Do Universal Owners Vote to Curb Negative Corporate Externalities? An Empirical Analysis of Shareholder Meetings

33 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2019 Last revised: 1 Oct 2019

See all articles by Marie Briere

Marie Briere

Amundi Asset Management; Paris Dauphine University; Université Libre de Bruxelles

Sebastien Pouget

Toulouse School of Economics

Loredana Ureche-Rangau

Université de Picardie Jules Verne, LEFMI

Date Written: June 13, 2019

Abstract

This paper tests whether very diversified and patient investors, also known as universal owners, tend to vote in favor of shareholder resolutions instructing corporations to reduce or communicate on the negative externalities they produce. Our sample includes 213 US fund families that voted on 13,108 different shareholder resolutions at 2,352 companies over the period from 2013 to 2016. We find that, contrary to the common ownership logic, universal owners’ support for issues related to externalities is lower than the one of otherwise similar fund families. Instead, support is positively associated with the proportion of socially responsible investment funds in the family. We discuss various practical implications of our results.

Keywords: Mutual Funds, Voting, Externalities, Social Responsibility, Universal Ownership

Suggested Citation

Briere, Marie and Pouget, Sebastien and Ureche-Rangau, Loredana, Do Universal Owners Vote to Curb Negative Corporate Externalities? An Empirical Analysis of Shareholder Meetings (June 13, 2019). Proceedings of Paris December 2019 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - ESSEC, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3403465 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3403465

Marie Briere (Contact Author)

Amundi Asset Management ( email )

90 Boulevard Pasteur
Paris, 75015
France

Paris Dauphine University ( email )

Université Libre de Bruxelles ( email )

Brussels
Belgium

Sebastien Pouget

Toulouse School of Economics ( email )

21 allée de Brienne
31015 Toulouse Cedex 6
France

Loredana Ureche-Rangau

Université de Picardie Jules Verne, LEFMI ( email )

10 placette Lafleur, BP 2716
Amiens Cedex 1, 80027
France

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
216
Abstract Views
1,578
Rank
260,405
PlumX Metrics