African wildlife conservation and the evolution of hunting institutions

Hunting is the active pursuit and harvest of wild animals. Loveridge et al (2006) identify three different types of hunters, based on motivation: (i) subsistence hunters, who seek to acquire food and other useful products for themselves and their immediate families; (ii) market or commercial hunters, who seek to acquire animal products to sell for profit; and (iii) recreational hunters, who enjoy the practice of hunting as a sport or leisure activity, albeit harvesting products such as meat or trophies. Fischer et al (2013a, 2013b) provide more detailed models of hunting motivations and functions, further identifying (iv) hunting for socio-cultural reasons and (v) perceived managerial needs to selectively control animal numbers or eliminate designated problem animals (i.e. culling). These analyses also reveal that motives for hunting are often mixed, confounding simple typologies. Hunting may also take place either legally or illegally. The latter practice, commonly termed 'poaching', is typically linked with rural poverty (Duffy et al 2016, Knapp et al 2017).

Within the conservation literature, there are three distinct focal points of discussion relating to hunting and appropriate policy responses. First is the so-called bushmeat crisis (Milner-Gulland and Bennett 2003, Bennett et al 2007), which is driven by expanding nutritional demands of human populations and changes in scale of hunting for meat from subsistence to commercial levels (Fa and Brown 2009, Brashares et al 2011, Lindsey et al 2013). Second is the transnational commercial poaching crisis, typically labelled as the 'illegal wildlife trade', which concerns market hunting to harvest valuable products such as elephant ivory, rhino horn and pangolin scales (Warchol 2004, Challender and MacMillan 2014).

The third focal area concerns recreational hunting, including trophy hunting, which is extensively discussed and debated in the literature (e.g. Dickson et al 2009). Some analysts argue that trophy hunting plays a vital supportive role in African wildlife conservation and caution against bans and excessive restrictions; others disagree (Naidoo et al 2016, Jacquet and Delon 2016, Ripple et al 2016c, Di Minin et al 2016b). Muposhi et al (2017, 2016) comprehensively review trophy hunting as a conservation tool, detailing problems with illegal hunting, inadequate monitoring systems and hunting bans. They argue that recreational hunting retains potential to incentivize conservation and contribute to rural development, but that more research is needed at local, regional and international levels to inform policy.

Contemporary opposition to hunting, especially trophy hunting, is also motivated by ethical concerns related to animal welfare, animal rights, aesthetics and objections against wildlife commodification (Varner 1998, 2011, King 2005, 't Sas-Rolfes 2016). These concerns underpin an emerging compassionate conservation movement that emphasizes protection of individual animals in addition to species (Vucetich and Nelson 2013, Ramp and Bekoff 2015), but which is not universally accepted by conservationists (Nelson et al 2016). Moral philosophers note that there are multiple ways to address ethical issues (moral pluralism), that ethical codes vary with culture and context (moral relativism), and that it is problematic to legally enforce ethical principles that are not universally shared (Brennan 2011, Rachels 1993, 2004). Accordingly, ethical approaches may influence public opinion and the positions of specific interest groups, but may not provide a firm basis for universally applicable hunting regulation. However, ethical codes clearly underpin varying informal institutions.

Separate strands of institutional thought within the fields of political science and economics are starting to converge under the influence of evolutionary theory, increasingly recognizing institutions as both structures and processes (Hodgson 2007, Lewis and Steinmo 2012, Potts 2007). Consistent with contemporary approaches, North (1991, p. 97) defines institutions as 'the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction', noting that they 'consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).' An evolutionary institutional economics approach examines and elucidates the dynamic interactions between these various institutions and the behaviour of humans motivated by economic incentives, and is grounded in seminal work by North (1990), Ostrom (1990) and Williamson (2000)³. This work is extended by richer theories of institutional links to socio-ecological systems and polycentric forms of environmental governance (Ostrom et al 2002, Ostrom 2005; 2010, Young et al 2006, Paavola 2007), and illuminated by the important concepts of institutional interplay, fit, scale, and dynamics (Young 2002, 2010).

The core insight to be gleaned from this literature is that setting effective regulation is a complex undertaking. Allocations of rights profoundly influence human behaviour, and regulations do not always guide behaviour in simple and direct ways. Regulators and lobbyists should consider the interplay between institutions at multiple scales and across geographies, and be mindful of how formal institutions interact with informal institutions—i.e. whether rights and regulations are inclusive or serve the vested interests of a minority or elite group. Failure to do so may result in significant second-order effects and unintended consequences that undermine the original intent of the regulations and create collateral and possibly even larger long-term problems. This last point, already well known to economists (Acemoglu 2006, Bastiat 1850), highlights the importance of understanding and anticipating institutional dynamics, and generally supports bottom-up approaches to regulation that involve all relevant stakeholders rather than top-down approaches that do not.

These paradigm shifts are evident in more recent direct applications of institutional and governance theory to African conservation and natural resource management (see Child et al 2008, Barnes and Child 2014, Muchapondwa and Stage 2015) and even specifically to hunting (Fischer et al 2013b). Much of this line of inquiry is nascent and unacknowledged in mainstream conservation science literature. Nonetheless, at least some conservationists recognize the significance of social values and role of political ecology (Jepson and Canney 2003, Adams and Hutton 2007). Accordingly, some academics and practitioners also seek to incorporate social development goals into African conservation policy, invoking the principle of sustainable use of natural resources (Prins et al 2000, Child 2004, McShane et al 2011), while others acknowledge that social values cannot be readily changed for the sake of conservation (Manfredo et al 2017).

Muposhi et al (2016) shed light specifically on African hunting institutions, following a detailed historical review in Zimbabwe. They affirm that hunting has deep traditional roots in human civilization and that many indigenous African communities sustainably regulated their hunting activities by way of customary frameworks (demarcation of sacred areas, use of totems, and other social norms) throughout pre-colonial history. These institutions were largely displaced during the colonial era and ultimately superseded by the establishment of state protected areas and strictly regulated recreational hunting in designated areas, with access often limited to paying outside visitors.

Social scientists have recently provided insights into underlying social tensions, the significance of power relationships, and mismatch between formal and informal institutions in other African countries where both legal and illegal hunting is prevalent⁴. These studies highlight that many institutional arrangements for African wildlife conservation and commercial hunting remain inherently socially unstable and that significant reforms may be needed to ensure future sustainability. Much of this instability, it is argued, is linked to a history of dispossession—widespread instances of local communities losing their customary rights to land and wildlife use—and apparent strong desires to reappropriate such rights from the government agencies, national elites, foreign investors, and foreign consumers who currently claim them. Trickle-down economic benefits from existing commercial hunting enterprises are frequently seen as inadequate, and more fundamental devolution of power or transfers of rights may be sought to address perceived past injustices, failing which conservation efforts may be impaired.

As Muchapondwa and Stage (2015) have thus noted, addressing elite capture, stakeholder disengagement and distributional issues remain key issues for African wildlife conservation governance. In the realm of hunting, two additional issues emerge. The first pertains to an alternative method of producing hunting stock: intensive and selective breeding, which has been enabled by the development of wildlife market institutions and raises new concerns for conservationists. The second relates to complex interdependent interactions between hunting and wildlife trade regulation, and the conservation consequences thereof. Both issues are highlighted in the following two case studies.

Populations of both African rhino species were abundant and widespread prior to the 19th century arrival of significant numbers of European colonial settlers with guns (Martin and Martin 1983). Treating wildlife as an open access resource, early settlers hunted rhinos extensively for sport, harvesting their meat for food and their horns for trade, sometimes co-opting local Africans as collaborators. Following drastic declines in African big game numbers, elite Western lobby groups inspired by hunters initiated the international conservation movement in the early 20th century (Jepson and Whittaker 2002). Rhinos benefited from the consequent creation of protected areas and game laws; sport and meat hunting largely ceased. However, rhino horn continued to be valued in Asian markets, inducing illegal market hunting. This prompted a 1977 international rhino horn trade ban under CITES. Initially considered a failure, the CITES trade ban finally appeared to contain poaching levels by 1995, by which time significant consumer countries had acceded to the convention and banned domestic trade.

South Africa's rhino populations, close to extinction by 1900, recovered impressively during the second half of the 20th century. To achieve this, South Africa adopted a formal institutional model, grounded in sustainable use principles, that enabled both state and private land-owning entities secure and beneficial property rights over individual animals, further allowing regulated commercial trophy hunting and market trade in live animals and their products ('t Sas-Rolfes 1990). This arrangement enabled both private and public operations to gain additional conservation finance, generated widespread economic benefits, and facilitated significant expansion of rhino range. This contrasted sharply with most other African countries, which maintained strict regulations and hunting bans, but mostly lost their wild populations during this time.

Following resurgent demand and associated rising market prices for rhino horn, from 2003 visiting Asian nationals started masquerading as trophy hunters to exploit the only legal means to export horns out of South Africa. The South African government responded by imposing tighter restrictions on a range of rhino-related activities, including hunting, and a moratorium on the domestic trade in rhino horn. Some wildlife industry participants responded to these restrictions by engaging in illegal practices, and the period 2007−2014 was characterised by a dramatic increase in rhino poaching and spread of related illegal activity across the country and internationally. This period is remarkable for the adaptability and ingenuity displayed by illegal market actors in response to evolving formal attempts to thwart their activities. The illegal market drew in many people, from impoverished rural locals to transnational organised crime syndicates, and involved numerous cases of corruption (Hübschle 2017).

From 2015, rhino poaching levels appeared to stabilize, but this was achieved only with substantial investment in militarized security measures, and poaching pressure remained high. Social scientists warned that this approach alienated local communities, was neither financially nor socially sustainable, and could result in deleterious long term consequences for wildlife conservation (Annecke and Masubelele 2016, Duffy 2015). Private owners, who harboured a growing portion of the rhino population (more than a third by 2017), mostly supported legalizing the horn trade, hoping to reinforce the successful 20th century sustainable use approach (Rubino and Pienaar 2017). However, an increasing number of privately-owned rhinos were being selectively bred under semi-extensive conditions, outside their core historical range, raising concerns about their long-term conservation role. Although private breeders eventually succeeded in rescinding the domestic trade moratorium, prospects of lifting the international CITES ban remained poor, preventing easy access to Asian consumer markets. NGOs mostly opposed legalizing rhino horn trade and objected to the emergence of rhino farming, with many also campaigning against continued trophy hunting.

Once widespread throughout Africa, lion populations have declined due to encroaching human agriculture and settlement, to the point where their future elicits great concern among conservationists (Bauer et al 2015). Lions are killed for sport by (mostly foreign) trophy hunters and for socio-cultural and retaliatory reasons by local Africans such as Maasai warriors (Hazzah et al 2009). In recent decades, lion trophy hunting has become increasingly regulated, if not banned altogether, in most African countries. The Cecil incident highlighted the occurrence of regulatory infractions, prompting conservation biologists to emphasize that exceeding established quotas may have serious negative impacts on lion population dynamics (Loveridge et al 2016).

As with rhinos, the South African institutional environment enabled the development of a commercial lion breeding and hunting industry. Initially intending to supply zoos and safari-parks, captive lion breeders started supplying 'put-and-take' trophy hunting ventures, which galvanized protests from animal welfare activists. Already firmly established by 2007, this industry also started supplying lion skeletons, as a by-product from trophy hunts, to Asian export markets. Following evidence that lion bones were being used as substitutes for tiger bones in traditional Asian medicines, conservationists raised concerns that such trade could stimulate commercial poaching of wild lions, but found no evidence that this was happening in South Africa (Williams et al 2015).

Following Cecil's death and a coordinated campaign against commercial captive breeding, activist NGOs persuaded several Western governments to implement trophy import bans. Most notable among these was a 2016 US ban on the import of trophies from captive-bred South African lions. This ban had a potentially significant impact on the economic viability of both lion breeding and trophy hunting, given that more than 95% of lions hunted in South Africa at the time were captive bred. A further NGO-led attempt to ban all international commercial lion trade under CITES failed. Instead, South Africa's government negotiated to maintain an annual legal lion skeleton export quota, supplied from captive bred lions only. No other international trade in wild lion body parts, aside from some hunter trophies, was permitted.

The South African government undertook to review its export quota annually, applying an adaptive management approach subject to the results of research on the conservation impact of wild lions. Although captive-bred lions are considered unsuitable for reintroduction into the wild (Hunter et al 2013) and therefore considered by the US government to have no conservation value, they may play a vital (as yet poorly understood) buffer role for wild populations (Lindsey et al 2012). Experience from the rhino case suggests that reactive attempts to stifle legal commercial activity may have unintended consequences that are ultimately detrimental for conservation. A comparative institutional analysis suggests that a complete ban on lion hunting since 1977 in Kenya failed to prevent the decline of wild populations in that country (Nelson et al 2013). By contrast, in 2015 South Africa appeared to be the only country in which all wild lion populations were increasing (Bauer et al 2015).