Abstract
The 20th century has been the era for the rise and
development of naturalist theories. With the combination of the linguistic turn
and side-effects of the positivist approach, philosophers began to rethink and
offer naturalist solutions to some of the chronic debates about the nature of
language and mind. In Knowledge and The
Flow of Information, Fred Dretske proposed a naturalist account for
knowledge and representation. According to him, the information-theoretic
account satisfies the requirements of naturalism in both epistemology and the
philosophy of mind. Not only
it does bring forth a new perspective, he believes that it also presents a new
way of dealing with the problem of misrepresentation in the contemporary
literature. In this
work, first I will provide a brief presentation of Dretske’s account of
information and representation. Afterwards, I will present how he deals with
the issue of misrepresentation. In the end, I will explain the reasons for the
failures in his solution. In particular, I will argue for the claim that (i)
not only his account fails to solve the problem of misrepresentation, (ii) but
it also fails in one of the requirements of naturalism.
Keywords
References
- ADAMS, Fred & AIZAWA, Ken (2010). “Causal Theories of Mental Content”, Erişim Tarihi: Spring 2010 (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/content-causal/).
- CUMMINS, Robert (1989). Meaning and Mental Representation, Cambridge, London: MIT Press.
- DENNETT, Daniel (1978, 1981). Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- DENNETT, Daniel (1978, 1981). “Artificial Intelligence as Philosophy and as Psychology,” Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- DENNETT, Daniel (1987). The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, London: MIT Press.
- DENNETT, Daniel (1987). “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The “Panglossian Paradigm” Defended.” The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, London: MIT Press.
- DRETSKE, Fred (1981, 1999). Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- DRETSKE, Fred (1983). “Précis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 6(1): 55-90.
- DRETSKE, Fred (1988). Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- DRETSKE, Fred (1995). Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- DRETSKE, Fred (2000). Perception, Knowledge and Belief, Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- FODOR, Jerry (1992). A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- FODOR, Jerry (1992). “Semantics, Wisconsin Style,” A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- GRICE, Paul (1957). “Meaning”, Philosophical Review, 66(3): 377-388.
Abstract
20. yy.
doğalcı kuramların yükselişi ve gelişiminin çağı olmuştur. Dile dönüş
hareketinin ve pozitivist yaklaşımın yan etkilerinin terkibiyle birlikte,
felsefeciler dilin ve zihnin doğasına dair bazı kronik tartışmaları yeniden
düşünüp doğalcı çözümler öne sürmeye başladılar. Knowledge and the Flow of Information kitabında, Fred Dretske bilgi
ve temsil için doğalcı bir açıklama önermiştir. Ona göre, enformasyon-kuramsal
açıklama hem epistemolojideki hem de zihin felsefesindeki doğalcılık şartlarını
sağlar. Yeni bir perspektif getirmesinin yanı sıra, o bu perspektifin ayrıca
çağdaş literatürdeki yanlış temsil sorununa da yeni bir çözüm yolu sunduğuna
inanır. Bu çalışmada, öncelikle Dretske’nin enformasyon ve temsil kuramının
kısa bir takdimini gerçekleştireceğim. Daha sonra, yanlış temsil sorununu nasıl
ele aldığına değineceğim. Son olarak da onun çözümündeki kusurların nedenlerini
açıklayacağım. Özellikle, (i) onun kuramının yanlış temsil sorununu
çözemediğini, (ii) ayrıca doğalcılık akımının şartlarından birisini de
sağlamadığını iddia edeceğim.
Keywords
References
- ADAMS, Fred & AIZAWA, Ken (2010). “Causal Theories of Mental Content”, Erişim Tarihi: Spring 2010 (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/content-causal/).
- CUMMINS, Robert (1989). Meaning and Mental Representation, Cambridge, London: MIT Press.
- DENNETT, Daniel (1978, 1981). Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- DENNETT, Daniel (1978, 1981). “Artificial Intelligence as Philosophy and as Psychology,” Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- DENNETT, Daniel (1987). The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, London: MIT Press.
- DENNETT, Daniel (1987). “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The “Panglossian Paradigm” Defended.” The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, London: MIT Press.
- DRETSKE, Fred (1981, 1999). Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- DRETSKE, Fred (1983). “Précis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 6(1): 55-90.
- DRETSKE, Fred (1988). Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- DRETSKE, Fred (1995). Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- DRETSKE, Fred (2000). Perception, Knowledge and Belief, Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- FODOR, Jerry (1992). A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- FODOR, Jerry (1992). “Semantics, Wisconsin Style,” A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- GRICE, Paul (1957). “Meaning”, Philosophical Review, 66(3): 377-388.
Details
| Primary Language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal Section | Research Article |
| Authors | |
| Publication Date | October 30, 2018 |
| Submission Date | October 25, 2018 |
| Published in Issue | Year 2018 Issue: 31 |
Cite
e-ISSN: 2645-8950