Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-m8qmq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-24T10:30:47.180Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Empirical Implications of Signaling Models: Estimation of Belief Updating in International Crisis Bargaining

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Taehee Whang
Taehee Whang*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4348. e-mail: taeheewhang@politics.tamu.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Signaling models are ubiquitous in political science. An essential characteristic of these models is that actors can update their beliefs about their opponents. An actor observes the behavior of his opponent, and this behavior functions as a signal that allows the actor to learn more about his opponent's true “type.” As a result, the actor is able to adapt his own behavior. Current statistical models of strategic choice based on perfect Bayesian equilibrium, however, allow for very little, if any, belief updating. I explain why current models allow for little updating and offer in their stead a new, fully strategic choice estimator that calculates the correct amount of belief updating.

Type
Research Article
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 18 , Issue 3 , Summer 2010 , pp. 381 - 402
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Banks, Jeffrey S. 1989. Agency budgets, cost information, and auditing. American Journal of Political Science 33: 670–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bas, Muhammet A., Signorino, Curtis S., and Walker, Robert W. 2008. Statistical backwards induction: A simple method for estimating recursive strategic models. Political Analysis 16: 21–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet, Arnold, Laura W., and Zorn, Christopher J. W. 1997. The strategic timing of position taking in congress: A study of the North American free trade agreement. American Political Science Review 91: 324–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carrubba, Clifford J., Yuen, Amy, and Zorn, Christopher. 2007. In defense of comparative statics: Specifying empirical tests of models of strategic interaction. Political Analysis 15: 465–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Diermeier, Daniel, and Feddersen, Timothy J. 2000. Information and congressional hearings. American Journal of Political Science 44: 51–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Esarey, Justin, Mukherjee, Bumba, and Moore, Will H. 2008. Strategic interaction and interstate crises: A Bayesian quantal response estimator for incomplete information games. Political Analysis 16: 250–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1994. Signaling versus the balance of power and interests: An empirical test of a crisis bargaining model. Journal of Conflict Resolution 38: 236–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1995. Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization 49: 379–414.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1997. Signaling foreign policy interests: Tying hands versus sinking costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41: 68–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gartzke, Erik, Li, Quan, and Boehmer, Charles. 2001. Investing in the peace: Economic interdependence and international conflict. International Organization 55: 391–438.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guisinger, Alexandra, and Smith, Alastair. 2002. Honest threats: The interaction of reputation and political institutions in international crises. Journal of Conflict Resolution 46: 175–200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hall, Peter A., and Franzese, Robert J. 1998. Mixed signals: Central bank independence, coordinated wage bargaining, and European monetary union. International Organization 52: 505–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leventoglu, Bahar, and Tarar, Ahmer. 2008. Does private information lead to delay or war in crisis bargaining? International Studies Quarterly 52: 533–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, Jeffrey B., and Schultz, Kenneth A. 2003. Revealing preferences: Empirical estimation of a crisis bargaining game with incomplete information. Political Analysis 11: 345–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Licaria, Michael J., and Meier, Kenneth J. 2000. Regulation and signaling: When a tax is not just a tax. Journal of Politics 62: 875–85.Google Scholar
Lohmann, Susanne. 1993. A signaling model of informative and manipulative political action. American Political Science Review 87: 319–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lupia, Arthur. 1992. Busy voters, agenda control, and the power of information. American Political Science Review 86: 390–404.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mansfield, Edward D., Milner, Helen V., and Rosendorff, Peter. 2003. Free to trade: Democracies, autocracies, and international trade. American Political Science Review 94: 305–21.Google Scholar
Martin, Lisa L. 1993. Credibility, costs, and institutions: Cooperation on economic sanctions. World Politics 45: 406–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morrow, James D. 1994. Alliances, credibility, and peacetime costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution 38: 270–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ordeshook, Peter C., and Palfrey, Thomas R. 1988. Agendas, strategic voting, and signaling with incomplete information. American Journal of Political Science 32: 441–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rogers, James. 2001. Information and judicial review: A signaling game of legislative-judicial interaction. American Journal of Political Science 45: 84–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sartori, Anne E. 2002. The might of the pen: A reputational theory of communication in international disputes. International Organization 56: 121–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sartori, Anne E. 2003. An estimator for some binary-outcome selection models without exclusion restrictions. Political Analysis 11: 111–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Schultz, Kenneth A. 1999. Do democratic institutions constrain or inform? Contrasting two institutional perspectives on democracy and war. International Organization 53: 233–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schultz, Kenneth A., and Lewis, Jeffrey B. 2006. Learning about learning: A response to wand. Political Analysis 14: 121–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Signorino, Curtis S. 1999. Strategic interaction and the statistical analysis of international conflict. American Political Science Review 93: 279–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Signorino, Curtis S. 2003. Structure and uncertainty in discrete choice models. Political Analysis 11: 316–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Signorino, Curtis S. 2007. On formal theory and statistical methods: A response to Carrubba, Yuen, and Zorn. Political Analysis 15: 483–501.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simmons, Beth A. 2000. International law and state behavior: Commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs. American Political Science Review 94: 819–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, Alastair. 1998. International crises and domestic politics. American Political Science Review 92: 623–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, Alastair. 1999. Testing theories of strategic choice: The example of crisis escalation. American Journal of Political Science 43: 1254–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Snyder, James M., and Ting, Michael M. 2002. An informational rationale for political parties. American Journal of Political Science 46: 90–110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wand, Jonathan. 2006. Comparing models of strategic choice: The role of uncertainty and signaling. Political Analysis 14: 101–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Whang, Taehee. 2009. Uncertainty and learning in statistical strategic models. Working paper, Texas A&M University.Google Scholar