Abstract
Many philosophers believe that there are both particulars and universals. Many of these philosophers, in turn, believe that universals are immanent. On this view, universals are wholly located where their instances are located. Both Douglas Ehring and E.J. Lowe have argued that immanent universals do not exist on the grounds that nothing can be wholly located in multiple places simultaneously without contradiction. In this paper, I focus on Lowe’s argument, which has received far less attention in the literature. Using the theory of location found in Josh Parsons (2007), I show how Lowe’s argument against immanent universals can be resisted.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Trenton Merricks for reading the first version of this paper. Thanks as well to Dean Da Vee for helpful comments on a slightly more recent version of the paper at the APA Central Division Meeting in 2016. Thanks to the audience that day as well, especially Peter Finocchiaro for serving as impromptu chair of that session. Finally, thanks to Jim Darcy and Derek Lam for helpful discussions about, and written feedback on, the most recent version of the paper.
References
Armstrong, D.M. 1978. Nominalism and Realism. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Armstrong, D.M. 1989. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139172226Search in Google Scholar
Armstrong, D.M. 2004. “How do Particulars Stand to Universals?” In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 1, edited by Dean Zimmerman, 139–154. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Barker, S., and P. Dowe. 2003. “Paradoxes of Multi-Location.” Analysis 63 (2):106–114.10.1093/analys/63.2.106Search in Google Scholar
Baxter, D. 2001. “Instantiation as Partial Identity.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):449–464.Search in Google Scholar
Brown, S. 2017. “Against Instantiation as Identity.” Philosophical Studies 174 (4):887–900.10.1007/s11098-016-0712-5Search in Google Scholar
Campbell, K. 1990. Abstract Particulars. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers.Search in Google Scholar
Casati, R., and A. Varzi. 1999. Parts and Places: The Structures of Spatial Representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Search in Google Scholar
Cowling, S. 2014. “Instantiation as Location.” Philosophical Studies 167 (3):667–682.10.1007/s11098-013-0120-zSearch in Google Scholar
Donnelly, M. 2010. “Parthood and Multi-Location.” In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 5, edited by Dean Zimmerman, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Ehring, D. 2002. “Spatial Relations Between Universals.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):17–23.10.1080/713659347Search in Google Scholar
Ehring, D. 2011. Tropes. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Gill, M.L., and P. Ryan. 1996. Plato: Parmenides. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company.Search in Google Scholar
Gilmore, C. 2003. “In Defense of Spatially Related Universals.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):420–428.10.1080/713659709Search in Google Scholar
Gilmore, C. 2006. “Where in the Relativistic World are we?.” Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):199–236.10.1111/j.1520-8583.2006.00107.xSearch in Google Scholar
Gilmore, C. 2014. “Building Enduring Objects Out of Spacetime.” In Mereology and the Sciences, edited by C. Calosi and P. Graziani, 5–34. Berlin: Springer.10.1007/978-3-319-05356-1_1Search in Google Scholar
Keskinen, A., M. Keinanen, and J. Hakkarainen. 2015. “Concrete Universals and Spatial Relations.” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 11 (1):57–71.Search in Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.Search in Google Scholar
Lowe, E.J. 2004. The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Mantegani, N. 2013. “Instantiation is Not Partial Identity.” Philosophical Studies 163 (3):697–715.10.1007/s11098-011-9840-0Search in Google Scholar
McDaniel, K. 2007. “Extended Simples.” Philosophical Studies 133 (1):131–141.10.1007/s11098-006-9010-ySearch in Google Scholar
Parsons, J. 2007. “Theories of Location.” In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 3, edited by D. Zimmerman. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Peacock, H. 2016. “Where Are Universals?” Metaphysica 17 (1):43–67.10.1515/mp-2016-0005Search in Google Scholar
Sattig, T. 2006. The Language and Reality of Time. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0199279527.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Saucedo, R. 2011. “Parthood and Location.” In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 6, edited by D. Zimmerman. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603039.003.0008Search in Google Scholar
Van Inwagen, P. 2011. “Relational vs. Constituent Ontologies.” In Metaphysics, Philosophical Perspectives 25, edited by J. Hawthorne and J. Turner, 389–405. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.10.1111/j.1520-8583.2011.00221.xSearch in Google Scholar
© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
