Michael Saks
ABSTRACT
Weak monotonicity is a simple necessary condition for a social choice function to be implementable by a truthful mechanism. Roberts [10] showed that it is sufficient for all social choice functions whose domain is unrestricted. Lavi, Mu'alem and Nisan [6] proved the sufficiency of weak monotonicity for functions over order-based domains and Gui, Muller and Vohra [5] proved sufficiency for order-based domains with range constraints and for domains defined by other special types of linear inequality constraints. Here we show the more general result, conjectured by Lavi, Mu'alem and Nisan [6], that weak monotonicity is sufficient for functions defined on any convex domain.
- A. Archer and E. Tardos. Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. In IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 482--491, 2001. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Y. Bartal, R. Gonen, and N. Nisan. Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions. In TARK '03: Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge, pages 72--87. ACM Press, 2003. Google ScholarDigital Library
- S. Bikhchandani, S. Chatterjee, and A. Sen. Incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions. Technical report, UCLA Department of Economics, Dec. 2004.Google Scholar
- A. Goldberg, J. Hartline, A. Karlin, M. Saks and A. Wright. Competitive Auctions, 2004.Google Scholar
- H. Gui, R. Muller, and R. Vohra. Dominant strategy mechanisms with multidimensional types. Technical Report 047, Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization, 2004. available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/dgr/umamet/2004047.html.Google Scholar
- R. Lavi, A. Mu'alem, and N. Nisan. Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions. In FOCS '03: Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, page 574. IEEE Computer Society, 2003. Google ScholarDigital Library
- D. Lehmann, L. O'Callaghan, and Y. Shoham. Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions. J. ACM, 49(5):577--602, 2002. Google ScholarDigital Library
- A. Mas-Colell, M. Whinston, and J. Green. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, 1995.Google Scholar
- N. Nisan. Algorithms for selfish agents. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1563:1--15, 1999. Google ScholarDigital Library
- K. Roberts. The characterization of implementable choice rules. Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, J-J. Laffont (ed.), North Holland Publishing Company.Google Scholar
- J.-C. Rochet. A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 16:191--200, 1987.Google ScholarCross Ref
- I. Rozenshtrom. Dominant strategy implementation with quasi-linear preferences. Master's thesis, Dept. of Economics, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, 1999.Google Scholar
Index Terms
- Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains
Recommendations
Truthful germs are contagious: a local to global characterization of truthfulness
EC '08: Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerceWe study the question of how to easily recognize whether a social choice function f from an abstract type space to a set of outcomes is truthful, i.e. implementable by a truthful mechanism. In particular, if the restriction of f to every "simple" subset ...
The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions
EC '09: Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerceWe analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the classic explore/exploit dilemma: while gathering information about the click ...
Comments