이 연구는 1970년대 미국이 주도했던 데탕트의 의미와 더불어 그 한계를 재조명하고, 그러한 한계가 냉전이후 미국중심적 국제질서의 혼돈에까지 어떻게 이어지고 있는가를 고찰한다. 닉슨과 키신저에 의해 고안되었던 1970년대 데탕트는 지정학적 현실주의에 입각해서 베이징에 접근함으로써 미·소 양극적 긴장을 완화하는데 기여했다는 점에서 긍정적 평가를 받아왔다. 이 연구는 닉슨-키신저 데탕트가 전 세계적으로 분출하던 주권에 대한 민족주의적 요구들과 인권에 대한 민주주의적 요구들에 적절히 대응하지 못한 한계를 갖고 있었다고 본다. 실제로 데탕트는 1979년 아프가니스탄, 베트남, 이란, 니카라과 등지에서부터 종식을 맞이했다. 1989년 냉전의 종언 또한 주권의지와 인권요구가 분출하면서 시작되었다. 양극체제 종언 이후 미국중심의 단극적 국제질서를 통해 보다 완전한 평화를 가져다주리라는 희망과 달리 미국중심적 국제질서는 혼돈에 직면해 있다. 1970년대 데탕트처럼 강대국 국제정치 중심의 해결책이 아니라 세계적으로 분출하는 주권의지와 인권요구가 만들어 내는 변화를 수용하는 새로운 국제질서를 함께 만들 필요가 있다. 그러기 위해서는 개인의 네트워크에 기반한 스파게티그릇 모델의 초국질서만으로는 부족하며 민주적 주권국가들 간의 상호작용이 제도화 된 샐러드그릇 모델의 국제질서가 공존해야 한다.
This study sheds new light on the meaning and limits of the detente designed by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger and its subsequent implications on the end of detente in 1979 and the present chaos of the U.S.-Centric international order. Compared to European detente since the 1960s, the detente based on the U.S. geopolitical realism made possible the U.S.-China rapprochement. By coercing the U.S.S.R., it attenuated the Cold War confrontation. However, as the detente was based only on the geopolitical thinking of the great powers, it had a limit to embrace the worldwide outbursts of sovereignty and human rights claims. This limit led to the end of the detente in 1979 when Afghanistan, Vietnam, Iran, and Nicaragua were in turmoil because of questions associated with their sovereignty and human rights. The end of the Cold War in 1989 was also closely related to sovereignty and human rights claims especially within the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, the delusion that the end of the bipolar order would result in a pacific unipolar world, the international order became chaotic. Instead of liberalist or neorealist thinking on great power games based on the U.S.-Centric thinking, a new international order is needed for embracing the inevitable chaos resulting from desires for sovereignty and human rights. This is why a spaghetti-bowl type transnational order based on the U.S.-Centric international order is not enough and a salad-bowl type international order based on national sovereignty should co-exist with.
This study sheds new light on the meaning and limits of the detente designed by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger and its subsequent implications on the end of detente in 1979 and the present chaos of the U.S.-Centric international order. Compared to European detente since the 1960s, the detente based on the U.S. geopolitical realism made possible the U.S.-China rapprochement. By coercing the U.S.S.R., it attenuated the Cold War confrontation. However, as the detente was based only on the geopolitical thinking of the great powers, it had a limit to embrace the worldwide outbursts of sovereignty and human rights claims. This limit led to the end of the detente in 1979 when Afghanistan, Vietnam, Iran, and Nicaragua were in turmoil because of questions associated with their sovereignty and human rights. The end of the Cold War in 1989 was also closely related to sovereignty and human rights claims especially within the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, the delusion that the end of the bipolar order would result in a pacific unipolar world, the international order became chaotic. Instead of liberalist or neorealist thinking on great power games based on the U.S.-Centric thinking, a new international order is needed for embracing the inevitable chaos resulting from desires for sovereignty and human rights. This is why a spaghetti-bowl type transnational order based on the U.S.-Centric international order is not enough and a salad-bowl type international order based on national sovereignty should co-exist with.
