Download This PaperCredit Misallocation During the European Financial Crisis
65 Pages Posted: 18 Apr 2017 Last revised: 21 Dec 2017
There are 6 versions of this paper
Credit Misallocation During the European Financial Crisis
Credit Misallocation During the European Financial Crisis
Credit Misallocation During the European Financial Crisis
Credit Misallocation During the European Financial Crisis
Credit Misallocation During the European Financial Crisis
Credit Misallocation During the European Financial Crisis
Date Written: March 1, 2017
Abstract
Do banks with low capital extend excessive credit to weak firms, and does this matter for aggregate efficiency? Using a unique data set that covers almost all bank-firm relationships in Italy in the period 2004-2013, we find that, during the Eurozone financial crisis: (i) Under-capitalized banks were less likely to cut credit to non-viable firms. (ii) Credit misallocation increased the failure rate of healthy firms and reduced the failure rate of non viable firms. (iii) Nevertheless, the adverse effects of credit misallocation on the growth rate of healthier firms were negligible, and so were the effects on TFP dispersion. This goes against previous influential findings that, we argue, face serious identification problems. Thus, while banks with low capital can be an important source of aggregate inefficiency in the long run, their contribution to the severity of the great recession via capital misallocation was modest.
Keywords: Bank capitalization, zombie lending, capital misallocation
JEL Classification: D23, E24, G21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de