Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction

Ding, Wei; Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1469745

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Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction

Economics Letters, Vol. 108, 210

7 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2009 Last revised: 31 Oct 2017

See all articles by Wei Ding

Wei Ding

University of Bonn - The Bonn Graduate School of Economics

Thomas D. Jeitschko

Michigan State University - Department of Economics

Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics; Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

There are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 7, 2009

Abstract

In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders' types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of first-price auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that signal-jamming occurs and explore the dynamics of equilibrium prices.

Keywords: Auctions, Signaling, Price Competition

JEL Classification: D44, D02, D43

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Ding, Wei and Jeitschko, Thomas D. and Wolfstetter, Elmar G., Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction (April 7, 2009). Economics Letters, Vol. 108, 210, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1469745 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1469745