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History of the Majority Principle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

John Gilbert Heinberg
John Gilbert Heinberg*
Affiliation:
Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government
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Extract

Perhaps no convention of our day is more acceptable to both the political scientist and the man on the street than the employment of the simple-majority device to determine the will of a group. Even the ponderous German scholar Otto von Gierke is drawn to the facetious conclusion that it is only in the institution of matrimony that the majority principle cannot be used. Exceptions, of course, exist. Examples familiar to students of American government include the two-thirds and three-fourths majorities of the federal amending process, the two-thirds vote of the United States Senate in the approval of treaties, and like majorities in the overriding of presidential and gubernatorial vetoes. But these exceptions do not invalidate the commonly accepted “naturalness” of decisions according to simple majority. The theory has probably been expressed best by Grotius: “It is unnatural,” he says, “that the majority should submit to the minority—hence the majority naturally counts as the whole, if no compacts or positive law prescribe a different form of procedure.”

Although it now finds almost universal acceptance, the practice of reaching decisions by counting heads has not always prevailed, and even where employed its use has been limited and contingent. Speaking historically, the modern dogma of majority rule is a comparatively recent development, although it is probably an outgrowth of the various theories of majority rule of days gone.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , February 1926 , pp. 52 - 68
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1926

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References

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2 Proverbs, II, 14. See SirLewis, George Cornewall, The Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion, (ed. of 1875), pp. 166–167, notesGoogle Scholar.

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12 Ibid.

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14 Gilbert, Op. cit., p. 297.

15 Ibid., p. 307. Lewis says that the courts of justice, smaller councils, and administrative bodies, the Athenian senate, board of generals, and Spartan gerusia also decided by a majority vote. Op. cit., p. 134.

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49 Konopczynski, W., “Une Antithèse du Principe Majoritaire en Droit Polonais,” in SirVinogradoff, Paul (ed.), Essays in Legal History, delivered before the International Congress of Historical Studies (London 1913), pp. 336–397Google Scholar. The liberum veto he says, “donnait à chaque député le droit de rompre la diète et à chaque gentilhomme celui de rompre la dietine.” Op. cit., p. 336.

50 Early German law, in its most primitive state, employed the principle of unanimity. Gierke, , Über die Geschichte des Majoritätsprincips, p. 314Google Scholar. For other instances of its employment see: Lewis, Op. cit., pp. 141–142, note p. 142; Simmel, Op. cit., pp. 187–188. Cf. also the American Articles of Confederation of 1781–89.