Moni Naor
Benny Pinkas
- 1.http://auction.eecs.umich.edu]]Google Scholar
- 2.D. Beaver, S. Micali and P. Rogaway, "The round complexity of secure protocols", Proc. 22nd ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, 1990, 503-513.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 3.M. Bellare, A. Desai, D. Pointcheval and P. Rogaway, "Relations among notions of security for public-key encryption schemes", Advances in Cryptology - Crypto '98, Springer-Verlag LNCS 1462 (1998), 26-45.]] Google ScholarCross Ref
- 4.M. Bellare and S. Micali, "Non-interactive oblivious transfer and applications", Proc. Adv. in Cryptology - Crypto '89, Springer-Verlag LNCS 435 (1990), 547-557.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 5.C. Cachin, "Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party", to appear, Proc. 6th ACM Conf. on Computer and Communications Security, 1999.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 6.K. Chui and R. Zwick, "Auction on the Internet - A preliminary study", manuscript, 1999. Available at http://home.ust.hk/mkzwick/Internet_Auction.html]]Google Scholar
- 7.E. Clarke, "Multiparty pricing of public goods", Public Choice, 11:17-23, 1971.]]Google ScholarCross Ref
- 8.R. Cramer, I. Damgard and B. Schoenmakers, "Proofs of partial knowledge and simplified design of witness hiding protocols", Proc. Advances in Cryptology - Crypto '94, Springer-Verlag LNCS 839 (1994), 174- 187.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 9.R. Cramer and V. Shoup, "A practical public key cryptosystem provably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks", Proc. Advances in Cryptology - Crypto '98, Springer-Verlag LNCS 1462 (1998), 13-25.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 10.D. Dolev, C. Dwork and M. Naor, "Non-malleable cryptography", Proc. 23th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, 1991.Full version: to appear Siam J. on Computing. Available at http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/naor/onpub.html]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 11.R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and C. M. Kahn, "Protecting the winner: second price vs. ascending bid auctions", Economic Letters, Vol. 35, 1991, 243-248.]]Google ScholarCross Ref
- 12.S. Even, O. Goldreich and A. Lempel, "A Randomized Protocol for Signing Contracts", Communications of the ACM 28, 1985, pp. 637-647.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 13.U. Feige, J. Kilian and M. Naor, "On minimal models for secure computation", Proc. 26th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, 1994, pp. 554-563.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 14.M. K. Franklin and M. K. Reiter, "The design and implementation of a secure auction server", IEEE Tran. on Software Engineering, 22(5), pp. 302-312, 1996.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 15.J. Glazer and A. Rubinstein, "Motives and implementation: on the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions", J. of Economic Theory 79, 157-173, 1998.]]Google ScholarCross Ref
- 16.O. Goldreich, Secure Multi-Party Computation (working draft) Version 1.1, 1998. Available at http://philby.ucsd.edu/books.html]]Google Scholar
- 17.O. Goldreich, S. Goldwasser and S. Micali, "How to construct random functions", J. of the ACM., vol. 33, 1986, 792-807.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 18.O. Goldreich, M. Micali and A. Wigderson, "How to play anymental game", Proc. 19th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, 1987, pp. 218-229.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 19.T. Groves, "Incentives in teams", Econometrica, 41:617-631, 1973.]]Google ScholarCross Ref
- 20.D. Gusfield and R. Irving, The Stable Marriage Problem : Structure and Algorithms, MIT Press, 1989.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 21.M. Harkavy, J. D.Tygar and H. Kikuchi, "Electronic auctions with private bids", 3rd USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, pp. 61-73, 1999.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 22.Q. Huai and T. Sandholm, "Mobile Agents in an Electronic Auction House", Mobile Agents in the Context of Competition and Cooperation (MAC3-workshop), 1999.]]Google Scholar
- 23.R. Impagliazzo and S. Rudich, "Limits on the Provable Consequences of One-Way Permutations", 20th ACM Symp. on the Theory of Computing, 1989, 44-61.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 24.N. Kfir-Dahav, D. Monderer and M. Tennenholtz, "Mechanism design for resource bounded agents", 1998.]]Google Scholar
- 25.M. Kumar and S. I. Feldman, "Internet auctions", 3rd USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, 1999.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 26.Luby M.,Pseudorandomness and Cryptographic Applications, Princeton University Press, 1996.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 27.J. K. MacKie-Mason and H. R. Varian, "Generalized Vickrey auctions", 1994.]]Google Scholar
- 28.D. Monderer and M. Tennenholtz, "K-Price auctions", Working Paper, 1998.]]Google Scholar
- 29.D. Monderer and M. Tennenholtz, "Internet auctions", Working Paper, 1998.]]Google Scholar
- 30.N. Nisan and A. Ronen, "Algorithmic mechanism design", Proc. 31st ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, 1999, 129-140.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 31.A. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press, 1994.]]Google Scholar
- 32.M. O. Rabin, "How to exchange secrets by oblivious transfer", Tech. Memo TR-81, Aiken Computation Laboratory, 1981.]]Google Scholar
- 33.A. E. Roth and M. A. Sotomayor, Two-Sided Matching : A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Cambridge Univ Press, 1990.]]Google ScholarCross Ref
- 34.S. G. Stubblebine and P. F.Syverson, "Fair on-line auctions without special trusted parties", Proc. of Financial Cryptography '99, 1999.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 35.H. R. Varian, "Economic mechanism design for computerized agents", First USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, 1995.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 36.D. Vickrey,"Counter speculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders", Journal of Finance, March 1961, pp. 9-37.]]Google Scholar
- 37.W. Walsh, M. Wellman, P. Wurman and J.K. MacKie- Mason, "Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling", 18th Int. Conf. on Distributed Computing Sys., 1998.]]Google Scholar
- 38.M. Wellman and P. Wurman, "Real time issues for Internet auctions", First IEEE Workshop on Dependable and Real-Time E-commerce Systems, 1998.]]Google Scholar
- 39.P. Wurman, W. Walsh and M. Wellman, "Flexible double auctions for electronic commerce: theory and implementation", Decision Support Systems 24:17-27, 1998.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- 40.A.C. Yao, "How to generate and exchange secrets", Proc. of the 27th IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science, 1986, pp. 162-167.]]Google ScholarDigital Library
Index Terms
- Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Recommendations
Privacy-aware mechanism design
EC '12: Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic CommerceMechanism design deals with distributed algorithms that are executed with self-interested agents. The designer, whose objective is to optimize some function of the agents private types, needs to construct a computation that takes into account agent ...
Design of online auctions: Proxy versus non-proxy settings
Recent years have witnessed the rapid development of online auctions. Currently, some online auctions, such as eBay, introduce a proxy bidding policy, under which bidders submit their maximum bids and delegate to a proxy agent to automatically outbid ...
Comments