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The Investigative Function of Congress

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

George B. Galloway
George B. Galloway
Affiliation:
Philadelphia Bureau of Municipal Research
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Extract

In the winter and spring of 1923–24 a blizzard of congressional investigations swept the national capital. Party lines were tied up, statesmen were snowed under, and Washington officialdom was chilled by a storm of inquiries into the conduct of government departments. Scarcely a corner of the administration escaped inquisition. The subjects of inquiry ranged from the naval oil reserve leases at Teapot Dome and Elk Hill to the administration of the Veterans' Bureau under Director Forbes of dubious fame. Upwards of two-score inquests were instituted by Congress, through its committees, into the official behavior of the executive branch of the national government. In the end, and as a direct result, two cabinet members lost their portfolios.

Such wide and effective use by Congress of its committees for the purpose of inquiry and examination of administrative conduct raised certain questions in the minds of students of government. What were the constitutional limits of the investigative function of Congress? What was the relation of this function to the law-making function and to impeachment? Was punishment by impeachment a satisfactory remedy for official misconduct, or had it become obsolete as too cumbersome? Did the vote of the Senate calling for Secretary Denby's resignation usher in a new process in this country? Should cabinet officials be required to appear on the floor of Congress and answer questions? Would this be preferable to investigating their actions long after they have been performed? Does the steady increase of federal powers necessitate greater supervision by Congress over the President and administrative officers? Have students of politics overlooked a function of Congress frequently and forcibly exercised for the control of administration?

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , February 1927 , pp. 47 - 70
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1927

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References

1 Exclusive of inquiries begun but not completed by report to House or Senate.

2 See Potts, , “Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt,” in 74 Pennsylvania Law Review, 691, 780 (1926).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Also see Landis, , “Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation,” in 40 Harvard Law Review, 153 (1926).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 68th Cong., 1st sess., S. Rep. 299, ser. no. 8220; U. S. v. Sinclair, 52 Wash. L. Rep., 451 (1924).

4 68th Cong., 1st sess., S. Rep. 475, ser. no. 8221; ex parte Daugherty, 299 Fed. 620 (D. C. 1924).

5 Revised Statutes, sec. 102.

6 Ibid., sec. 104.

7 See “Digest of Decisions and Precedents,” Sen. Misc. Docs., 53d Cong., 2d sess., ser. no. 3178.

8 243 U. S. 537 (1917).

9 Ibid., 543.

10 Ibid., 542.

11 Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (1821).

12 Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 541 (1917).

12a Bowers, , Jefferson and Hamilton, 175.Google Scholar

13 Ibid., 199–203.

14 Redlich, , Procedure of the House of Commons, II, 188–189.Google Scholar

15 Cf. Potts, op. cit., 813.

16 Cf. Goodnow, , Comparative Administrative Law, Vol. IGoogle Scholar, Div. 3, Chaps. 1 and 2.

17 A final ruling on this point is expected from the Supreme Court when it delivers its opinion in the case of McGrain v. Daugherty.

18 Willoughby, and Rogers, , Introduction to the Problem of Government, 213–214.Google Scholar

19 Cf. Freund, , “American Administrative Law,” Polit. Sci. Quar., IX, 415.Google Scholar

20 Jenks, , “The Control of Administration by Congress,” in Amer. Rev., Nov.–Dec, 1924.Google Scholar

21 American Commonwealth, II, 267.

22 Modern Democracies, II, 122.

23 Ibid., 162.

24 There were 112 investigations in Missouri from 1820 to 1920.

25 Hobson, , Free Thought in the Social Sciences, 188.Google Scholar

26 Cf. Young, James T., “The Relation of the Executive to the Legislative Power,” in Proceedings of Amer. Polit. Sci. Assoc., I, 53 (1904).Google Scholar

27 Representative Government, 200.

28 Ibid., 202.

29 Ford, , Representative Government, 307.Google Scholar

30 Willoughby, W. F., The Problem of a National Budget, 96–99.Google Scholar

31 Witness their tactics in the defeat of the proposal for an investigation of the Aluminum Corporation of America.

32 Witness the investigation of the Department of Justice in 1924 by the Brookhart committee which was held up by an order issued by Federal Judge Cochran preventing the committee from examining the bank records of Mr. Mally S. Daugherty, 299 Fed. 620 (1924). See also 40th Cong., 1st sess., H. Journal 126.

33 Ford, , Representative Government, 237–8.Google Scholar

34 Jenks, op. cit., 599.

35 Public Opinion, 289.

36 Secretary Mellon advised President Coolidge to this effect during the early stages of the Couzens inquiry into the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

37 Wilson, , Congressional Government, 278.Google Scholar

38 Wilson, , Congressional Government, 270.Google Scholar

39 Ford, Representative Government, Chap. VII.