47 The Blenheim Manuscripts in the British Library contain an account of the Peninsular campaign by a Colonel Pepper. This document also supports Peterborough’s defense of his conduct. A Brief Account of some particular Transactions during the two last Years’ Warr in Spain and Portugal. B. L., Add MS 61515, ff. 95-106. C, H.M.. The Manuscripts of the House of Lords, 1706-1708, NS (London, 1921)Google Scholar 7: 398-406, 453-54, 509, 513 (hereafter cited as Lords). This record also shows that Peterborough was under pressure from London to detach three regiments for service in the aid of the duke of Savoy. Ibid. pp. 367-70.
48 Wollman, David Harris, “Parliament and Foreign Affairs, 1697-1714” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1970), pp. 280–81Google Scholar, n73. The cabinet members also refused to give Peterborough credit for the decision to attack, and eventually capture, Barcelona. He also complained about the state of his forces and the conduct of Henry Ruvigny, earl of Galway, his counterpart in the western command of peninsular operations. Peterborough to Hedges. June 24, 1705. B. L., Add. MS. 61121, f.164-164v. Peterborough to Godolphin. [July?, 1705]. Lords, pp. 500-05. Peterborough to [Marlborough] November 10, 1706. Add. MS. 61164, f.79. Same to Same. February 27, 1707. Add. MS. 61164, f. 86-90.
49 These included charges that his orders gave him insufficient authority to settle problems, including his financial obligations to Charles III, his authority to raise additional funds and the coordination of his command with Galway and the Portuguese. Peterborough to [Hedges]. June 27, 1706. B. L., Add. MS. 61164, ff. 64-70v.
50 Godolphin to Marlborough. August 13, 1706. ed. Snyder, Henry L., The Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1975)Google Scholar, 2: 650. Marlborough to Godolphin. August 21, 1706. Ibid., 2: 655. Same to same. September 2, 1706. Ibid., 2: 663.
51 Marlborough to Godolphin. August 23, 1706, Snyder, Correspondence, 2: 657. Marlborough to Duchess. August 14, 1707. Ibid., 2: 881. Marlborough to Godolphin August 4, 1707. Ibid., 2: 857.
52 Same to same. August 9, 1707. Ibid., 2: 877. It is tempting to speculate that Marlborough negotiated a settlement with Peterborough, whereby the latter would not press a case against the ministry in exchange for the ministry making a minimal attack on his conduct. But no collateral evidence of this has been found. Perhaps Peterborough relied on Marlborough’s support and was disappointed that this support did not gain him access to Queen Anne. Godolphin to Marlborough. August 15, 1707. Ibid. 2: 883 and 883 n.13. Marlborough to Godolphin [August, 1707]. Ibid., 2: 888-89. Same to same. September 4, 1707. Ibid., 2: 903.
53 Peterborough to Robert Harley. 23 August 1707. B. L., Add. MS. 61514, ff. 69-69v. In his letter he states that when the queen receives his statement, he will receive a reception consistent with his services. On Somers’ willingness to promote the Spanish campaign see Sachse, William L., Lord Somers: A Political Portrait (Manchester and Madison, Wise, 1975), pp. 254–58.Google Scholar
54 Same to same. 29 August 1707. Lords, p. 398. Ibid., pp. 394-06.
55 Burnet recorded that Peterborough only generally defended himself before the queen and cabinet and left the major part of his defense to Parliament. Burnet, Gilbert, History of His Own Time, ed., Martin Joseph Routh, 7 vols. (Hildesheim, 1969)Google Scholar, 6: 347-8. But this defense probably took place in correspondence rather than in person.
56 Wollman, Gilbert, “Parliament and Foreign Affairs,” pp. 287–88.Google Scholar My account of the parliamentary session of 1707-1708 is based upon Wollman. See also Speck, Birth of Britain, pp. 129-31, 133. Speck ignores Peterborough’s role and concentrates on the debate over the number of troops present at Almanza. He also ascribes Godolphin’s charge of “treachery” against Harley to Harley’s willingness tc allow Godolphin to be implicated in the shortage of troops. It is more likely that Godolphin expected Harley to continue the support he had shown during negotiations concerning Peterborough that had taken place before the session.
57 Ibid., p. 286.
58 The debates over naval affairs are summarized in Hattendorf, John B., England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and Conduct of Grand Strategy (London and New York, 1987), pp. 214–15.Google Scholar
59 Black, , “Diplomatic Crisis,” pp. 77–78.Google Scholar On August 10 (New Style), Viscount Stair, Ambassador in Paris, wrote to Byng that the lateness of the year shortened the time available for diplomatic negotiations, presumably because it also shortened the ability of the allies to mount a military campaign. Stair to Byng, August 10, 1718. S. P., 78/162, ff. 34-35. On the need for decisive actions, see below.
60 Black, “Diplomatic Crisis,” pp. 88-89.
61 Gibbs, G. C., “Parliament and the Treaty of Quadruple Alliance,” in William ill and Louis XIV, pp. 301–04.Google Scholar
62 Boyer, A., Political State of Great Britain, 60 vols. (1711-1740), 16: 463 (hereafter cited as Boyer).Google Scholar
63 Gibbs, “Quadruple Alliance,” pp. 300-05.
64 Boyer, 16: 477.
65 Gibbs, “Quadruple Alliance,” p. 302.
66 The bill passed the Commons in a committee of the whole 247 to 229. On its final reading it passed 186 to 105 with Walpole voting with the majority. William Cobbett, Parliamentary History of England, 36 vols. (1798), 7: 536-37. In the Lords the opposition gathered 77 votes in favor of amendments against the government’s tallies ranging between 88 and 91. On the final vote the Lords passed the bill 88 to 61. Ibid., 7: 538^8. Gibbs, “Quadruple Alliance,” p. 293. During the wars of William and Anne, the oppressions of a standing army had been commonly ascribed to the tyranny of a “universal monarchy.” Lois Schowerer, “No Standing Armies!” The AntiArmy ideology in Seventeenth Century England (Baltimore and London, 1974).
67 Stanhope to Stair. 17 February 1718. Kent Archives Office, U1590/O145/22. Black, “Diplomatic Crisis,” pp. 79-86.
68 Gibbs, “Quadruple Alliance,” pp. 291-93.
69 Ibid., p. 293.
70 Michael, Wolfgang, England under George I, 2 vols. (London, 1936), 1: 355–56, 380–81. The initial instructions were dated May 26/June 6.Google Scholar
71 Boyer, 16: 155-56, 169.
72 Craggs to Stanhope. 26 July 1718. S. P. 104/138 (Secretary’s Letterbook). Craggs also indicated that Stanhope could gauge Spanish intentions within two weeks’ time.
73 Boyer, 16: 305-14, 328.
74 Boyer, 11: 70; 12: 224.
75 Gibbs, “Quadruple Alliance,” pp. 296-98.
76 Boyer, 15: 223, 237-38. 17: 390. The embargo was imposed with parliamentary support in February of 1716 and lifted in April of 1719.
77 Byng’s account of his conduct is printed in An Account of the Expedition of the British Fleet to Sicily in the years 1718, 1719 and 1720, under the command of Sir G. Byng (London, 1739). Michael, George I, 1: 357-58.
78 Boyer, 16: 213-17. These reports also included further information on commercial grievances against Spain.
79 Pattee Byng’s Journal, ed., Cranmer-Byng, J. L., Navy Records Society (London, 1950), pp. 30–32.Google Scholar
80 Boyer, 16: 150-57.
81 Craggs to Monteleon. September 4, 1718. B. L., Stowe Manuscript 247, ff. 140-12. Printed in Boyer, 16: 212.
82 Examples included a number of memorials of George I to Europe’s crowned heads and addresses to the king from local county associations. Boyer, 12: 200-05; 13: 224; 506-07; 621-22. George I’s biographer also subscribes to this characterization. Hatton, Ragnhild, George I: Elector and King (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), p. 213.Google Scholar
83 In his closing speech to the 1718 session of Parliament George described Alberoni as the “desperate and extravagant projects of one ambitious man,” and referred to “conspiracies and seditious practices” such as Spanish support of the Pretender. Boyer, 17: 435. An Essay Towards the Life of Julius Alberoni, Boyer, 16: 201-10.
84 Boyer, 13: 472-73; B. L., Add. MS. 9132, “Mr. [Horace] Walpole’s Apology,” ff. 87-91. Boyer, 16: 62, 437, 439. Ibid., 12: 202, 203. Letter to a Friend at The Hague (1718). Ibid., 16: 10-11.
85 Boyer, 16: 347-18; A letter to a Friend at the Hague concerning the Danger of Europe, Ibid., 16: 150-57; Ibid., 17: 390. Gibbs, “Quadruple Alliance,” p. 300. Black, “Diplomatic Crisis,” p. 94.
86 A report on the success of Passarowtiz, emphasizing George I’s Mediation is found in Boyer, 16: 49.
87 Gibbs, “Quadruple Alliance,” p. 302.
88 Journals of the House of Lords, 21: 633 (entry of December 19, 1721). In 1730 a similar request was denied. Ibid., 23: 463.
89 Both Whigs and Tories had reasons to endorse the Quadruple Alliance. Gibbs, “Quadruple Alliance,” pp. 303-04.
90 Cobbett, Parliamentary History, 7: 560-65.
91 This point did surface at the time in a pamphlet, Character of an Independent Whig. Boyer, 16: 482. The Journals of the Commons and Lords show no action on a motion for an inquiry and the calendars in The House of Lords Record Office have no mention of any such inquiry.
