¹ Rothstein, Robert L., Alliances and Small Powers (New York 1968), 12–13.Google Scholar

² Recent books focusing on small size and foreign policy behavior include Vital, David, The Survival of Small States (Fair Lawn, N.J. 1971)Google Scholar; Schou, August and Brundtland, Arne O., eds., Small States in International Relations (New York 1971)Google Scholar; Jacques Rapoport and others, Small States and Territories: Status and Problems (UNITAR Studies, New York 1971)Google Scholar; Sveics, V. V., Small Nation Survival: Political Defense in Unequal Conflicts (Jericho, N.Y. 1970).Google Scholar

³ Rosenau, James N., “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in Farrell, R. B., ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Ill. 1966), 27–92.Google Scholar

⁴ See Rummel, R. J., “Some Empirical Findings on Nations and Their Behavior,” World Politics, XXI (January 1969), 226–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sawyer, Jack, “Dimensions of Nations: Size, Wealth, and Politics,” American Journal of Sociology, LXXIII (September 1967), 145–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Salmore, Stephen A. and Hermann, Charles F., “The Effects of Size, Development and Accountability on Foreign Policy,” Peace Research Society (International) Papers, XIV (1969), 15–30.Google Scholar

⁵ For an excellent discussion of the inconsistencies in the literature regarding the relationship between power and aggressiveness, see Salmore, Stephen A., Foreign Policy and National Attributes: A Multivariate Analysis, unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Princeton University 1972), 40–68.Google Scholar

⁶ The abstraction of these foreign policy behavior patterns is based on wide reading in the general literature of international politics and foreign policy. Among the more revealing sources are the following: Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations (New York 1967)Google Scholar; Aron, Raymond, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (Garden City, N.Y. 1966)Google Scholar; Organski, A.F.K., World Politics (New York 1968)Google Scholar; Liska, George, Alliances and the Third World (Baltimore 1968).Google Scholar

⁷ In this instance, the term “rational” is used to imply the minimizing of costs and the maximizing of impact by operating under the same assumptions and rules that might apply in a large, developed state. It is this “rationality” that will be questioned below.

⁸ Almough it would be difficult to point to an author who explicidy espouses these assumptions, much of the discussion of small states within a strategic perspective implies as much. There is discussion of strategic roles, long-range and short-range alliance objectives, etc. See especially Liska (fn. 6) throughout.

⁹ Rothstein (fn. I), I.

¹⁰ For similar arguments, see Harold, and Sprout, Margaret, “The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources,” World Politics, xx (July 1968), 660–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Deutsch, Karl W., “The Future of World Politics,” Political Quarterly, XXXVII (January-March 1966), 9–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ Deutsch, Karl W., “The Point of No Return in the Progression Toward War,” in Pruitt, D. and Synder, R. C., eds., Theory and Research on the Causes of War (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1969), 60.Google Scholar The general communications-based model utilized here owes much to die work of Deutsch, although there are several points of disagreement between his position and mine. See Deutsch, , Nerves of Government (New York 1963)Google Scholar; Deutsch, and Singer, J. David, “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,” World Politics, XVI (April 1964), 390–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹² See O'Leary, Michael, “Linkages Between Domestic and International Politics in Underdeveloped Nations,” in Rosenau, James N., ed., Linkage Politics (New York 1969), 324–46Google Scholar; Good, Robert C., “State-Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States,” in Martin, Laurence W., ed., Neutralism and Nonalignment (New York 1962).Google Scholar

¹³ For a more complete description of the CREON Project data set, see Hermann, Charles F., Salmore, Stephen S., and East, Maurice A., Code Manual for an Analytic Deck of Comparative Foreign Policy Events (mimeo), Ohio State University, 1971.Google Scholar The exact time periods included are the following: October-December 1959, April-June 1960, January-March 1961, October-December 1962, April-June 1963, July-September 1964, January-March 1965, July-September 1966, April-June 1967, and October-December 1968.

¹⁴ It should be noted that a major task of the CREON Project is to undertake a series of quality control procedures to determine the effect and extent of source bias. Also, the data analyzed in this research represent only a part of those available in the data set.

¹⁵ For a more complete description of the rules and procedures governing the identification and abstraction of foreign policy events, see Hermann, Charles F., “What is a Foreign Policy Event?” in Hanrieder, Wolfram F., ed., Comparative Foreign Policy (New York 1971), 295–321.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Both Vital (fn. 2) and Rothstein (fn. 1) attempt to grapple with this problem—but rather unsuccessfully, it seems. Rothstein's analysis of developing states is in a single chapter toward the end of the book and is not well integrated with the other sections which deal almost exclusively with the “older” small developed states. Vital's work focuses on case studies of Czechoslovakia, Israel, and Finland, none of which fit the criteria for small developing states. Furthermore, Vital, in an earlier work (The Inequality of States [Fair Lawn, N.J. 1967], 8), uses a different “rough upper limit” of population for developed than for developing states. For economically advanced countries, the upper limit of population is 10–15 million; for developing states it is 20–30 million.

¹⁷ Discriminant analysis is a statistical technique for partitioning a linear combination of a set of variables so as to minimize the number of misclassifications and maximize the distance between the resulting groupings, taking into account the entire set of variables. In the final partitioning, large countries are those with populations above 23.7 million; developed countries are those with a GNP per capita exceeding $401. See Burgess, Philip M., “Nation-Typing for Foreign Policy Analysis: A Partitioning Procedure for Constructing Typologies,” in Fedder, Edwin H., ed., Methodological Concerns in International Studies (Center for International Studies, University of Missouri-St. Louis 1970), 3–66.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Although the 32 nations included in the data set are not a random sample of all nations, the choice of time periods for which data were collected is random by quarters. Therefore, there are certain inferential statistics in the tables presented here. In addition to the statistics given, it should be noted that a percentage difference of four per cent or larger is statistically significant at the p = .05 level, given die size of the groups being compared.

¹⁹ See Alger, Chadwick F. and Brams, Steven J., “Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations,” World Politics, XIX (July 1967), 646–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and East, Maurice A., Stratification and International Politics, unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Princeton University 1969), 128–46.Google Scholar

²⁰ For this and the remaining tables, the significance level of the chi square value will be given only if it is below p = .01. Also, it should be noted that the chi square values are likely to be large due to the large number of cases being analyzed.

²¹ Under certain conditions, announcements of actions may qualify as deeds rather than verbal behavior. Generally, this is where the announcement is of an action that has already taken place, or where there are no conditional factors likely to intervene between the announcement and the action. See Hermann and omers (fn. 13).

²² Hoffmann, Stanley, The State of War (New York 1965), 138.Google Scholar

²³ On WEIS, see McClelland, Charles A. and Hoggard, Gary, “Conflict Patterns in the Interactions Among Nations,” in Rosenau, James N., ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, rev. ed. (New York 1969), 711–24.Google Scholar The revised scheme follows closely the work of Walter Corson, “Measuring Conflict and Cooperation Intensity in East-West Relations: A Manual and Codebook” (mimeo), University of Michigan 1970.

²⁴ The findings presented in Table 8 correspond nicely to a status discrepancy model of international conflict; i.e., those states whose status on one dimension (size) is in-congruent with status on another dimension (development) are most likely to exhibit conflict behavior. Large developing and small developed states are the two status-discrepant types, and they rank first and second in percentage of conflict behavior. See Galtung, Johan, “A Structural Theory of Aggression,” Journal of Peace Research, I, No. 2 (1964), 95–119CrossRefGoogle Scholar; East, , “Status Discrepancy and Violence in the International System,” in Rosenau, James N. and others, eds., The Analysis of International Politics (New York 1972), 299–319.Google Scholar

²⁵ Information on the bureaucratie structures involved in foreign policy events was available for 52 per cent of all events. Given the nature of the source, Deadline Data, this degree of richness in the data exceeded the highest expectations of the most optimistic members of the project.

²⁶ It is not clear why large developing states have such a small proportion of events involving economic bureaucracies. Size again is the dominating factor, but the alternatíve model would predict that the large developing state would show more economically oriented activity. Also, it is of interest to note that in large developed states (the principal actors in international economic affairs), only 6 per cent of the total foreign policy activity involves economic bureaucracies.

²⁷ Given the conception of techniques of statecraft employed here, it is possible for a state to use economic aid as a technique of statecraft to secure military advantages. Similarly, military techniques, for instance mobilizing troops, could be used to gain economic or diplomatic advantages.

The original coding used six categories, but the distribution of events across categories was so skewed that three categories (containing only 3 per cent of the events) were omitted. The omitted categories were political-legal, cultural, and ideological.