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Ben Blumson, Two Conceptions of Similarity, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 68, Issue 270, January 2018, Pages 21–37, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqx021
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Abstract
There are at least two traditional conceptions of numerical degree of similarity. According to the first, the degree of dissimilarity between two particulars is their distance apart in a metric space. According to the second, the degree of similarity between two particulars is a function of the number of (sparse) properties they have in common and not in common. This paper argues that these two conceptions are logically independent, but philosophically inconsonant.
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