Abstract
Using cross-country data from the European Company Survey, we investigate the relationship between workplace employee representation and management perceptions of the climate of industrial relations, sickness/absenteeism, employee motivation, and staff retention. For a considerably reduced subset of the data, a fifth indicator – strike activity – is also considered alongside the other behavioral outcomes. From one perspective, the expression of collective voice through works council-type entities may be construed as largely beneficial, especially when compared with their counterpart union agencies either operating alone or in a dominant position. However, if heightened distributional struggles explain these differential outcomes in workplace employee representation, it should not go unremarked that the influence of formal collective bargaining is seemingly positive.
Notes
Availability of Data and Materials: The main data source used in this inquiry is the 2013 European Company Survey. The data are publicly available in the U.K. Data Service at https://www.ukdataservice.ac.uk/.
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Appendix
Variable definition and means of selected variables, full MM and matched MM-ER samples.
| Variable | Mean (MM Sample) | Mean (MM-ER matched sample) | Definition |
|---|---|---|---|
| Industrial relations performance: | |||
| Strike incidence | N.A. | 11 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if there has been a stoppage or strike in the establishment in the last 12 months |
| General work climate (Manager view) | 83 | 79 | (IR_quality MM)1/0 dummy: 1 if the general work climate in the establishment is very good or good |
| Absenteeism (Manager view) | 16 | 25 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if there is a high level of sickness leave |
| Difficulties in staff retention (Manager view) | 11 | 11 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if there are difficulties retaining employees |
| Low employee motivation (Manager view) | 19 | 23 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if there is low motivation of employees |
| Worker representation/Labor organization: | |||
| Works council-type representation | 25 | 63 | 1/0 dummy; 1 if a works council or a prevalent works council is present |
| Union-type representation | 23 | 37 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if a union or a prevalent union representation is present. |
| Establishment union density | N.A. | 44 | Union membership at the establishment |
| Union-dominated union body | N.A. | 19 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if a union or a prevalent union representation is present and the majority of representatives are trade union members |
| Union-dominated works council | N.A. | 26 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if a works council or a prevalent works council is present and the majority of representatives are trade union members |
| Collective agreement: | |||
| No collective agreement | 34 | 16 | No collective agreement |
| Company level | 14 | 19 | Company level |
| Higher than company level | 33 | 39 | Higher than company level |
| Mixed | 19 | 26 | Mixed (i. e. company level and higher than company level) |
| Changes in organization: | |||
| Changes in the remuneration system | 32 | 34 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if major changes in the remuneration system were introduced in the past three years. In 2013 the variable is defined simply as ‘changes’ in the remuneration system |
| Changes in the work process | 39 | 45 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if changes in the organization of the work process were introduced in the past three years. In 2013 the variable is defined as changes in ‘ways to coordinate and allocate the work to employees’ |
| Changes in the working time | 22 | 29 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if changes in the working time arrangements were introduced in the past three years |
| Restructuring measures | 48 | 55 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if restructuring measures were introduced in the past three years. In 2013 the variable is defined as changes in the ‘use of technology’ |
| Changes in recruitment policies | 23 | 27 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if changes in recruitment policies |
| Single establishment | 67 | 53 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if single independent company or organization |
| Private sector | 91 | 85 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if establishment belongs to the private sector |
| Sector: | |||
| Industry | 33 | 37 | |
| Construction | 7 | 9 | |
| Commerce and hospitality | 25 | 15 | |
| Transport and communication | 8 | 9 | |
| Financial services and real estate | 5 | 10 | |
| Other services | 21 | 20 | |
| Establishment size: | |||
| 10 to 49 employees | 51 | 23 | |
| 50 to 249 employees | 32 | 52 | |
| More than 250 employees | 17 | 25 | |
| Workforce composition: | |||
| Workers with an OEC | 84 | 85 | Percentage of employees who have an open-ended contract (OEC) |
| Female workers | 39 | 37 | Percentage of employees who are female |
| Workers with a university degree | 26 | 25 | Percentage of employees who have a university degree |
| Part-time workers | 14 | 14 | Percentage of employees who work part-time (i. e. less than the usual full-time arrangement) |
| Training: | |||
| On- and off-the-job training | 36 | 44 | Percentage of employees who in the past 12 months received paid time-off from their normal duties to undertake training, either off or on the job. |
| Performance-based pay: | |||
| HVPBRES | 41 | 43 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if payment by results, for example piece rates, provisions, brokerages or commissions |
| HVPINPER | 51 | 58 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if variable extra pay linked to the individual performance following management appraisal |
| HVPGRPE | 33 | 39 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if extra pay linked to the performance of the team, working group or department |
| HVPPRSH | 38 | 48 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if variable extra pay linked to the results of the company or establishment (profit sharing scheme) |
| HVPSHOW | 8 | 10 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if variable extra pay in form of share ownership scheme offered by the company |
| Country-level synthetic indicators: | |||
| Union decentralization | 3.5 | 2.4 | 0–7 scale: 0 is the lowest level of union decentralization. This is the Jansen (2014) scale. The raw variable (unauthority) can be downloaded from the ICTWSS database (Visser 2013). |
| Bargaining centralization | 2.3 | 2.8 | 0–5 scale: 0 is the lowest level of centralization. |
| Bargaining system: (Country- and establishment-based classification) | |||
| BB_0_individual bargaining | 37 | 19 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if individual bargaining |
| BB_1_company bargaining | 18 | 22 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if company bargaining |
| BB_2_coordinated sector bargaining | 10 | 17 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if coordinated sector bargaining |
| BB_3_uncoordinated sector bargaining | 5 | 3 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if uncoordinated sector bargaining |
| BB_4_national bargaining | 9 | 9 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if national bargaining |
| BB_5_governed company and sector bargaining | 3 | 5 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if governed company and sector bargaining |
| BB_6_ungoverned company and sector bargaining | 4 | 5 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if ungoverned company and sector bargaining |
| BB_7_governed company and national bargaining | 1 | 1 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if governed company and national bargaining |
| BB_8_ungoverned company and national bargaining | 3 | 4 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if ungoverned company and national bargaining |
| BB_9_governed sector and national bargaining | 2 | 5 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if governed sector and national bargaining |
| BB_10_governed sector and national bargaining | 3 | 2 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if ungoverned sector and national bargaining |
| BB_11_governed company, sector and national bargaining | 2 | 4 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if governed company, sector and national bargaining |
| BB_12_ungoverned company, sector and national bargaining | 3 | 4 | 1/0 dummy: 1 if ungoverned company, sector and national bargaining |
Note: Means are given in percentage points.
Article note
This article is part of the special issue “Industrial Relations: Worker Codetermination and Collective Wage Bargaining” published in the Journal of Economics and Statistics. Access to further articles of this special issue can be obtained at www.degruyter.com/journals/jbnst.
© 2019 Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH, Published by De Gruyter Oldenbourg, Berlin/Boston
