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On optimal group claims at voting in a stochastic environment

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Abstract

There is a paradox in the model of social dynamics determined by voting in a stochastic environment (the ViSE model) called “pit of losses.” It consists in the fact that a series of democratic decisions may systematically lead the society to the states unacceptable for all the voters. The paper examines how this paradox can be neutralized by the presence in society of a group that votes for its benefit and can regulate the threshold of its claims. We obtain and analyze analytical results characterizing the welfare of the whole society, the group, and the other participants as functions of the said claims threshold.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

    V. A. Malyshev & P. Yu. Chebotarev

  2. Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Moscow, Russia

    V. A. Malyshev & P. Yu. Chebotarev

Authors
  1. V. A. Malyshev
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  2. P. Yu. Chebotarev
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Correspondence to V. A. Malyshev.

Additional information

Original Russian Text © V.A. Malyshev, P.Yu. Chebotarev, 2017, published in Avtomatika i Telemekhanika, 2017, No. 6, pp. 157–172.

This paper was recommended for publication by A.L. Fradkov, a member of the Editorial Board

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Malyshev, V.A., Chebotarev, P.Y. On optimal group claims at voting in a stochastic environment. Autom Remote Control 78, 1087–1100 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117917060091

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117917060091

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