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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter July 6, 2016

Diagnosis is driven by probabilistic reasoning: counter-point

  • Amos Cahan EMAIL logo
From the journal Diagnosis

Abstract

Uncertainty is involved in each and every step of the diagnostic process. Trying to eliminate doubt altogether is too costly, is likely to fail, and may lead to patient harm. Acknowledging this, the threshold approach aims to optimize diagnosis-making by adopting the explicit use of probability estimates and by discouraging the pursuit of 100% certainty. Yet physicians are affected by cognitive biases which compromise their probabilistic reasoning and may lead to unreliable estimates. Health informatics tools helping to overcome human limitations by empowering physicians to handle probabilities are needed to increase the efficiency of diagnostic process.


Corresponding author: Amos Cahan, MD, IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, 1101 Kitchawan Road, Route 134, Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA, Phone: +1 914 945 2590

  1. Author contributions:The author has accepted responsibility for the entire content of the submitted manuscript and approved submission.

  2. Research funding: None declared.

  3. Employment or leadership: None declared.

  4. Honorarium: None declared.

  5. Competing interests: The funding organization(s) played no role in thestudy design; in the collection, analysis, and interpretationof data; in the writing of the report; or in the decision tosubmit the report for publication.

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Received: 2016-5-30
Accepted: 2016-6-1
Published Online: 2016-7-6
Published in Print: 2016-9-1

©2016 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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