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Agraria and Industria: Two Models of the International System

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

George Modelski
Affiliation:
Australian National University
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Ever since the invention of the steam engine in the eighteenth century, men have reflected upon the profound transformations being wrought in their societies by what soon came to be called the Industrial Revolution. In their own fields, historians, economists, sociologists, military specialists, and Marxist philosophers have all traced the effects of industrialization, and some of them—particularly those interested in and aroused by war—have perceived the implications of these changes for international relations. Priority in this respect seems to belong to Auguste Comte, the founder of modern sociology, for devising the first analytical-historical model of the industrial society—one moreover that explicitly, though not always convincingly, pointed to the international repercussions of industrialism. In an essay first published in 1822, Comte drew a distinction betwelen two types (or models) of civilization: the Theological and Military, and the Scientific and Industrial (there also was a third, transitional—as he called it, “mongrel””type, the Metaphysical and Juridical). Comte's first model is notable for the predominance of military activities: “Society makes conquest its one permanent aim.” War makes it possible to found larger societies. In the transitional stage, he observed, “The two aims of activity, conquest and production, advance pari passu. Industry is at first favoured and protected as a military resource. Later its importance augments, and finally war is regarded and systematically pursued as a means of favouring industry.” But, in the last model, “industry has become predominant. All the special relations have gradually established themselves upon industrial bases. Society, taken collectively, tends to organize itself in the same manner,” renounces conquest and war, and makes production “its only and constant aim.”

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1961

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References

1 Comte, A., System of Positive Policy, London, Longmans, Green, 1877, IV, pp. 572–73Google Scholar; see also 11, pp. 320–24, and III, pp. 48–53.

2 Spencer, H., Principles of Sociology, New York, 1886, II, p. 664.Google Scholar

3 Cited in Baumont, M., L'essor industriel et I'imperialisme colonial, 1878–1904, Paris, Felix Alcan, 1937, p. 2.Google Scholar

4 See, e.g., Eagleton, Clyde, International Government, New York, 1932, pp. 10ff.Google Scholar; Wright, Quincy, A Study of War, Chicago, 1942, 1, pp. 199200Google Scholar; Morgenthau, H. J., Politics Among Nations, 2nd ed., New York, 1956, pp. 357–61.Google Scholar

5 See, e.g., Almond, G. A. and Coleman, J. S., eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton, N.J., 1960.Google Scholar See also Riggs, F. W., “Agraria and Industrial Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration,” in Siffin, W. J., ed., Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration (Bloomington, Ind., 1957)Google Scholar, to which I owe the terms “Agraria” and “Industria” and other insights into the working of the two societies. In his paper in the present symposium, Riggs presents a deductive model, using, for example, the terms “fused” and “refracted” society. I have retained his earlier, inductive terminology, which seems to me more concrete and more familiar. It is compatible with the notion of a continuum and allows for an addition of “primitive” society alongside Agraria and Industrie. The original terms, furthermore, appear less final and positive about the shape of the future; they leave open to question whether the few industrial societies that we now know (for instance, the United States) are in fact the “ultimate” in social development.

6 E.g., McClelland, Charles, “Systems and History in International Relations: Some Perspectives in Empirical Research Theory,” General Systems, III, 1958, pp. 242ff.Google Scholar; Rostow, W. W., The Stages of Economic Growth, New York, 1960Google Scholar; Organski, A., World Politics, New York, 1959.Google Scholar Organski believes that the present international system is still in the transitional stage and refuses to speculate about the characteristics of the future industrial international society (ibid., p. 307).

7 “Theoretical International Relations,” Australian Outlook, XIII (June 1959), pp. 141–43.

8 For examples of constructs of past, present, future, and hypothetical international systems, see, e.g., Wright, , op.cit., II, pp. 1493–97Google Scholar, and Kaplan, M. A., System and Process in International Politics, New York, 1957, ch. 2.Google Scholar

9 In Almond, and Coleman, , eds., op. cit., p. 11.Google Scholar

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11 Parsons, Talcott, The Social System, Glencoe, Ill., 1951, pp. 2426.Google Scholar

12 Almond, G. A., “Comparative Political Systems,” in Eulau, H., ed., Political Behavior, Glencoe, Ill., 1956, pp. 3642.Google Scholar

13 See, e.g., Wright, Quincy, ed., The World Community, Chicago, 1948, pp. 47ff.Google Scholar

14 This conception of the international environment avoids the familiar difficulty of envisaging the international system as a system without an environment; see, e.g., McClelland, , op.cit., p. 237Google Scholar, and Wright, , A Study of War, I, p. 955.Google Scholar

15 Classification based on Parsons’ scheme of functional system problems; see The Social System, esp. chs. 1–5. See also Parsons, T., Bales, R., and Shils, E., Working Papers in the Theory of Action, Glencoe, Ill., 1953, ch. 5Google Scholar; and Parsons, , Structure and Process in Modern Societies, Glencoe, Ill., 1960Google Scholar, passim.

16 See, e.g., Redfield, Robert, The Primitive World and Its Transformations, Ithaca, N.Y., 1953, pp. 7ff.Google Scholar

17 Segmentation occurs because limitations on the economies of scale prevent the uncontrolled extension of a given unit; cf. Parsons, , Structure and Process, p. 263. The fact of segmentation creates the problem of relations between segments. International relations provides one set of models for understanding segmental relations.Google Scholar

18 In Africa, XXIII (July 1953), pp. 213–23.

19 For a thorough survey, see Wright, , A Study of War, 1, ch. 6.Google Scholar

20 For an extensive study along these lines, see Numelin's, R.The Beginnings of Diplomacy: A Sociological Study of Intertribal and International Relations, London, Oxford University Press, 1950.Google Scholar

21 Parsons, , Structure and Process, p. 117.Google Scholar

22 Redfield, Robert, Peasant Society and Culture, Chicago, 1956Google Scholar, passim.

23 Deutsch, K. W., Nationalism and Social Communication, New York, 1953.Google Scholar On international homogeneity, see Mathisen, T., Methodology in the Study of International Relations, New York, 1959, pp. 9395.Google Scholar

24 Riggs, , op.cit., pp. 7374.Google Scholar

25 We might call this “horizontal” homogeneity, as distinguished from “vertical” homogeneity of units of the system—for instance, the rate of uniformity in ideological and other domestic arrangements of members of a system.

26 Tait, , op.cit., p. 213.Google Scholar

27 Wright, , A Study of War, 1, pp. 467, 612.Google Scholar

28 On the homogeneity of primitive society, see Redfield, The Primitive World.

29 See, e.g., Deutsch, K. W., “Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics,” American Political Science Review, LIV (March 1960), p. 56.Google Scholar

30 The same connections do not hold between the size of a state and its agrarian or industrial character; a small state might be industrial because it forms part of an international system within which its special skills are accommodated.

31 At times when costs of power transmission declined—for instance, during the periodic eruptions of the nomads across the Eurasian land mass or when West European seapower broke out of the North Atlantic—the state systems of the world have experienced profound changes.

32 On the loose or tight structuring of Agraria and Industria, see Riggs, , op.cit., pp. 69ff.Google Scholar; looseness or tightness are corollaries of homogeneity or its absence.

33 International stratification extends to individuals inasmuch as the standing or status of a person vis-à-vis citizens of another state depends on the position of his nation in the international ranking order.

34 Fox, W. T. R., Theoretical Aspects of International Relations, Notre Dame, Ind., 1959, pp. 3940Google Scholar

35 For a full account of its operation under the Ching emperors (1644–1911), see Fairbank, J. K. and Teng, S. Y., “On the Ch'ing Tributary System,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, VI (1941), pp. 135246.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

36 Stressed, e.g., by Morgenthau, , op.cit., pp. 221ff.Google Scholar

37 Ibid., p. 228.

38 Walker's, R. L. excellent study, The Multi-state System of Ancient China (Hamden, Conn., 1953)Google Scholar, could profitably be repeated with respect to other international systems.

39 See the author's The Communist International System, Research Monograph No. 9, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, December 1, 1960.

40 See also Aron, Raymond, War and Industrial Society, London, Oxford University Press, 1958.Google Scholar