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Political Solutions to Market Problems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Kenneth A. Shepsle  and
Barry R. Weingast
Kenneth A. Shepsle
Affiliation:
Washington University
Barry R. Weingast
Affiliation:
Washington University
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Abstract

For some, market failures serve as a rationale for public intervention. However, the fact that self-interested market behavior does not always produce felicitous social consequences is not sufficient reason to draw this conclusion. It is necessary to assess public performance under comparable conditions, and hence to analyze self-interested political behavior in the institutional structures of the public sector. Our approach emphasizes this institutional structure—warts and all—and thereby provides specific cautionary warnings about optimistic reliance on political institutions to improve upon market performance.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 78 , Issue 2 , June 1984 , pp. 417 - 434
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1984

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