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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
Decentralization is widely advocated as a means of alleviating the perceived central stultification of modern nation-states, especially those lacking federal constitutional structures. The experience of a separate administrative and decision-making structure in Northern Ireland is examined in an effort to gain an insight into the advantages and weaknesses of decentralization in practice.
1 Burke, “A Vindication of Natural Society” (1752); in Worlds and Correspondence (London 1952), II, 541.
2 Jefferson, Thomas, Autobiography (New York: Capricorn 1959), 92Google Scholar. A good general account of American feelings on this issue is given by Huntington, Samuel, “The Founding Fathers and the Division of Powers,” in Maass, Arthur, ed., Area and Power (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1959), 150–205Google Scholar.
3 I explore this issue in greater detail in “The Practical Significance of Decentralization,” Journal of Politics, XXXVI (November 1974), 958–82.
4 For an argument in favor of the first premise, see Kochen, Manfred and Deutsch, Karl W., “Toward a Rational Theory of Decentralization,” American Political Science Review, LXIII (September 1969), 734–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For the second, see Vincent Ostrom, “Can Federalism Make a Difference?” (unpub. paper prepared for delivery at “Towards '76, A Conference on Federal Democracy in the United States,” 1972). For the third, see Crozier, Michael, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (University of Chicago Press 1964), 198–208Google Scholar.
5 Figures computed by author. Any of a number of indices—increased volatility, declining respect for party leadership, rise of third parties—could have been used.
6 Great Britain, Royal Commission on the Constitution, Research Paper No. 7: “Devolution and Other Aspects of Government: An Attitudes Survey” (London: H.M.S.O. 1973), 16–23.
7 This is the opinion of the Economist (July 6, 1974), 15–16. A perusal of its recent editorials reveals the previously mentioned apocalyptic tone of political debate. For a similar theme from the left, see Johnson, Paul, “Whom the Gods Wish to Destroy,” New Statesman, Vol. 88 (June 14, 1974), 823–24Google Scholar.
8 Welsh nationalists have attempted to use the issue of water for a similar transformation in outlook; Liverpool and much of the Midlands use water from Wales. See Ryder, Chris, “… And Will England Pay for Welsh Rain?” Times (London), May 19, 1974Google Scholar. So far, however, the nature of the two liquids has tended to keep Welsh enthusiasm at a lower level than Scottish.
9 For an account of general developments in Belgium, see Heisler, Martin O., “Institutionalizing Societal Cleavages in a Cooptive Polity: The Growing Importance of the Output-side in Belgium,” in Heisler, ed., Politics in Europe (New York: McKay 1974). 178–220Google Scholar.
10 For examples, see Nicholson, Max, The System (London: Hodder and Stoughton 1967)Google Scholar; and Paton, H. J., The Claim of Scotland (London: Allen and Unwin 1968), 261Google Scholar.
11 Cf. Wallace, Martin, Northern Ireland: 50 Years of Self-Government (Newton Abbot: David and Charles 1972), 82–86Google Scholar.
12 Great Britain, Hansard (November 13, 1972), col. 46. In general, see Great Britain, Royal Commission on the Constitution, “Minutes of Evidence, Vol. III: Northern Ireland” (London: H.M.S.O. 1971), and “Written Evidence, Vol. VI: Northern Ireland” (London: H.M.S.O. 1972).
13 Mansergh, The Government of Northern Ireland (London: Allen and Unwin 1936), 49.
14 Furniss (fn. 3), 962.
15 This point is well made by Thomas Wilson in an excellent memorandum to the Royal Commission, “Regional Government (with Special Reference to Northern Ireland),” in “Written Evidence” (fn. 12), 73–74.
16 The recommendation of, for example, the Northern Ireland Labour Party. See “Minutes of Evidence” (fn. 12), 71–73. This is also the basic conundrum facing the British Government. There is a strong urge to reestablish a regional government in Northern Ireland, and yet there is a disinclination to accord the body any effective power.
17 As stated by Mr. Leitch (Parliamentary Draftsman's Office), “We are a different community, I suppose, just as much as Scotland.... If legislation is passed at Westminster, it might be doubtful whether people would want it here. Take abortion, homosexuality or even divorce law reform; our community in these matters may be more oldfashioned and so because of having our own parliament, we do not have Acts on these subjects.” Ibid., 8.
18 Ibid., 150.
19 This point is generally underexplored. For an excellent case study on London, see Dearlove, John, “Councillors and Interest Groups in Kensington and Chelsea,” British Journal of Political Science, 1 (April 1971), 129–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
20 Cf. “Minutes of Evidence” (fn. 12), 45–56. Moreover, there is the almost total nonrepresentation of those with a religious faith different from “their” representative. This point is made strongly in the Scarman Report, Cmnd. 566, “Violence and Civil Disturbance in Northern Ireland” (London: H.M.S.O. 1972).
21 Fifth Report of the Northern Ireland Commissioner for Complaints, “Annual Report for 1972” (Belfast: H.M.S.O. 1973); quotation from p. 17.
22 All three examples are taken from the useful compendium of Acts passed by the Northern Ireland Parliament 1965–1969, classified according to whether they were unique to Ulster or parity legislation with Britain. Almost two-thirds of the bills were found to be related to purely Northern Ireland matters. See “Minutes of Evidence” (fn. 12), Appendix II.
23 Sir Matthew, Robert, Belfast Regional Survey and Plan (Belfast: H.M.S.O. 1964), 132Google Scholar. This conclusion is echoed by Thomas Wilson, Economic Development in Northern Ireland, Cmnd. 470 (Belfast: H.M.S.O. 1966), 39–72.
24 There is less statistical information about Northern Ireland, for example, than about Wales. Ibid., 143.
25 Matthew (fn. 23), 39–43.
26 Ibid.
27 These two examples are recounted in Wilson (fn. 23), 88, and in Great Britain, Hansard (December 21, 1972). It is pointless to add up all the positive and negative features (legislation on economic and environmental issues behind and in advance of general British pace) and to see which outweighs the other. The exercise would not only be tedious and inconclusive, but it would obscure the point that the Ulster government generated both as a matter of course.
28 This argument is developed by Bourjol, Maurice, Les Institutions Régionales de 1789 à Nos fours (Paris: Berger-Levrault 1969), 317–51Google Scholar.
29 See Watson, Martin, Regional Development Policy and Administration in Italy (London: Longmans 1970), 4–17Google Scholar. A comprehensive discussion is provided in the compendium of papers published by the University of Cagliari, Burocrazia e Autonomie Regionali (Milan 1970).
30 Figures compiled from “Digest of Statistics: Northern Ireland” (Belfast: H.M.S.O. March 1974), Table 8.
31 Quoted in Reginald Lawrence, The Government of Northern Ireland: Public Finances and Public Services 1921–1964. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1965), 45.
32 The phrase is that of Dewar, Donald, “Devolution and Local Government Reform,” in MacCormick, Neil, ed., The Scottish Debate (London: Oxford University Press 1970), 66Google Scholar.
33 Wallace (fn. n), 82.
34 The estimate is that of the Northern Ireland Ministry of Finance. “Minutes of Evidence” (fn. 12), 21–27.
35 The implications of this situation were detailed fully in the Cameron Report, “Disturbances in Northern Ireland,” Cmnd. 532 (Belfast: H.M.S.O. 1969).
36 Cf. Rose, Richard, Governing Without Consensus (Boston: Beacon Press 1971)Google Scholar.
37 In federal states, with long established and recognized systems of overlapping jurisdictions, these conditions might not hold to the extent that the federal divisions do not correspond to perceived differences within the population.
38 Results reported in the Club Nouvelle Frontière, Le Dossier du 27 Avril (Paris: Editions Bernard Grasset 1969), 41–48.
39 This conclusion is not in contradiction to the widespread affirmation of the idea of decentralization recorded earlier in Britain. Large numbers favored it when the matter was broached, but when asked to name what reforms might help out their area, less than 1 per cent of English respondents mentioned decentralization spontaneously. The percentages rose to nine in Wales and twenty in Scotland. This distinction, unfortunately, was not made in the otherwise useful Royal Commission on the Constitution's “Memorandum of Dissent,” Cmnd. 5460–1 (London: H.M.S.O. 1973), 26–27.
40 For a discussion of these areas from the perspective of future European economic growth areas, see Parker, Geoffrey, An Economic Geography of the Common Market (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1969), 85–99Google Scholar.
41 An excellent summary of this argument, which has spawned a whole literature of regional economic analysis, is given by Hirschman, Albert, “Interregional and International Sources of Economic Growth,” in McKee, David L. and others, eds., Regional Economics: Theory and Practice (New York: Free Press 1970), 105–20Google Scholar.
42 Should some extraordinary exogenous factor intrude to render a region more prosperous than the center, these remarks obviously lose their applicability. On the other hand, the meaning of decentralization would also change to mean a disassociation from the problems of the more unfortunate. In this connection, should the discovery of North Sea oil make Scotland more prosperous than the rest of Britain (still an unlikely event) and thereby spark a groundswell for autonomy, Tom Nairn's assessment would seem to assume particular relevance: Scotland “is a junior but (as these things go) highly successful partner in the general business enterprise of Anglo-Scots imperialism. Now that this business is evidently on its last legs, it may be quite reasonable for the Scots to want out. But there is really no point in disguising this desire with heroic ikonry.” Nairn, “The Three Dreams of Scottish Nationalism,” in Karl Miller, ed., Memoirs of a Modern Scotland (London: Faber and Faber 1970), 45.
43 The reforms had their genesis in the Reports of die Royal Commission on Local Government in England 1966–69 and the Royal Commission on Local Government in Scotland 1966–69, Cmnd. 4040 and 4150. The recommendations were enacted, with some boundary changes, in 1971.
