THE IDIOSYNCRASIES OF THE EUROPEAN MARKET OF CORPORATE CONTROL

39 Pages Posted: 20 May 2020 Last revised: 8 Oct 2020

See all articles by Hector Fabio Perafan-Peña

Hector Fabio Perafan-Peña

Universidad ICESI

Belen Gill-de-Albornoz

Jaume I University - Department of Finance and Accounting

Begoña Giner

University of Valencia

Date Written: October 5, 2020

Abstract

This paper provides a comprehensive descriptive analysis of the European market of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) between 1990 and 2017. We examine several features of the deal announcements in the region like: 1) completion; 2) method of payment; 3) geographical scope; 4) target’s attitude; 5) bidders’ competition; 6) industry relatedness; 7) public status of the firms involved; and 8) acquirers’ ownership of targets before and after the transaction. Additionally, we identify the similarities and differences of this market with those of the dominant market worldwide, namely the US. Both markets show similar trends in their activity and the occurrence of waves concentrated around economic shocks. However, the European market notably exhibits higher levels of friendly and cash deals.

Keywords: Mergers and acquistions, Europe, Acquisitions, Restructuring, Corporate Governance

Suggested Citation

Perafan-Peña, Hector Fabio and Gill de Albornoz Noguer, Belen and Giner Inchausti, Begoña, THE IDIOSYNCRASIES OF THE EUROPEAN MARKET OF CORPORATE CONTROL (October 5, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3583700 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3583700

Hector Fabio Perafan-Peña (Contact Author)

Universidad ICESI ( email )

Calle 18 #122-135
A.A. 25608
Cali
Colombia

Belen Gill de Albornoz Noguer

Jaume I University - Department of Finance and Accounting ( email )

Campus del Riu Sec
12081 Castello de la Plana
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://www.uji.es

Begoña Giner Inchausti

University of Valencia ( email )

Departament de Comptabilitat Edifici Departamental Oriental
E-46022 Valencia
Spain

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