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Nathan L. King, Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology: A Reply to the Situationist Challenge, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 64, Issue 255, April 2014, Pages 243–253, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqt047
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Abstract
Some epistemologists—virtue responsibilists—model the intellectual virtues on Aristotelian moral virtues. According to responsibilists, intellectual virtues are stable, excellent dispositions of cognitive character like intellectual courage, open-mindedness, curiosity and creativity. Such virtues figure prominently in responsibilist accounts of knowledge, epistemic justification and proper inquiry. In a recent paper, Mark Alfano argues that because human subjects rarely possess responsibilist virtues, responsibilism skirts skepticism and empirical inadequacy. The present paper defends responsibilism against these charges.