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Between Mathematics and Physics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Michael D. Resnik
Michael D. Resnik*
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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Extract

The distinction between mathematical and physical objects has probably played a greater role shaping the philosophy of mathematics than the distinction between observable and theoretical entities has had in defining the philosophy of science. All the major movements in the philosophy of mathematics may be seen as attempts to free mathematics of an abstract ontology or to come to terms with it. The reasons are epistemic. Most philosophers of mathematics believe that the abstractaess of mathematical objects introduces special difficulties in accounting for our ability to know them, to refer to them and even to entertain beliefs about them. These difficulties—supposedly absent even in the case of the most theoretical physical objects—make mathematical objects especially problematic and philosophically unattractive.

Few have questioned this epistemic thesis or the ontic distinction it presupposes. LaVerne Shelton (1980) challenged the abstract-concrete distinction some years ago in an unpublished APA address.

Type
Part IX. Mathematical and Physical Objects
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1990 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1990 , 1990 , pp. 368 - 378
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1991

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Footnotes

1

I would like to thank Susan Hale and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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