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Non‐Political Caretaker Administrations and Democratic Elections in Bangladesh: An Assessment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Habib Zafarullah  and
Muhammad Yeahia Akhter
Habib Zafarullah
Affiliation:
Teaches political science and public policy at the University of New England, Australia
Muhammad Yeahia Akhter
Affiliation:
Teaches political science at the University of Chittagong, Bangladesh
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Extract

The transition to democracy in bangladesh after the overthrow of the authoritarian regime in 1990 began with the formation of a non-political caretaker administration (NCA) to prepare the ground for the transfer of power to a popularly mandated government. Its other important purpose was to manage the affairs of the state during the interlude that separated the dissolution of the authoritarian regime (December 1990) and the complete installation of the democratically-elected government (September 1991) to rule the country in its own right.

The need for this NCA was imperative in the wake of the dismantling of authoritarian rule. The attempts of the ousted regime to conduct a third election, while still in power, were not acceptable to its political adversaries, given the former's proven tendency to unduly inf luence the electoral process in the past.

Type
Original Article
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 35 , Issue 3 , July 2000 , pp. 345 - 369
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 2000

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References

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