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Corporate Lobbying Revisited
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 January 2017
Abstract
Using a panel data of S&P 500 Index firms covering 1998–2004, this paper compares the determinants of lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions and estimates the returns to lobbying as assessed by the financial market. Lobbying depends more on managerial incentives and protection needs beyond industry structures than contributions do. Lobbying also has a positive effect on the firm's equity returns relative to the market and, to a lesser degree, relative to its industry.
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- Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2008 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press
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