¹ Respectively, by George Pendle (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952); Russell H. Fitzgibbon (New Brunswick, N. J., Rutgers University Press, 1954); and Simon G. Hanson (New York, Oxford University Press, 1938).

² Johnson, John J., Political Change in Latin America (Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 1–14 Google Scholar, states the general thesis regarding the “middle sectors”; pp. 45–65 discuss Uruguay specifically.

³ Support for these generalizations is presented in the author's Government and Politics of Uruguay (New Orleans, Tulane Studies in Political Science, Vol. VII, 1962)Google Scholar.

(New Orleans, Tulane Studies in Political Science, Vol. VII, 1962).

The racial composition of the cast of characters in Uruguay is almost entirely white. The folk-myth of the plainsman or gaucho, the semi-civilized mestizo, is retained today in diet and in the semana criolla (in other countries, Holy Week), but in little else.

⁴ Acevedo, Eduardo, Anales Históricos del Uruguay (Montevideo, Barreiro y Ramos, 3d printing, 1933), Vol. 3, pp. 9–364, discusses the detailsGoogle Scholar.

⁵ Devoto, Juan E. Pivel and Devoto, Alcira Ranieri de Pivel, Hisloria de la República Oriental del Uruguay (1830–1980) (Montevideo, Editorial Medina, 1945), pp. 540–542 Google Scholar.

⁶ Briefly, the election law of 1924 allows the “most-voted” sector of the “most-voted” party to control the accumulated votes of all sectors of that party. The same is true for the corresponding sector of the “second most-voted” party. This rule applies to election of the executive officers. PR is employed without gimmicks for election of legislative officers. 1924 Registre Nacional de Leyes y Décrètes del la República Oriental del Uruguay, pp. 81-122; 1925 Registre, pp. 27–59. The operation of the law is discussed in detail in Taylor, op cit., pp. 43–49.

⁷ The agreement, and several accompanying understandings, were enacted into law. The Pact is #8,765, October 15, 1931 (1931 Registre, pp. 577–680).

Blanco electoral control of interior Departments increased steadily after 1946. In the 1954 election, only Montevideo Department returned a Colorado majority. Uruguay, Corte Electoral, Elecciones Uruguayas (Montevideo, 5 vols., 1948–1959)Google Scholar, by Julio T. Fabregat.

“Pacts” among political parties are rather common in the history of the republican period in Latin America. They are recognition of the real loci of power, and of the fact that constitutionalism is no deeper in penetration than the depth of agreement at the moment among the leaders of the more important political groups.

⁸ Taylor, op. cit., pp. 45–49.

⁹ The most comprehensive and authoritative Uruguayan work on Batlle is Giudice, Roberto M. and Conzi, Efraín González, Batlle y el batllismo (Montevideo, Editorial Medina, 2d Edition, 1959)Google Scholar. The disintegration of the system is described in many polemic works; perhaps the best of them is Gallinal, Gustavo, El Uruguay hacia la dictadura. Preparación del golpe de estado (Montevideo, 1938)Google Scholar. Vanger, Milton I., José Batlle y Ordóñez of Uruguay, the Creator of His Times, 1902–1907. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, covers the early years of his political control. See also Hanson, op. cit., pp. 19–26; and Grompone, Antonio M., “Las clases medias en el Uruguay,” Materiales para el estudio de la clase media en la América Latina (Washington, D. C., Pan American Union, 1950, vol. I, pp. 76–91)Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Taylor, op cit., p. 140.

¹¹ Nardone's first political activity was as a leftist. In the early 1940s he made an unsuccessful effort to join and control the Asociación Rural, an old and respected organization of estancieros. In 1951 he broke openly with this group and began to espouse the cause of the coastal and small farmers. In 1954 he joined with Luis Batlle, the Colorado leader, in an unsuccessful effort to attain power. Batlle accepted his aid but refused the favors demanded. By 1956 Nardone was ready to seek other allegiances. The record is reported in a useful article in Visión, February 27, 1959.

¹² Evidence of Nardone's naïveté rests in his failure to offer supporting candidacies for legislative or local governmental posts when he came to the coalition. As a result, Nardone stood alone except in the executive branch when the Blancos unexpectedly, won.

¹³ Instituto Uruguayo de la Opinión Pública (IUDOP), Elecciones de 1958 en Montevideo; Un estudio sobre las posibilidades de predicción electoral a través de los métodos de muestra representativa (Montevideo, 1958)Google Scholar; and IUDOP, Un estudio sobre las posibilidades de predicción electoral y de las caracteristicas socio-económicas de los grupos partidarios. Efectuado en la ciudad de Montevideo par el método de muestras representativas (Montevideo, 1959)Google Scholar. The first study presents the pre-election survey and offers tentative analysis. The second reports on the re-interview of the first group of respondents, and suggests the major reasons for errors which occurred in the analysis. There is a full report of sample construction as well as the logical reasoning employed in the analyses.

The second analysis shows clearly that the suburban vote, which had not been represented adequately in the sample, threw the results more heavily to the Blancos than had been anticipated.

¹⁴ The appointee to the central position in the new Cabinet, Minister of Treasury, was Juan Azzini, Professor of Economics in the University of Montevideo. Azzini's performance has been courageous, at least, and has demonstrated considerable capacity for personal growth in a difficult position. Several other appointments have been of equal stature. The Monetary Reform Law of December 17, 1959 (1959 Registre, 1378–1385) is discussed in some detail in Taylor, op. cit., pp. 141–146.

¹⁵ IUDOP, Una incógnita nacional, El empleado público (Montevideo, 1956), pp. 15–20 Google Scholar, discusses employment figures. IUDOP, La austeridad y los problemas económicos-familiares (Montevideo, 1959), pp. 64–70 Google Scholar, discusses pensions and social legislation.

¹⁶ The Monetary Reform Law of 1959 freed all exports and imports from administratively controlled exchange rates, and left the peso free to seek its own level in international money markets. The peso value of lands and animals immediately rose spectacularly. At the same time, all agricultural exports were subjected to “retentions” (export taxes), which cut back on profits to the ranchers and slaughterers. Cattle raisers also sought free access for privately slaughtered beef to the Montevideo market; a decree of February 1, 1934 (1934 Registre, 215–216) had closed it to all but the government-owned Frigorifico Nacional. The ranchers scored a momentary victory when this market was opened on June 5, 1959 (1959 Registre, 520–528), but within 18 months all previous controls had been reimposed by indirect methods or by urban public pressures.

Ranchers have been able to curtail or even eliminate some retentions, but the country has been subjected to the penalties of mounting price inflation as a result. Bank of London and South America, Fortnightly Review, February 12, 1961; December 2, 1961.

¹⁷ See particularly, Shils, Edward, “Political Development in New States,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 2, nos. 2 and 3 (04 and 07, 1960), pp. 265-292, 379–411 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Millikan, Max F. and Blackmer, Donald L. M., The Emerging Nations, Their Growth and United States Policy (Boston, 1961)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Almond, Gabriel A. and Coleman, James S., eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 16–17, 58–64 Google Scholar. A useful discussion of Latin America which examines the area from the general approach developed by the S.S.R.C. Committee on Comparative Politics is found in George Blanksten's “Political Groups in Latin America,” in this Review, Vol. 53 (03, 1959), pp. 106–127 Google Scholar.

¹⁹ An example of interesting, but only moderately useful studies is the series of articles prepared each five years by Russell H. Fitzgibbon on the basis of polling a selected group of specialists on Latin America. The most recent of these, growing out of the fourth round of questionnaires, is written with the collaboration of Johnson, Kenneth F.: “Measurement of Latin American Political Change,” this Review Vol. 55 (09, 1961), pp. 515–526 Google Scholar.

²⁰ Taylor, op. cit., pp. 126–129.

²¹ The position of the Church is discussed in useful detail in Mecham, J. Lloyd, Church and State in Latin America (Chapel Hill, N. C., The University of North Carolina Press, 1934), pp. 331–339 Google Scholar; and in Fitzgibbon, op. cit., pp. 230-244.

²² Fitzgibbon, op. cit., pp. 24–25, and Wyckoff, Maj. Theodore, “The Role of the Military in Contemporary Latin American Politics,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 13 (09, 1960), pp. 745–763 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, discuss the role of the Uruguayan military.

²³ Taylor, op. cit., pp. 53–59.

²⁴ The country's area is 72,172 square miles. Its population was declared officially to be 2,538,734 in 1944, with a continued rise estimated annually by the census bureau. University of Montevideo sociologists estimate it, however, at not more than 2.4 million in 1960, while other, partial, censuses place it at about 2.25 million. A recent Visión estimate, reported without attributed source, shows Montevideo as having 1,363,000 population (February 9, 1962).

Comprehensive studies for the government petroleum company, ANCAP, have failed to dis¬cover exploitable oil, Fortnightly Review, October 24, 1959. Studies concerning iron and other ores have been similarly unencouraging, El Debate, February 22, 1960.

²⁵ In the period 1954–1960 the country suffered deficits on current foreign trade accounts in all seven years. The total deficit was $385,218,000 or approximately three times the value of exports in 1960. Comercial, Banco, Información económica del Uruguay (Montevideo, 04 1961), #18, p. 1 Google Scholar.

²⁶ Fitzgibbon, op. cit., p. 71.

²⁷ Rostow, W. W. suggests a general thesis concerning economic development in his The Stages of Economic Growth (London, Cambridge University Press, 1960)Google Scholar. It may be suggested, somewhat facetiously, that in terms of Rostow's stages, Uruguay chose to pass from the second stage (transition, or precondition for takeoff) directly to the fifth, one of the alternative forms of which is the stage of high mass consumption.

²⁸ The problem is discussed in detail in Taylor, op. cit., pp. 99–105.

²⁹ Social security and retirement contributions apply to all earned income. They are graded upward so that higher incomes pay at a higher rate. Rates also have increased as benefits have become more generous. A law of October 6, 1919 (1919 Registre, vol. II, 293–302), established a four percent deduction from all wages of certain employees. Law 11,496, September 27, 1950 (1950 Registre, 1000), raised this to 7% for salaries up to 300 pesos monthly and 9% for salaries over 900 pesos monthly. In law 12,380, February 12, 1957 (1957 Registro, 253–262), the range became 8% on salaries to 150 pesos monthly, to 13% on salaries over 1,200 pesos monthly. In all cases employers at least match the employee contributions, and in the lower brackets must do better. Additionally, all contribute to funds for subsidies to lower-income employees.

³⁰ Not surprisingly, granted the climate of Uruguayan thought about rewards and punishments, this practice is condoned in periodic amnesties which absolve the employer if he pays within a specified period. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 146–148. In the meantime, only 7% interest is charged.

³¹ Fortnightly Review, March 14, 1959; September 26, 1959. Hispanic American Report, September, 1959.

³² Taylor, op. cit., pp. 57–58.

³³ The elections of November, 1962, produced a paper-thin Blanco plurality for a joint UBD-Herrerista slate. In effect, the 1963-1967 government will merely continue the tight-rope-walking act of the past four years.

³⁴ A damning (but at least partially verifiable) indictment of the pensions system is contained in “El Problema de las Cajas de Jubilaciones,” published in the official journal of the Communist party of Uruguay, Estudios Políticos-Económicos-Filosoficos-Culturales (08-11, 1956), pp. 70–73 Google Scholar. The article is by the party's specialist on the Pensions Funds, Héctor Cerruti. A second article by him appears in the issue for September, 1959 at pp. 17–19, “La Defensa de las Cajas de Jubilaciones y de sus Afiliados.”

In another instance a private businessman offered evidence of having been approached by a highly placed official for collusion in fraud in connection with the importation of machinery. The amount involved would have been about $140,000 to be split between the two.

³⁵ The concern for the implications of Benito Nardone's rise to prominence is stated by Rama, Carlos in “La crisis politica uruguaya,” Combate 45 (03-04, 1959), pp. 3–6 Google Scholar.

³⁶ It is clear that the productive capacity of the rural areas is limited sharply in the absence of intense capitalization of agricultural activities. Nevertheless, data show that neither ranchers nor farmers take maximum advantage of the currently available possibilities through more active attention to breeding, cultivation, etc. SOFRE-RAIL, op. cit., pp. 310–316, suggests that productive capacity could be increased 30% over figures for 1950–57; it also suggests that 1970 would be the year in which productivity would flatten out if available opportunities were used.