Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften

Abstract:
At the meeting of the Hungarian Lawyersʹ Association on 9 January 1889, the renowned Hungarian scholar of criminal law and judge, Károly Csemegi, emphasized the close relationship between judicial, especially disciplinary, responsibility and judicial independence. He argued that the Judicial Disciplinary Act could not be anything other than an extended version, ʺa corollary of judicial independenceʺ. In April 1699, Henri François dʹAguesseau (1668‐1751), attorney general of the Parliament of Paris, stipulated that the first duty of the judge must be to administer justice and the second to preserve his dignity, respect himself and venerate ʺthe holiness of his officeʺ. The preservation of the dignity, integrity and respect of judges is inconceivable if the judge abuses his powers, neglects his judicial duties or even violates them. A strong, well‐educated and independent judiciary can function only if the legislature lays down the rules of accountability. Until the middle of the 19th century, the general provisions on the responsibility of state or administrative officials in Hungary also applied to members of the judiciary.