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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2014
THE SHOCK INDUCED IN SWEDEN BY OLOF PALME'S assassination was not translated into any dramatic political consequences. In the absence of any identifiable culprit or motive Swedes could do little more than speculate inconclusively whether responsibility might lie in a vendetta against Palme pursued by some foreign agency or, less likely but more insidious, in some unsuspected pathology within their own society. The assassination served no obvious political purpose. It could only be registered, therefore, as signifying that Sweden, no less than countries with a tradition of political violence, was subject to the ‘sleep of reason’. In a mood of sad resignation the country sought to resume normal politics.
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4 Ibid.
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