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Attacking cryptographic schemes based on "perturbation polynomials"

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Published:09 November 2009Publication History

ABSTRACT

We show attacks on several cryptographic schemes that have recently been proposed for achieving various security goals in sensor networks. Roughly speaking, these schemes all use "perturbation polynomials" to add "noise" to polynomialbased systems that offer information-theoretic security, in an attempt to increase the resilience threshold while maintaining efficiency. We show that the heuristic security arguments given for these modified schemes do not hold, and that they can be completely broken once we allow even a slight extension of the parameters beyond those achieved by the underlying information-theoretic schemes.

Our attacks apply to the key predistribution scheme of Zhang et al. (MobiHoc 2007), the access-control schemes of Subramanian et al. (PerCom 2007), and the authentication schemes of Zhang et al. (INFOCOM 2008). Our results cast doubt on the viability of using "perturbation polynomials" for designing secure cryptographic schemes.

References

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    • Published in

      cover image ACM Conferences
      CCS '09: Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
      November 2009
      664 pages
      ISBN:9781605588940
      DOI:10.1145/1653662

      Copyright © 2009 ACM

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      Publication History

      • Published: 9 November 2009

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