skip to main content
10.1145/2459976.2460031acmotherconferencesArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication PagescsiirwConference Proceedingsconference-collections
research-article

Designing and operating through compromise: architectural analysis of CKMS for the advanced metering infrastructure

Published:08 January 2013Publication History

ABSTRACT

Compromises attributable to the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) highlight the necessity for constant vigilance. The APT provides a new perspective on security metrics (e.g., statistics based cyber security) and quantitative risk assessments. We consider design principles and models/tools that provide high assurance for energy delivery systems (EDS) operations regardless of the state of compromise. Cryptographic keys must be securely exchanged, then held and protected on either end of a communications link. This is challenging for a utility with numerous substations that must secure the intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) that may comprise complex control system of systems. For example, distribution and management of keys among the millions of intelligent meters within the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is being implemented as part of the National Smart Grid initiative. Without a means for a secure cryptographic key management system (CKMS) no cryptographic solution can be widely deployed to protect the EDS infrastructure from cyber-attack.

We consider 1) how security modeling is applied to key management and cyber security concerns on a continuous basis from design through operation, 2) how trusted models and key management architectures greatly impact failure scenarios, and 3) how hardware-enabled trust is a critical element to detecting, surviving, and recovering from attack.

References

  1. F. T. Sheldon, R. K. Abercrombie, and A. Mili, "Methodology for Evaluating Security Controls Based on Key Performance indicators and Stakeholder Mission," IEEE HICSS, Jan. '09Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  2. A. Ben Aissa, R. K. Abercrombie, F. T. Sheldon, and A. Mili, "Quantifying Security Threats and Their Potential Impacts: A Case Study," Innovations in Systems and Software Engineering, Volume 6, Number 4, pp. 269--281, Springer London: December 2010 (DOI 10.1007/s11334-010-0123-2) Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  3. "RSA to replace millions of SecurID tokens -- IT should take notice", http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/201123/7248/RSA-to-replace-millions-of-SecurID-tokens-IT-should-take-notice, Jun 2007Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  4. "EMC Unit RSA to Replace Security Tokens After Data Breach", http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-06-07/emc-unit-rsa-to-replace-security-tokens-after-data-breach.htmlGoogle ScholarGoogle Scholar
  5. "Comodo Hacker Claims Credit for DigiNotar Attack", http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/239534/comodo_hacker_claims_credit_for_diginotar_attack.htmlGoogle ScholarGoogle Scholar
  6. "Google tells Iranians: Change your Gmail password", http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/09/09/gmail_diginotar_se curity_alert/Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  7. "Google, Skype, Yahoo Targeted by Rogue Comodo SSL Certificates",http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/223147/google_skype_yahoo_targeted_by_rogue_comodo_s sl_certificates.html, Mar 2011Google ScholarGoogle Scholar

Index Terms

  1. Designing and operating through compromise: architectural analysis of CKMS for the advanced metering infrastructure

    Recommendations

    Comments

    Login options

    Check if you have access through your login credentials or your institution to get full access on this article.

    Sign in

    PDF Format

    View or Download as a PDF file.

    PDF

    eReader

    View online with eReader.

    eReader