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⁴ The point is also made by Merkl, Peter H., “The Study of European Political Development,” World Politics, XXIX (April 1977), 462–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ See, for instance, Overholt, William H., “An Organizational Conflict Theory of Revolution,” American Behavioral Scientist, XX (March/April 1977), 493–520CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ See, for instance, Schwartz, John E., “The Scottish National Party: Nonviolent Separatism and Theories of Violence,” World Politics, XXII (July 1970), 496–517CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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¹¹ For example, Eckstein, Harry, “On the Etiology of Internal Wars,” History and Theory, iv (No. 2, 1965), 133–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tilly, Charles, “Does Modernization Breed Revolution?” Comparative Politics, v (April 1973), 425–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bienen, Henry, Violence and Social Change: A Review of Current Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1968)Google Scholar; and Useem, Michael, Protest Movements in America (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1975)Google Scholar. But see Oberschall, Anthony, Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1973)Google Scholar, Halebsky, Sandor, Mass Society and Political Conflict: Towards a Reconstruction of Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1976)Google Scholar; and, most important, Tilly (fn. 3).

¹² This method will be recognized by those familiar with Garrison's, William A.The Strategy of Social Protest (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press 1975)Google Scholar on which it is loosely modeled, although it does not resort to the formal sampling and coding procedures which he employed. Garrison followed groups forward, with the advantage that outcomes varied; I have looked backward from events, with the advantage of maximizing the number of well-researched cases in which the outcome I am interested in (collective political activity) actually occurred.

¹³ The following 58 cases were studied: Belgium: Collective expressions of Flemish and of Walloon nationalism in the 1960's. Canada: The rise of the CCF; the rise of Quebec separatism. Ceylon: Sinhalese anti-Tamil riots, 1956. China: The Red Guards. Cuba: The Revolution. Dominican Republic: The 1965 revolt. England: The Peasant Revolt of 1381 (Wat Tyler); Wilkes and Liberty (1760s and 1770s); The Gordon Riots (1780); Reform (1830s). France: Jacqueries; The Revolution of 1789; Vendée Counterrevolution (1793); July 1830; February 1848; June 1848; 1870; Poujadist Movement (1950s); student uprising of May 1968. Germany: The revolutions of 1848 and 1918; the rise of the Nazis in the late 1920s; East German revolt of June 1953; the NPD (1966–1971). Hungary: 1956. Italy: The revolution of 1848 and its aftermath; worker and peasant protests 1880–1900; the Fascist movement 1920–1922; upsurge of the neo-Fascists 1970–1973. Japan: Sokagakkai, 1960s. Korea: Student revolt of 1960. Malaysia: Communal riots of 1969. Mexico: The revolution in Morelos, 1909–1920; the revolt of Primo Tapia; the protest of the peons, 1976. Northern Ireland: The civil rights movement of 1968; the response of the Ultras. Pakistan: The 1977 riots. Russia: The Pugachev uprising, 1773–1775; the revolutions of March and October 1917. Scotland: The Scottish National Party, 1967. Spain: The Basque Nationalist revival (1960s); Catalan nationalism (1970s). Switzerland: The autonomist movement in the Jura after 1950. Turkey: The student uprising of 1960. United States: Shays' Rebellion (1786–1787); the Whiskey Rebellion (1794); Dorr's Rebellion (1842); the temperance movement (1870–1933); the Townsend movement (1930s); the civil rights movement (c. 1945 to date); the anti-Vietnam War movement (1965–1973); the women's rights movement (1961). A list of the sources used is available from the author. Some of the cases chosen are at the borderline of the category “collective political activity.” I refer to the movement-parties of the radical right and of major ethnic subdivisions of a society (e.g., the NPD, the Poujadists, the Quebec separatists, the Scottish Nationalists). Each of these are challenging political parties that have mobilized numbers of people to provide fresh competition to the long-standing major parties. They have not necessarily depended on public demonstrations and other obvious forms of collective expression, but their electoral activities have often taken on a more intense and committed character than the routine ones of more established parties. Since the activists of these parties represent a relatively small group, they might as easily be excluded as included in the category of collective political activities—but so might the French Revolution of 1830 in which only .01% of the population participated. (See James Rule and Charles Tilly, “1830 and the Unnatural History of Revolution,” Journal of Social Issues, xxvm [No. 1, 1972], 49–76.) Nevertheless they appear, upon examination, to have many of the same characteristics of more overt rebellions; they differ primarily in their adherence to conventional forms of expression, reflecting both their minority status and the openness of the regimes they face. Unlike the fringe groups that often surround them, they demand an investment of time and other resources from established members of their respective communities and organizations. Indeed, that is presumably true of all popularly based and publicly active political parties, especially in their early years, as well as of such broad-based interest groups as the Anti-Saloon League and the NAACP.

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²⁷ Relatively spontaneous uprisings, by blurring the distinction between motives and decisions to act, help to make threat seem as common a trigger of collective political activity as opportunity. These mobilizations often begin with very diffuse goals and develop more explicit political targets as their initial successes create opportunities to do so. In this way, they represent highly condensed life histories of organization, being aroused by a perceived threat, growing and acting with opportunity, then perhaps congealing into a formal organization designed to defend what has been achieved rather than to incur new risks (except, perhaps, through previously agreed means). (Wilson's only important organizational omission is the revolutionary organization and others like it, which have the taking of certain opportunities written into their charters, so to speak. While even these may become conservative in practice, they will always be vulnerable to demands that they live up to their own rhetoric. That, perhaps, is why even the most sophisticated of non-Communist politicians and commentators may remain ill at ease with the domestication of the French and Italian Communist Parties.)

²⁸ Cf. Von Eschen, Donald, Kirk, Jerome, and Pinard, Maurice, “The Organizational Substructure of Disorderly Politics,” Social Forces, II (June 1971), 529–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Charles Tilly, “Revolutions and Collective Violence,” in Greenstein and Polsby (fn. 8), III: Macropolitical Theory.

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⁶¹ If one feels the need for a comprehensive abstract picture of social action, one based on voluntaristic assumptions and emphasizing choice would be more suited to the approach favored in this discussion (for instance, Etzioni, fn. 3). A less pretentious, rather hard-nosed presentation of an approach emphasizing concrete choices based on rationally weighed material interests may be found in Leites, Nathan and Wolf, Charles Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham 1970)Google Scholar. An excellent overview of these issues may be found in Oberschall (fn. 11).

⁶² See, for example, Emerson, Rupert, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self- Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Boston: Beacon 1960)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Garrison (fn. 12); Hibbs (fn. 50), and “Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 70 (December 1976), 1033–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Migdal, Joel S., Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures toward Political and Social Change in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974)Google Scholar; Muller, Edward N., “A Text of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 66 (September 1972), 928–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Paige (fn. 10); Shannon, Fred A., American Farmers' Movements (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1957)Google Scholar; Shorter and Tilly (fn. 2); Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly (fn. 2); Jenkins and Perrow (fn. 46); and Wolf, Eric R., Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper & Row, 1969)Google Scholar.

⁶³ Among the exceptions are Gamson (fn. 12); Shorter and Tilly (fn. 2); and Dennis A. Kavanagh, “Crisis Management and Incremental Adaptation in British Politics: The 1931 Crisis of the British Party System,” in Almond and others (fn. 2), 152–223.

⁶⁴ See Waterman (fn. 3).

⁶⁵ Portes, Alejandro and Walton, John, Urban Latin America: The Political Condition from Above and Below (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976)Google Scholar, chap. 3, as reported in Peeler, John A., “Urbanization and Politics,” Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, VI (No. 062, 1977), 9Google Scholar.