1 Compare J. Jackson, world trade and the law of gatt 788 (1969): “In the long run, it may well be the machinery that is most important (i.e., the procedures), rather than the existence of any one or another specific rule of trade conduct.“

2 At numerous intergovernmental conferences during the 1970’s, representatives of developing countries have promoted the cause of increased voting rights for their countries in international economic organizations. At the conference on the establishment of IFAD (see text accompanying note 5 infra) the developing countries, having failed to adopt a one-nation, one-vote system for directing that organization, made a joint declaration stating that they would “continue to fight [for such a system] in all international fora.” Report of the Meeting of International Countries on the Establishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development to the Secretary-General, World Food Council Doc. IFAD/CRP.21, at 10 (February 16, 1976). The “Manila Declaration,” made by the developing countries’ Group of 77 prior to the convening of the UNCTAD IV Conference in Nairobi, included the following statement: “The system of voting in the IMF and World Bank should be reformed so as to accord developing countries greater representation and weight in decision-making in these institutions.” Doc. 77/MM(III)/4a, at 28 (1976).

3 See text accompanying notes 72-83 infra.

4 See Reynolds, , A Common Fund to Finance International Commodity Agreements, 10 L. & Pol’y in Int’l Bus. 887, 893 (1978)Google Scholar. See also text accompanying notes 69-71 infra.

5 See generally T. Weiss & R. Jordan, The World Food Conference and Global Problem Solving (1976). See also text accompanying notes 84-91 infra.

6 See Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, UN Doc. A/RES/3202 (S-VI) 1974, paras. II and IX, reprinted in 13 ILM 720, 726, 731 (1974) (calling for more equitable voting patterns in the World Bank and IMF); Art. 10, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UN Doc. A/RES/3281 (XXIX) 1975, reprinted in 14 id. at 251 (1975) (declaring that all states are “juridically equal and, as equal members of the international community, have the right to participate fully and effectively in the international decision-making process in the solution of world economic, financial and monetary problems, inter alia, through the appropriate international organizations in accordance with their existing and evolving rules …“); UN Doc. A/RES/3362 (X-VII) 1975, reprinted in id. at 1524 (calling for increased participation of developing countries in the decisionmaking processes of international finance and development institutions). See also the preparatory report for the latter resolution, A New United Nations Structure for Global Economic Cooperation, UN Doc. E/AC.62/9, at 56-57 (1975).

7 As used in this article, the term international economic organization includes all organizations of an intergovernmental nature that deal with economic, financial, and monetary relations between nations, or with matters, such as international trade, that directly affect such relations.

The emphasis in this article on international economic organizations is justified, even though the distinction between economic and political institutions is not always clear; indeed, many organizations are both economic and political. Nevertheless, by separating organizations into functional categories, we may analyze institutional responses to what are often similar constraints and pressures. See W. Koo, Oting Procedures in International Political Organizations 23 (1947). It is no coincidence that the decisionmaking processes (including the formal voting structures) of institutions that serve an economic purpose have usually differed from the decisionmaking processes adopted by political (e.g., security) organizations; each responds to distinct sets of forces. Yet, while the general literature on decisionmaking in international political organizations (especially the UN General Assembly) is abundant, there have been few detailed studies on the formal voting procedures of international economic organizations.

8 See H. M. Chung, Decision Making in the IBRD and the ILO: A Comparative Analysis of the Rules and Practices 355 et seq. (Diss., U. Penn. 1970). See also Remarks of Lester Nurick, then Associate General Counsel of the World Bank, in The Effectiveness of International Decisions 366-67 (Schwebel ed. 1971); Gold, The Structure of the Fund, Finance & Dev., June 1979, at 11 [hereinafter cited as Gold, Structure]; J. Gold, Voting and Decisions in the International Monetary Fund 215 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gold, Voting]; J. White, Regional Development Banks: A Study of Institutional Style 55, 154 (1970).

9 See M’Bow, , The Practice of Consensus in International Organizations, 30 Int’l Soc. Sci. J. 893, 895 (1978)Google Scholar. The reluctance to rely on formal votes in weighted voting organizations is explained in McIntyre, , Weighted Voting in International Organizations, 8 Int’l Org. 484, 491 (1954)Google Scholar:

The potent factor of “invisible weighting” which operates under any voting arrangement will always give the states with the major interest influence beyond the limits of their voting power. When this powerful influence fails to achieve substantial agreement, passage of a disputed measure by weighted vote is not very useful in agencies that must depend on governments for implementation of decisions and recommendations, and in organizations that have a greater degree of control [a formal vote] is not likely to seem desirable to the predominant states except as a last resort in the protection of vital interests.

10 Gold, Voting supra note 8, at 216. See also Gold, , Weighted Voting Power: Some Limits and Some Problems, 68 AJIL 687, 702–04 (1974)Google Scholar.

11 See H. Sihermers, 2 International Institutional Law 328 (1972): “Consensus is strongly influenced by the legal rules on voting.“

12 O. Schachter, Sharing the World’s Resources 28-31 (1977).

13 For an explanation of the distinction between recommendatory and task-oriented agencies, see the text accompanying note 95 infra.

14 Compare The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization (Cox & Jacobson eds., 1973). Professors Cox and Jacobson find a “common stratification of influence, with minor variations,” in the organizations included in the study; the predominance of rich Western democracies is evident in all. Id. at 423.

15 Claude, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization 119 (4th ed. 1971); C Alexandrowicz, World Economic Agencies: Law and Practice 277 (1962); W. Koo, supra note 7, at 8, 285. Compare Newcombe, , West, , & Newcombe, , Comparison of Weighted Voting Formulas for the United Nations, 23 World Pol. 452 (1971)Google Scholar: “[T]he main criterion in evaluating a weighted-voting formula is acceptability, not either abstract justice or theoretical reasoning.”

16 I Claude, supra note 15, at 118.

17 Id. at 119; W. Koo, supra note 7, at 4; see also P. Jacob, A. Atherton, & A. Wallenstein, The Dynamics of International Organization 27 (rev. ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as P. Jacob]; C. Riches, Majority Rule in International Organization: A Study of the Trend from Unanimity to Majority Decision 12, 245 (1940).

18 R. Klein, Sovereign Equality Among States: The History of an Idea 1-4, 54 et seq. (1974); E. Dickinson, The Equality of States in International Law 334 (1920).

19 See R. Klein, supra note 18, at 1-4, 166.

20 See, e.g., M’Bow, supra note 9, at 895:

[W]e regard it as only natural at the national level that, in accordance with the principle “one man, one vote,” the richest individual should have the same entitlement to vote in elections as the poorest of the poor… . This fundamental principle of the equality of citizens before the law, which is basic to modern democracy, has its equivalent in the principle of the sovereign equality of States, on which the international community of today is based. Those who sometimes advocate a different system—for example a weighted vote—ignore this reality.

21 See B. Broms, The Doctrine of Equality of States as Applied in International Organizations 19 (Diss., University of Helsinki, 1959).

22 R. Klein, supra note 18, at 10 et. seq.

23 This is especially true in the inter-American system, according to Klein; id. at 39 et seq., 102-08, and 140 et. seq.

24 Id. at 69 et. seq.

25 The preamble to the UN Charter recognizes the “equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” Article 2(1) reads: “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.“

26 See G. Clark & L. Sohn, World Peace Through World Law: Two Alternative Plans (3d ed. 1966); Barrett, & Newcombe, , Weighted Voting in International Organizations, Peace Research Reviews, April 1968 Google Scholar; Manno, , Selective Weighted Voting in the U.N. General Assembly: Rationale and Methods, 20 Int’l Org. 37 (1966)Google Scholar; Newcombe, et at., supra note 15, and works cited therein.

27 Kelsen, , The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization, 53 Yale L.J. 207, 209 (1944)Google Scholar. “Members of the society of nations may be presumed to be equal as a general principle; but when it appears that in certain aspects of legal equality they are organically unequal, it would seem that the law must either take cognizance of the facts or else admit its unreality.” Id. at 211-12.

28 In democratic societies, individual rights and duties, including human equality, rate highest priority, just as individuals form the basic decisionmaking units of society. In the international sphere, the basic decisionmaking unit, the nation, is a group of individuals, and to ensure human equality, one must accord more weight to a large group (populous nation) than to a small one. Thus, “the principle of human equality leads automatically and logically to the principle of state inequality.” Barrett & Newcombe, supra note 26, at 5. Of course, this does not explain why states with similar populations should exercise different voting power because one is wealthier, or stronger, or more productive, or a greater consumer, than the other. The reason for such distinctions has nothing to do with philosophical values; rather, it lies in the gradual realization—a realization that coincided with the growth and increasing influence of international organizations—that such distinctions were necessary because without them world government would not function. Compare R. Klein, supra note 18, at p. 7; E. Dickinson, supra note 18, at 334-35.

29 Broms, supra note 21, at 80-81; C. RICHES, supra note 17, at 19 et. seq. In the course of drafting the Covenant of the League of Nations, the British delegate, Lord Robert Cecil, declared that “all international decisions must by the nature of things be unanimous.” Id. at 11.

30 The rule of unanimity is still applied, either exclusively or partially, in a number of organizations of limited membership, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (North Atlantic Treaty, Art. 10); the League of Arab States (Pact of the League of Arab States, Arts. 6 and 7); the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) (Comecon Charter, Art. IV(3)); the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (EFTA Convention, Art. 32(5)); the Council of Europe (Statute of the Council of Europe, Art. 20(a)); and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (OECD Convention, Art. 6). See also J. Plano & R. Riggs, Forging World Order: The Politics of International Organization 138-39 (1967); H. Schermers, supra note 11, at 328.

A vestige of the rule of unanimity remains in many economic organizations, where decisions are made by consensus, without resort to a formal vote. See text accompanying notes 95-100 infra. Consensus is a type of informal unanimity since a single dissenter can force a showdown vote. However, in comparison with the formal rule of unanimity, consensus is not obstructive in international organizations because members agree on the general and/or specific goals of the organization, and the formal voting rules are structured so as to protect vital interests of members in case consensus breaks down and a formal vote is called for.

31 See Sohn, , Voting Procedures in U.N. Conferences for the Codification of International Law, 69 AJIL 310 (1975)Google Scholar; Vignes, , Will the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea Work According to the Consensus Rule﹜, 69 AJIL 119 (1975)Google Scholar.

32 McIntyre, supra note 9, at 485-86; C. Riches, supra note 17, at 245-90; Broms, supra note 21, at 277-78. See also D. W. Bowett, The Law of International Institutions 357-58 (3d ed. 1975); Jenks, , Unanimity, The Veto, Weighted Voting, Special and Simple Majorities, and Consensus as Modes of Decision in International Organizations, Cambridge Essays in International Law 48, 52 (1965)Google Scholar. The earliest international organization to employ weighted voting appears to have been the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine (established in 1804), which used weighted voting in choosing its chief inspector. C. Riches, supra note 17, at 167-70. Some of these organizations, such as the International Institute of Agriculture, divided members into several classes, according to financial contribution; states were at liberty to choose their class and level of contribution, and thus their level of voting power. Id. at 50-58; McIntyre, supra note 9, at 486.

33 See C. Riches, supra note 17, at 104-05, 234-35.

34 Id. at 104-05, 228-29.

35 As established, the League of Nations was to decide important questions according to unanimity. In practice, decisions were increasingly made according to procedures allowing majority rule. Id. at 19-21.

36 ILO Const., Art. 7.

37 C. Riches, supra note 17, at 149.

38 By a resolution dated June 20, 1979, the Executive Directors of the World Bank voted, in conjunction with a general increase in the bank’s capital, to increase to 500 the number of basic votes available to member states. None of the new shares distributed as basic shares will require newly paid-in capital.

39 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [hereinafter cited as World Bank], Articles of Agreement, Art. V, sec. 3. IMF Articles of Agreement, Art. XIII, sec. 5.

The voting structures of World Bank affiliates, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the International Development Association (IDA), are similar to the World Bank structure. IFC Articles of Agreement, Art. IV, sec. 3; IDA Articles of Agreement, Art. VI, sec. 3 (500 basic votes plus one vote for each $5,000 subscription).

In contrast to several early international organizations, which had allowed members to choose their levels of contributions and, thus, determine their relative voting power, the IMF and World Bank made relative voting power a function of relative economic strength. The IMF developed a mathematical formula based on several factors to determine relative economic strength, and then simply allocated quotas according to this formula. See McIntyre, supra note 9, at 484. The World Bank, whose members must belong to the IMF, uses the IMF weighting system to determine relative contributions to its capital and, thus, relative voting power.

40 World Bank, 1979 Annual Report 160-61; IMF, Annual Report 1978, at 142-44.

41 This exclusion was the result of a conscious decision by the African countries to escape the political influence and interference of the developed countries. J. White, supra note 8, at 91-96, 140-50. The AfDB has recently begun negotiations to admit nonregional developed countries for the first time. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs, Appropriations for 1980: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and Related Programs of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., at 172 (1979). The lack of developed country membership adversely affected the AfDB’s ability to raise private capital, either through bond sales or private placements. As a result, the AfDB established in 1973 the African Development Fund with developed country membership, as a vehicle for increased developed country contributions to the AfDB aid program. According to the Fund Agreement, the AfDB members received 1,000 votes, or half of the total votes in the fund, and the developed countries (“State participants“) receive the other 1,000 votes. Each group elects six members to the Board of Directors. The developed countries’ votes are allocated in proportion to each country’s contribution to the fund. However, in a departure from the common system of weighted voting in international financial institutions, the six African directors of the fund (elected from among the nine directors of the AfDB) share equal voting power (166 2/3 votes per director). Afrcan Development Fund, Articles of Agreement, 510 UNTS 3, Art. 29. See also U.S. Sen. Rep. No. 673, 94th Cong., 2d Sess, at 22-23 (1976).

The acceptance of such a system of voting, which tends to minimize the importance of relative financial contributions, may be attributed to two factors: the relatively minor contribution and interest of the developed countries in a fund that will not greatly affect their economies and aid programs, and the even more minor contribution of the African members, none of whom were called upon to contribute funds separate from their existing contributions to the AfDB.

42 On the regional development banks generally, see J. White, supra note 8, passim; J. Syz, International Development Banks (1974); P.-W. Huang, Jr., The Asian Development Bank: Diplomacy and Development in Asia (1975).

43 J. White, supra note 8, at 54. See also J. SYZ, supra note 42, at 34.

44 Unlike the other agreements, which accord a set number of basic votes to each member, the ADB Agreement refers to a percentage figure, 20%. 571 UNTS 123, Art. 33(1)(i). Thus, even as capital subscriptions increase, the basic vote will increase.

45 See note 41 supra.

46 Thus, the ADB most closely resembles the World Bank in its lending operations and policies. J. Syz, supra note 42, at 27.

47 B . Gosovic, UNCTAD: Conflict and Compromise 53, 57 (1972). On the ITO generally, see J. Jackson, supra note 1, at 35; K. Dam, The Gatt: Law and International Economic Organization 10 (1970).

48 See generally J. Jackson, supra note 1, at 49-53.

49 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. XXV(3) and (4). Most decisions are taken by the Contracting Parties, i.e., the GATT members acting in general assembly. In 1959, the Contracting Parties established, an executive body, the GATT Council, to deal with the increasing number of trade decisions without having to convene a meeting of all contracting parties. The voting procedures of the Council mirror those of the Contracting Parties: all votes are counted equally, and all decisions require the same majority required for action by the Contracting Parties. J. Jackson, supra note 1, at 154 et. seq.

50 These include Article I (most-favored-nation treatment); and Article II (and related tariff schedules), which embodies the GATT system of bound tariffs.

51 Art. XXX.

52 J. Jackson, supra note 1, at 73, 81.

53 Id. at 669.

54 Id. at 123, 126-28. See also J. Jackson, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations 411 (1977).

55 B. Gosovic, supra note 47, at 3-27.

56 UNCTAD now has 154 members: 29 developed countries, 9 socialist countries, and 116 developing countries.

57 Procedural matters are subject to a simple majority vote. See paragraph 24 of the UNCTAD Charter, contained in UN Doc. A/RES/1995 (XIX) 1964.

Day-to-day operations are conducted by an executive body, the Trade and Development. Board, which consists of 68 members elected at each conference. A gentleman’s agreement assures that the largest states are always represented on the board and on UNCTAD’s substantive committees. Nye, UNCTAD: Poor Nations’ Pressure Group, in Cox & Jacobson, supra note 14, at 340. All decisions of the board are by a simple majority.

58 For a detailed description of bloc voting, see Nye, supra note 57, at 355-57.

59 B. Gosovic, supra note 47, at 56. See also H. Schermers, supra note 11, at 326-27; Nye, supra note 57, at 336.

60 B. Gosovic, supra note 47, at 319, 324-26.

61 Id. at 207. H. Schermers, supra note 11, at 327.

62 This article focuses on the four oldest, and most active, commodity schemes. The voting structures of other commodity organizations closely resemble those described in the text. International cartel agreements, such as OPEC, have only producing countries as members and are not considered in detail in this study. On international commodity agreements generally, see P. Reynolds, International Commodity Agreements and the Common Fund (1978); A. Law, International Commodity Agreements (1975); J. Rowe, Primary Commodities in International Trade (1965); Comment, , United Stales and International Commodity Accords: Cocoa, Coffee, Tin, Sugar and Grain, 9 L. & Pol’y in Int’l Bus. 553 (1977)Google Scholar.

63 International Coffee Agreement of 1976, Art. 15(1).

64 M. Van Meerhaeghe, International Economic Institutions 161 (2d ed. 1971).

65 EEC Treaty, 294 UNTS 23, Art. 148. The Secretariat of the European Communities is managed by the European Commission, consisting of 14 commissioners chosen by the Council. The Commission does not employ weighted voting; however, its powers are largely recommendatory or concerned with implementation. On EEC voting, see R. Lauwaars, Lawfulness and Legal Force of Community Decisions 127(1973); D. Greig, International Law 557 (1970); D. W. Bowett, supra note 32, at 361-62; McIntyre, supra note 9, at 488.

66 1977 figures, from 1978 World Bank Atlas at 29.

67 R. Lauwaars, supra note 65, at 127.

68 See, e.g., Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association, Jan. 4, 1960, Art. 32(5) (decisions and recommendations of the Council by unanimous vote); Montevideo Treaty establishing the Latin American Free Trade Association, Feb. 18, 1960, Art. 38 (decisions by affirmative votes of two-thirds of contracting parties, provided no negative vote is cast).

69 On the Common Fund generally, see P. Reynolds, supra note 62, at 109 et seq.

70 See id. at 893. See also Erb, & Fisher, , U.S. Commodity Policy: What Response to Third World Initiatives?, 9 L. & Pol’y in Int’l Bus. 479, 500 (1977)Google Scholar.

71 See, The Common Fund: Development, Mechanics and Forecasts, 11 L. & Pol. in Int’l Bus. 1193, 1203(1979).

72 See Note, , Procedure and Techniques of Multinational Negotiation: The LOS III Model, 17 Va. J. Int’l L. 217, 226 (1977)Google Scholar; Adede, , Law of the Sea—Developing Countries’ Contributions to the Development of the Institutional Arrangements for the International Sea-Bed Authority, 4 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 1 (1977)Google Scholar.

73 Even the procedures to be used in voting on the final text of the treaty were sources of dispute. See Note, supra note 72, at 233 et. seq. According to the author, the negotiation of issues in blocs of special interest groups—a variation on the UNCTAD theme—has tended to solidify group positions and delay agreement. Id. at 227-31.

74 Adede, supra note 72, at 11-12. See abo Knight, , Issues before the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 34 La. L. Rev. 155, 171 (1974)Google Scholar.

75 See Remarks of U.S. Ambassador Elliott Richardson, Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference, in Law of the Sea Conference Status Report: Summer 1978: Hearing before the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 House Hearing]. See also Adede, supra note 72, at 39-40.

76 Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Seventh Session of UNCLOS III, in 1978 House Hearing, supra note 75, at 33.

77 See ICNT/Rev.1 Art. 161(1), reprinted in 18 ILM 686, 746 (1979). The groups are, in broad terms: technologically advanced (4 members); major importers of minerals to be exploited (4 members); major exporters of the same (4 members); developing countries with special interests (6 members); and 18 members selected according to equitable geographical distribution.

78 ICNT/Rev.1 Art. 161(6) and (7).

79 Remarks of Ambassador Richardson in 1978 House Hearing, supra note 75, at 5.

80 Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Seventh Session of UNCLOS III, in id. at 33, 55.

81 Adede, supra note 72, at 38.

82 The eighth session of UNCLOS III saw little progress on the question of blocking power. The discussion has shifted to consideration of a two-thirds majority requirement, with a possible veto if a certain number of Council members cast negative votes. Developed countries favor blocking by a small coalition of negative votes, while developing countries would weaken the blocking power by requiring a larger coalition. Oxman, , The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Eighth Session (1979), 74 AJIL 1, 16 (1980)Google Scholar.

83 ICNT/Rev.1 Art. 153.

84 The World Food Problem: Proposals for National and International Action, UN Doc. E/CONF.65/4, at 225-31 (1974). For a full discussion of the World Food Conference and its background, see T. Weiss & R. Jordan, supra note 5.

85 T. Weiss & R. Jordan, supra note 5, at 26, 59-61.

86 Agreement Establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development, adopted June 13, 1976, UN Doc. IFAD/1, Art. 6, sees. (3) and (6) (1977).

87 Total pledges to IFAD were as follows (in U.S. dollars): Category I, $567,316,017; Category II, $435,500,000; and Category III, $8,960,000. IFAD, The International Fund for Agricultural Development (1977).

88 Report of the Meeting of Interested Countries on the Establishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development on the Work of its Second Session, World Food Council Doc. IFAD/CRP.11, at 2 (November 10, 1975).

89 IFAD Agreement, Art. 6, sec. 3(a). The voting systems chosen by the three categories, as contained in Schedule II to the IFAD Agreement, are as follows:

Category I (developed countries): 17.5% of the votes are distributed equally, the remaining 82.5% in direct proportion to each member’s contributions to IFAD. The United States holds approximately one-third of the Category I votes, or 12% of the IFAD total votes. The United States, Canada, West Germany, and Japan hold a majority of the voting power in Category I. Category 11 (OPEC): 25% of the 600 votes are equally distributed to the members of Category II. The remaining 75% is distributed in proportion to the contributions of each member. This system gives Iran and Saudi Arabia each slightly less than 25% of the total Category II votes, the other votes being relatively equally distributed among the remaining 10 OPEC countries.

Category II (developing countries): The 600 votes are distributed equally among all members of this category.

90 IFAD Agreement, Art. 6, sees. 2(a) and 5(f).

91 IFAD Agreement, Arts. 3(3), 4(3), 6(2)(f), 6(8), 6(9), 6(10), 7(1)(3), 8(1), 9(2), 9(4), and 12(b).

92 OPEC, Annual Review and Record 1976, at 56.

93 Agreement Establishing the OPEC Special Fund, Jan. 28, 1976, Art. 5, sec. 5.08.

94 Id., Arts. 5, 7, 8, and 10.

95 Different authors use different terms for the two categories. See, e.g., W. Koo, supra note 7, at 5, 7 (“consultative” v. “action” agencies); Cox & Jacobson, supra note 14, at 5-6 (“forum“ v. “service” organizations); Chung, supra note 8, passim (“political” v. “functionally oriented“ organizations).

96 In one study of 80 governmental organizations (including national, regional, and international organizations), the author found that those organizations which dispose of issues vital to their members are the most likely to have stringent voting requirements, weighted voting, and a high incidence of special majorities with high majority requirements. L. Randolph, The Fundamental Laws of Governmental Organizations 121 (1971)

97 Chung, supra note 8, at 222, 351. On the lack of formal voting in the IMF, see Gold, Voting, supra note 8, at 215; and Gold, Structure, supra note 8, at 11.

98 See, e.g., sec. 10, By-Laws of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (as amended through July 8, 1974).

99 Chung, supra note 8, at 369-72, 404-05.

100 J. Plano & R. Riggs, supra note 30, at 139. See also Schachter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation, in Schwebel, supra note 8, at 12.

101 P. Jacob, supra note 17, at 366. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) does not employ a weighted voting system, but instead guarantees disproportionate, but nevertheless minority, representation on its Governing Council to developed country members of the United Nations. The failure to provide for weighted voting may be one of the reasons the UNDP has had difficulty gaining financial support from developed countries for capital investment projects. D. W. Bowett, supra note 32, at 58; Moulton, , On Concealed Dimensions of Third World Involvement in International Economic Organizations, 32 Int’l Org. 1019, 1033 (1978)Google Scholar.

102 In 1976, a panel of trade experts recommended important institutional reforms to the international trade system. They proposed the creation of a World Trade Organization (WTO), an umbrella organization that would promote the development of binding, substantive “subcodes” to be separately adhered to by WTO members. The panel recommended that the organization abandon the GATT rule of equality in favor of a weighted voting structure, but one weighted according to “non-power characteristics” (population, geographical balance) as well as “economic contribution and importance.” ASIL, Re-Making the System of World Trade: A Proposal for Institutional Reform 27 (Studies in Transnational Legal Policy No. 12, 1976).

103 See E. Luard, International Agencies: The Emerging Framework of Interdependence 318 (1977).

104 The GATT is the exception that proves the rule: trade matters, too important to be left to majority voting, are negotiated by the members, as explained above.

The industrialized nations are relatively unaffected by the policies of international economic organizations. The organizations may fit into the overall foreign economic policies of these nations; but if faced with a serious economic problem, they tend to solve it unilaterally, or bilaterally through ad hoc negotiations with other developed countries. The developing countries, more dependent on these organizations for aid in solving economic problems, submit themselves to decisions arrived at by a consensus greatly influenced by the developed countries.

105 See text accompanying notes 152-155 infra.

106 See McIntyre, supra note 9, at 492.

107 Randolph, supra note 96, at 43.

108 See text accompanying notes 149-151 infra.

109 See D. W. Bowett, supra note 32, at 362. Compare Broms, supra note 21, at 284-85.

100 Jenks, supra note 32, at 53. See also J. Plano & R. Rices, supra note 30, at 138: “weighted voting is most common where the weighting principle can be tied to a single measurable criterion directly related to the primary function of the organization.“

111 L. Randolph, supra note 96, at 104.

112 See, e.g., the extension of the IMF weighted voting formula to the Special Drawing Account created in 1964, discussed in Gold, Weighted Voting Power, supra note 10, at 688.

113 P. Jessup, A. Lande, & O. Lissitzyn, International Regulation of Economic and Social Questions 46 (1955).

114 Gold, Weighted Voting Power, supra note 10, at 688.

115 See note 38 supra.

116 On majority requirements generally, see H. Schermers, supra note 11, at 337-58.

117 In the past, the United States Department of State has favored equal voting, with special (high) majority requirements, rather than complicated weighted voting for many recommendatory organizations. McIntyre, supra note 9, at 490-91.

118 In analyzing majority requirements, one must also consider the quorum requirements for meetings in which decisions are made, since quorum requirements may affect the degree of stringency of the majority requirement. L. RANDOLPH, supra note 96, at 51-56. For example, a “strict” majority requirement of 80% of the members present and voting would in fact be a lenient requirement, if a relatively small proportion of the total membership could constitute a quorum. In general, quorum requirements serve to prevent decisions by a minority of the membership. In addition, in weighted voting organizations, the quorum requirement serves to ensure the presence of members with large votes. In fact, the Randolph study found that, in general, a greater stringency in quorum requirements existed in weighted than in nonweighted voting groups. Id. at 99-100.

119 Gold, Weighted Voting Power, supra note 10, at 689-90.

120 L. Randolph, supra note 96, at 53, and table 6 at 150.

121 Id. at 94-98.

122 D. W. Bowett, supra note 32, at 362.

123 Jenks, supra note 32, at 54-55. See also D. Greig, supra note 65, at 55.

124 L. Randolph, supra note 96, at 103.

125 Id. at 102.

126 Rarely have the unanimity requirements of the IMF, which apply to certain amendments and to the suspension of certain operations, been tested. See Gold, Weighted Voting Power, supra note 10, at 689-94:

127 Gold, Structure, supra note 8, at 12.

128 See the discussion of bloc voting at text accompanying notes 141-145 infra.

129 Jenks, supra note 32, at 57-58

130 Gold, Voting, supra note 8, at 213. The Second Amendment of the IMF Agreement added a provision (Art. XII, sec. 1) under which, by a majority vote of 85% of the total voting power, a third organ, the Council, could be established, with powers delegated by the Board of Governors. Placed in the IMF structure between the Executive Board and the Board of Governors, the Council is to combine the advantages of continuous session and detailed knowledge of the Fund, like the Executive Board, with the political power of the Board of Governors. The Council has not been formed, owing to a fear that its political nature would be misused; instead, an “Interim Committee” has taken its place. See Gold, Structure, supra note 8, at 13-15.

131 Cox & Jacobson, supra note 14, at 375.

132 Chung, supra note 8, at 155, 356.

133 ILO Const. Art. 7. See Barrett & Newcombe, supra note 26, at 40, for a discussion of the factors used to determine chief industrial importance.

134 D. W. Bowett, supra note 32, at 116-121, 356-62; P. Jacob, supra note 17, at 25-26; C. Alexandrowicz, supra note 15, at 285-86; I. Claude, supra note 15, at 133.

135 See note 77 supra, and accompanying text.

136 D. W. Bowett, supra note 32, at 118-19.

137 An exception formerly existed in the IMF Articles, which expressly provided for the election of 2 Executive Directors by the American republics not entitled to appoint directors. GOLD, VOTING, supra note 8, at 61. Under the Second Amendment to the IMF Articles, the specific reservation of directors to the American republics was stricken, although in practice these countries still elect 3 members to the 20-member Executive Board. IMF Articles of Agreement, Art. XII, sec. 3(b).

138 R. Klein, supra note 18, at 8-9.

139 A few countries supported equal voting for the Asian and African Development Banks, but this was never seriously considered. J. White, supra note 8, at 95.

140 Arab Monetary Fund Loan Operations begin with Payments Assistance for Five Members, 8 Imf Survey 249-50 (Aug. 20, 1979). The two largest contributors, Saudi Arabia and Algeria, together hold 25% of the total votes.

141 See P. Jacob, supra note 17, at 30-32.

142 B. Gosovic, supra note 47, at 324.

143 The assigning of seats on the Council of the International Seabed Authority to special interest groups is another example of a functional, rather than political, approach to decisionmaking. See note 77 supra, and accompanying text.

144 Walter, , UNCTAD: Intervener between Poor and Rich States, 7 J. World Trade L. 527, 546 (1973)Google Scholar.

145 Note, supra note 72, at 227-31.

146 For instance, in 1966 the UN General Assembly, by a majority vote of the developing countries, established a new lending facility, the UN Capital Development Fund, to be controlled by those countries. The fund failed, in part because developed countries withheld financial support because of the proposed voting structure. I. Claude, supra note 15, at 133-34; Barrett & Newcombe, supra note 26, at 80-82.

147 See E. Luard, supra note 103, at 234, 253-55, 293.

148 A discussion of this- point, using India’s experience with the World Bank, can be found in Moulton, supra note 101, at 1019. According to the author, “ostensibly Western-dominated international economic organizations have the potential to form symbiotic linkages with ‘dependent’ governments, either through shared values and orientations or through shared institutional interests.” Id. at 1035.

149 Oxman, , Institutional Arrangements and the Law of the Sea, 10 Law. Americas 687, 710 (1978)Google Scholar.

150 Broms, supra note 21, at 279.

151 C. Riches, supra note 17, at 289 (emphasis added).

152 As evidence of this, the author relates that the World Bank’s general capital increase in 1959 was “rubber-stamped” by the general membership after management and a few major stockholders decided on the increase. Chung, supra note, 8, at 163—64.

153 Id. at 404-05.

154 Id. at 222, 351. Accord, P. JACOB, supra note 17, at 391.

155 J. White, supra note 8, at 11-13. .

156 Id. at 18 (emphasis added).

157 See Jeker, , Voting Rights of Less Developed Countries in the IMF, 12 J. World Trade L. 218, 222–23 (1978)Google Scholar.