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Privacy enhancing identity management: protection against re-identification and profiling

Published:11 November 2005Publication History

ABSTRACT

User centric identity management will be necessary to protect user's privacy in an electronic society. However, designing such systems is a complex task, as the expectations of the different parties involved in electronic transactions have to be met. In this work we give an overview on the actual situation in user centric identity management and point out problems encountered there. Especially we present the current state of research and mechanisms useful to protect the user's privacy. Additionally we show security problems that have to be borne in mind while designing such a system and point out possible solutions. Thereby, we concentrate on attacks on linkability and identifiability, and possible protection methods.

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  1. Privacy enhancing identity management: protection against re-identification and profiling

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          Andrew Robert Huber

          How can systems be designed to identify users, and at the same time protect their identities__?__ The two sides in an electronic transaction have different needs, and balancing these viewpoints is a complex task. The authors provide an overview of how identity management systems can control and limit the data released to a service. Users are represented by sets of attributes, and can have partial identities based on subsets of these attributes. The identity management system manages these partial identities to provide servers with only the information required for authentication, while preventing the server from learning the full identity and full attributes of the user. This requires limiting the ability of servers and attackers to link partial identities. Two types of identity management systems are described: server centric and decentralized. Decentralized systems tend to be user oriented. Privacy-enhancing identity management systems permit user control of the kind and amount of personal information released. Attacks that allow third parties to discover or link several partial identities and find a user's complete identity are classified and described. These include active and passive attacks by insiders (service providers) and outsiders (external attackers). Some of these are well known, such as statistical attacks on databases. Others rely on timing or linking several databases. Methods of protecting against these attacks are also summarized, such as randomization of statistical databases. Some discussion of the practicality of various attacks and possible success rates would have been helpful. Overall, this summary of current work on identity management systems is useful. Online Computing Reviews Service

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          • Published in

            cover image ACM Conferences
            DIM '05: Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Digital identity management
            November 2005
            120 pages
            ISBN:1595932321
            DOI:10.1145/1102486

            Copyright © 2005 ACM

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            Publication History

            • Published: 11 November 2005

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