ABSTRACT
A non-standard modal logic that we argue useful to represent formally the concept of ignorance in multi-agent systems is reported. We give syntax, and semantics and discuss issues relating to its axiomatisation.
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Index Terms
- Ignore at your peril - towards a logic for ignorance
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