Testing Theories of Fairness - Intentions Matter

Zurich IEER Working Paper No. 63

24 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2001

See all articles by Armin Falk

Armin Falk

University of Bonn - Economic Science Area; briq - Institute on Behavior & Inequality

Ernst Fehr

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Urs Fischbacher

University of Konstanz - Faculty of Economics and Statistics

Date Written: September 2000

Abstract

Recently developed models of fairness can explain a wide variety of seemingly contradictory facts. The most controversial and yet unresolved issue in the modeling of fairness preferences concerns the behavioral relevance of fairness intentions. Intuitively, fairness intentions seem to play an important role in economic relations, political struggles and legal disputes. Yet, so far there is little rigorous evidence supporting this intuition. In this paper we provide clear and unambiguous experimental evidence for the behavioral relevance of fairness intentions. Our results indicate that the attribution of fairness intentions is important both in the domain of negatively reciprocal behavior and in the domain of positively reciprocal behavior. This means that reciprocal behavior cannot be fully captured by equity models that are exclusively based on preferences over the distribution of material payoffs. Models that take into account players' fairness intentions and distributional preferences are consistent with our data while models that focus exclusively on intentions or on the distribution of material payoffs are not.

Keywords: Fairness, Reciprocity, Intentions, Experiments, Moonlighting Game

JEL Classification: D63, C78, C91

Suggested Citation

Falk, Armin and Fehr, Ernst and Fischbacher, Urs, Testing Theories of Fairness - Intentions Matter (September 2000). Zurich IEER Working Paper No. 63, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=259263 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.259263

Armin Falk (Contact Author)

University of Bonn - Economic Science Area ( email )

briq - Institute on Behavior & Inequality

Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5-9
Bonn, 53113
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.briq-institute.org/

Ernst Fehr

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Blümlisalpstrasse 10
Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland
+41 1 634 3709 (Phone)
+41 1 634 4907 (Fax)

Urs Fischbacher

University of Konstanz - Faculty of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Universitaetsstr. 10
78457 Konstanz
Germany

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