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Russia and the Turkish Straits: A Revaluation of the Origins of the Problem*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

J. C. Hurewitz
Affiliation:
Columbia University
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Extract

The USSR placed on the agenda of the Big Three wartime conference at Yalta in February 1945 the question of the Turkish Straits. Of this 200-mile natural channel, less than 60 miles—the Bosphorus coming from the Black Sea and the Dardanelles going to the Aegean—are true straits, joined by the inland sea of Marmara. Ever since 1841 the transit of naval vessels through the Straits has been regulated by international agreement. The latest regime was established by a convention signed at Montreux in July 1936, authorizing Turkey to remilitarize the strategic waterway and, if it were “threatened with imminent danger of war” or actually engaged in war (Articles 20 and 21), to permit or disallow at its discretion the passage of warships through the narrows.

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Research Article
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Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1962

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References

1 Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Dept. of State [DS] Publication 6199, Washington, D.C., 1955), p. 903.

2 Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945 (DS Pub. 7015, Washington, D.C., 1961), 1 p. 1035.

3 Ibid., 11, p. 258.

4 See, for example, Great Britain [GB], Parliamentary Papers [PP], 1878, C. 1953Google Scholar, Turkey No. 16 (1878), “Treaties and other Documents relating to the Black Sea, the Dardanelles, and the Bosphorus: 1535–1878”; and Shotwell, James T. and Dcák, Francis, Turkey at the Straits: A Short History, New York, 1950, pp. 1416.Google Scholar

5 Austria (1784), the UK (1799), France (1802), Prussia (1806), Norway, Sweden, Spain (1827), the US (1830), Tuscany (1833), and Belgium (1838).

6 Text in Turkey No. 16 (1878), p. 11.

7 Articles 11 and 12, which were replaced by Article 3 of the Treaty of London, 13 March 1871; Hurewitz, J. C., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Princeton, N.J., 1956, 1, pp. 155 and 174.Google Scholar

8 Ibid., p. 123.

9 O chernomorskikh prolivakh [On the Black Sea Straits], Moscow, 1946, pp. 13–15 and 28.

10 Diplomaticheskii slovar', Moscow, 1950, 11, pp. 463, 546–47.

11 Goriainow, Serge, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, pp. 4344.Google Scholar

12 Mosely, Philip E., Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839, Cambridge, Mass., 1934, pp. 1213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13 Goriainow, , op.cit., pp. 410, 43–44, 87.Google Scholar

14 Ibid., p. 6.

15 Nol'de, B. E., Vneshniaia politika [Foreign Policy], St. Petersburg, 1915, p. 78Google Scholar; chap. 2 deals with the Straits.

16 Gagarin, S., “Konstantinopol'skie prolivy,” Russkaia mysl', April 1915, pp. 105–6Google Scholar; Noradounghian, G., Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'empire ottoman, Paris, 1900, 11, p. 76Google Scholar; English translation from Hurewitz, , op.cit., p. 76.Google Scholar

17 Gagarin, , op.cit., p. 106.Google Scholar Gagarin concluded his two-part article with a warning that any solution of the Eastern Question, denying Russia “unlimited control over Constantinople and the Straits,” would “not give Europe a durable peace”; ibid., May 1915, p. 66.

18 Ibid., April 1915, p. 106; Noradounghian, , op.cit., p. 75Google Scholar; and Hurewitz, , op.cit., p. 75.Google Scholar

19 The Question of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, London, 1917, pp. 32–37.

20 Studies in Diplomatic History, London, 1930, chap. 8, especially pp. 220–24.

21 Enghnd and the Near East: The Crimea, London, 1936, p. 413, n. 107, and p. 410, n. 78; also SirWebster, Charles, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830–1841, London, 1951 1. pp. 305–6.Google Scholar

22 Napoleon and the Dardanelles, Berkeley, Calif., 1951, pp. 64–65, 100; also Mackesy, Piers, The War in the Mediterranean, 1803–1810, London, 1959, pp. 154–55.Google Scholar

23 L'Alliance russo-turque au milieu des guerres napoléoniennes, Neuchatel, 1954, pp. 197–202 and Annex XVII, p. 405; contrast with André N. Mandelstam, “La Politique russe d'accès à la Méditerranée au XXe siècle,” Académie de Droit International, Recueil des cours, XLVII (1934), pp. 599800.Google Scholar A former Russian dragoman at Istanbul (1899–1914), Mandelstam devoted only a few lines (pp. 604–5, 607–9) to the 1798/1799 and 1805 treaties. He cited Noradounghian's Art. 7, significantly without mentioning the Goriainov variant, of which Mandelstam must certainly have known.

24 The Problem of the Turkish Straits (DS Pub. 2572, Wash., 1947), pp. 14–15; see also Potsdam Conference Papers, 11, p. 258, n. 44.

25 Hurewitz, , op.cit., pp. 6567, 72–77.Google Scholar

26 Bogazlar Meselesi, Istanbul, 1947, pp. 65–107; the Turkish text of Art. 7 (1805) appears on p. 106, n. 4.

27 Dranov, , op.cit., pp. 6367.Google Scholar

28 Ibid., p. 93.

29 de Martens, G. F.Recueil général de traitis, 1st ed., Göttingen, 1801, VII, pp. 214–18 [1798/1799]Google Scholar; and GB, PP, 1836Google Scholar, L, No. 85 [Hünkâr İskelesi].

30 Russia, Ministerstvo inostrannykh del, Izvestiia, 1, Bk. 5 (St. Petersburg, 1912), pp. 244–49Google Scholar; the instructions to Italinskii (pp. 235–37) do not furnish any fresh evidence on the Straits question. Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka. Dokumenty Rossiiskago ministerstva inostrannykh del, 1st. ser., II [April 1804 to Dec. 1805], ed. by Narochnitskii, A. L., Moscow, 1961, No. 184, pp. 582–94Google Scholar; although the volume bears the publication date of 1961, it did not become available to the author until the present article was in galleys. It has therefore been impossible to incorporate all the material in the half-dozen other documents (Nos. 11, 39, 43, 45, 90, and 100) that shed light on the official Russian attitudes of the day toward the Straits and that confirm the accuracy of the present analysis.

31 Of the seven pertinent articles in the two secret treaties (1–4 [1798/1799] and 1, 4, and 7 [1805]) Goriainov furnished the purported texts of only the last two; Dranov, only the 1805 trio in Russian translation of the Noradounghian French translation from the Turkish—which was itself a translation from the original French—plus the divergent Goriainov Art. 7.

32 Miliutin, D. M., Istoriia voiny Rossii s Frantsiei v tsarstvovanie Pavla I v 1799 godu [History of the Russo-French War of 1799 in the Reign of Paul I], 1st ed., St. Petersburg, 1852, 3 vols.Google Scholar, a work started by Lt.-Gen. Aleksandr I. Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii, who completed before his death in October 1848 only Part 1, comprising the first 13 chapters of Vol. 1. Part 1, chap. 10, mentions both the public and the secret treaties of 1798/1799 (Russ. ed., 1, pp. 111–12; Ger. ed. [München, 1856], 1, pp. 92–93); a more detailed summary of the two may be found in footnote 169 of both editions, where the author disclosed that he had consulted the original texts at the Foreign Ministry archives in St. Petersburg.

33 Dranov, , op.cit., p. 63Google Scholar; also Zhigarev, Sergei, Russkaia politika v vostochnom voprose [Russian Policy in the Eastern Question], Moscow, 1896, p. 246Google Scholar; and Mischef, P. H., La Mer noire et les détroits de Constantinople Paris, 1899, pp. 200–4.Google Scholar

34 GB, PP, 1854, LXXIIGoogle Scholar, No. 88, “Treaties (Political and Territorial) between Russia and Turkey, 1774–1849”; and note 4 above.

35 The Treaty Relations of Russia and Turkey from 1774 to 1853, London, 1877.

36 Ayntâbi, Ahmed Asim, Astm Tarihi, Istanbul, n.d., 1, pp. 6568.Google Scholar

37 Muahedat Mecmuasi, IV, Istanbul, 1298 A. H. (1882–83), pp. 19–27 (1798/1799) and pp. 41–48 (1805).

38 Noradounghian, , op.cit., 11, pp. 7477.Google Scholar

39 Erim, Nihat, comp., Devletlerarasî Tarih Metinleri, Ankara, 1953. pp. 227–32.Google Scholar

40 Republic of Turkey, Başbakanlşivi, Muahedeler Tasnifi, No. 418/1–3.

41 Turkish texts, probably copies of the originals, in Başbakanlşivi, Hatt-1 Hümâyûnlar Nos. 52804 (secret), 52808 (public).

42 The instruments were first drafted in French, then translated into Russian and Turkish.

43 Republic of Turkey, Dis İsleri Bakanliği Arşivi (Istanbul), Dosya 886.

44 In an alleged despatch of 23 Jan./4 Feb. 1805, No. 94, to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, St. Petersburg; cited by Goriainow, , op.cit., p. 6Google Scholar, n. 1.

45 Naff, Thomas, “EOttoman Diplomacy and the Great European Powers, 1797–1802” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1960), pp. 130–36, 238–48, 268–74.Google Scholar

46 Cf. GB, Public Record Office, FO 65/40, Whitworth to Grenville, 3 and 6 Aug. 1798, Nos. 33–34; 78/20, Grenville to Smith, 14 Sept. 1798, No. 4; 78/24, Grenville to Elgin, 2 Dec. 1799, No. 5; 65/54, Warren to Hawkesbury, 13, 20, and 27 Apr. 1804, Nos. 23–25 and 29; and 78/42, Straton to Hawkesbury, 28 May 1804, No. 33.

47 In negotiating this article, the Russians insisted that the Sublime Porte undertake to pay the costs of provisioning the forces; the Ottoman negotiator feared that, in default of such payments, Russia might demand territorial compensation. Sultan Selim III, however, instructed his plenipotentiary that “If I could be certain that they [the Russians] would bring and take their soldiers at our behest, I should not dwell on the matter of the supply fund.” Başbakanlşivi, Hatt-i Hümâyûnlar No. 15008, Kaymakam Paşa to Padişah, 9 Cemazielevvel 1213 [20 Nov. 1798].

48 At the start Selim refused to sign any secret alliance until France might declare war on the Sublime Porte or on Russia; Başbakanlşsivi, Hatt-1 Hümâyûnlar No. 146H, Padişah to Sadrazam, 1219 [1804–5]. But even in negotiating the public treaty, the Sublime Porte insisted on qualifying the invitation of Russian troops to Ottoman soil by having inserted in Art. 4—over the objections of the Tsar's minister—the following phrase: “the routes to be followed by these troops will be indicated in advance by the state requiring assistance.” Such a qualification, the Sultan's representative argued, would enable the Sublime Porte to prevent “the passage of Russian troops through Wallachia and Sofia.” Ibid., No. 7104B, Reis Efendi to Padişah, summary proceedings of treaty negotiations, 17 Zilhicce 1219 [20 March 1805].

49 FO 65/58, Granville to Mulgrave, 3 Sept. 1805, No. 39.

50 FO 78/20, Smith to Grenville, 30 Dec. 1798, No. 45, enclosing minutes of negotiations by Ottomans on 10 Sept. 1798 with Russians and British for naval action in the Mediterranean. See also Pisani, M. P., “L'Expédition russo-turque aux îles ioniennes,” Revue d'histoire diplomatique, II (1888), pp. 190222.Google Scholar

51 French text in Noradounghian, , op.cit., II, pp. 3641.Google Scholar

52 Cf. Mischef, , opjcit., p. 206Google Scholar, n. 2.

53 Anderson, R. C., Naval Wars in the Levant, 1559–1853, Princeton, N. J., 1952, pp. 427–28.Google Scholar

54 FO 78/29, Elgin (Istanbul) to Grenville (London), 14 Apr. 1800, No. 41; 78/30, 23 Sept 1800, No. 86; 78/31, 15 and 25, Mar. 1801, Nos. 27 and 36; and Anderson, , op.cit., p. 427.Google Scholar

55 FO 78/30, to Grenville, 23 Sept. 1800, No. 86.

56 Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka. Dokumenty Rossiiskogo ministerstva inostrannykh del, 1st ser., I [Mar. 1801 to Apr. 1804], ed. by Narochnitskii, A. L., Moscow, 1960, No. 139, p. 349.Google Scholar There is only one other Straits document (No. 180, pp. 432–33), in which Vorontsov on 16/28 May 1803 applauded Italinskii's reminder to the Sublime Porte to shut the Bosphorus to the warships of all nations: “We affirm our complete approval of this rule by not requesting any exception from it ourselves.” For further evidence, see ibid., 11, Chartoryskii to Italinskii, 13/25 Aug. 1804 (No. 43, pp. 115–16), and to Vorontsov, 18/30 Aug. 1804 (No. 45, pp. 119–23).

57 FO 65/54, to Hawkesbury, 13 Apr. 1804, No. 23. Cf. also Narochnitskii, ed., op.cit., II, Nos. 43 and 45, pp. 115–16 and 119–23.

58 FO 65/54, to Hawkesbury, 27 Apr. 1804, No. 29, report of conversation with Chartoriskii on 6/18 Apr. 1804.

59 FO 65/54, to Hawkesbury, 13 Apr. 1804, No. 24.

60 FO 65/54, to Hawkesbury, 20 Apr. 1804, No. 25.

61 FO 78/45, Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 10 Aug. 1805, No. 10.

62 FO 78/45, Arbuthnot to Mulgrave, 4 Aug. 1805, No. 9.

63 SirWard, A. W. and Gooch, G. P., eds., Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Cambridge, 1922, 1, pp. 331–48Google Scholar passim; Mackesy, , op.cit., pp. 46Google Scholar, 54, 67–68; and Hardman, William, History of Malta, 1798–1815 London, 1909.Google Scholar

64 Anderson, , op.cit., pp. 428–30, 438.Google Scholar

65 Among pertinent Osmanl[later Marshal] Guillaume Brune, the French Ambassador, for closing the Straits and for not renewing the alliance with Russia and Britain; Başbakanlik Arşsivi, Hatt-1 Hümâyûnlar Nos. 1506 and 1505. “These favors have been requested from Your Majesty [Selim] numerous times,” bewailed Brune in the second mémoire, “bom before and after the arrival of the French Ambassador in your country. Besides this, four different letters have been presented to Your Majesty on this subject. Your silence, however, has continued for exactly 45 days.”

66 de Testa, I., Recueil des traités de la porte ottomane avec les puissances étrangères, Paris, 1865, 11, pp. 271–72.Google Scholar

67 Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Correspondance Politique, Turquie, CCXI, to Talleyrand, 13 Jan. 1806, No. 47; although Ruffin mentioned the enclosure of the treaty text, I could not locate it.

68 Ibid., CCXII, 21 June 1806, No. 2; cf. Napoleon's instructions to Talleyrand on 9 June in Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, Paris, 1863, XII, No. 10339, pp. 449–50, and Napoleon's letter to Selim on 20 June, No. 10382, pp. 474–75; on French diplomacy in Istanbul, see Puryear, op.cit., passim.

69 Cf. despatches to Fox, FO 78/51, 28 Aug., 8 Sept., and 30 Oct. 1806, Nos. 55–56, 80; FO 78/55, 15 Jan. 1807, No. 1.

70 FO 78/52, from Howick, 20 Nov. 1806, No. 2.

71 FO 78/49, to Mulgrave, 6 Feb. 1806, No. 4.

72 On 25 Jan. 1807, Arbuthnot, 36 hours after receiving Howick's instructions of 14 Nov. 1806, conferred for four hours with Mehmed Galib (the Reisülküttap) and three of his colleagues. The English arid Ottoman conference minutes leave no doubt that by then Arbuthnot, his proposed policy of forceful demonstration having received Foreign Office approval, sided unequivocally with Russia. From that point on, given the difficulties of communication between Istanbul and London, an Anglo-Ottoman war was unavoidable; Başbakanlşivi, Hatt-1 Hümâyûnlar No. 6971 and enclosure of FO 78/55, to Howick, 27 Jan. 1807, No. 9.

73 Anderson, , op.cit., pp. 457–59.Google Scholar

74 Translated from French text in Mosely, , op.cit., p. 143.Google Scholar

75 Langer, W. L., “Russia, the Straits Question, and the European Powers, 1904–08,” English Historical Review, XLIV (1929), pp. 5985.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

76 Kozhevnikov, F. I., ed., International Law: A Textbook for Use in Law Schools (English ed.), Moscow, n.d., p. 231Google Scholar; the work was prepared by the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and chap. 5, in which this discussion appears, was written by S. V. Molodtsov.