Introduction
This article addresses the present political situation in the Sudan, including the regime's institutions and social organisation. It focuses on the role of civil society under the current regime, and describes the main social movements and organisations.
An authoritarian National Islamic Front (NIF)/National Congress Party (NCP) regime has clung to power since June 1989, mobilising state resources and institutions to serve the interests of political Islam. That a multicultural and multiethnic Sudan is still to openly confront this legacy is itself a reflection of the dominant influence of the NIF over the country's various regions. However, this is not an accusation that can be directed at the NIF alone. Historically, other regimes in the Sudan have been criticised for of the use of religion in pursuit of power. For instance, political leaders have often called Islam into play during crises: for example, the declaration of sharia law by Nimeiri in 1983; and the success of the alliance of Islamists from the Umma Party, National Unionist Party and Muslim Brotherhood in securing the dissolution of the Sudanese Communist Party in 1965, and expulsion of its democratically elected members from the constituent assembly (Mahmoud 1997). This trend was intensified after the coup of 1989, with the Islamic movement using the institutions of the state to structure and legitimise its hegemony. Ruling party policies, strategies and ideology are propagated using the state apparatus, which also provides the governing party with the means for coercion, while also giving it the material resources to divide society.
This article consists of two main sections. The first focuses on the rise and growth of the NIF from a small political party to a ruling power following the military coup of 1989. It discusses the nature of government organisations/institutions and analyses the causes leading to the failure of the Islamic project in the country. The second describes the challenges facing an independent civil society, highlighting how legal restrictions and control, gender inequality and social exclusion have impacted on the different regions of the multicultural state.
The rise of the Islamic movement
The post-independence period
The Islamic movement1 started as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement in the mid 1940s. The Unified Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood Organisation was established in 1954. Ten years later, in 1964, the movement established a political organisation called the Islamic Charter Front, which was shaped by its student origins and came to be seen as an urban-centred modern movement, notably when compared to the tradition-bound Sufi orders (Khatmiyyah) and the Umma Party (Ansar). It was Hassan Al-Turabi, the Muslim Brotherhood's main thinker, who changed the movement's nature and fortunes. Between 1964 and 1969, the movement grew into a pressure group advocating an Islamic constitution, a project that was supported by both the Ansar and the Khatmiyyah sects, and which contributed to both the dissolution of the Sudanese Communist Party in 1965 and the Nimeiri-led coup of May 1969.
Turabi's opportunistic approach in aligning the Brotherhood with the Nimeiri regime (1969–85) saw the Muslim Brothers becoming, after 1971, the only politically active party in the country and Turabi being appointed Attorney General in 1979, alongside other Muslim Brothers who secured positions in cabinet and other key government institutions. By aligning itself with an undemocratic regime, the Islamic movement succeeded in infiltrating the regime's structures and creating space within official channels, to campaign for Islamisation. Collaboration with Nimeiri was crucial, too, in allowing the movement to build a solid economic foundation, based on Islamic banking and investment. The association presided over an increase in the number of branches of the Faisal Islamic Bank, an expansion in the adoption of Islamic clothing by women and, in September 1983, the declaration of sharia law by Nimeiri. Writing about the last of these. Mahmoud (2007, pp. 275–286) wrote that:
The regime's shift to the right and its gradual Islamization reached a dramatic climax in 1983 when Nimayri announced the imposition of the Islamic penal code or hudud. The new harsh and extreme penal measures of limb amputation and humiliating floggings were enthusiastically promoted and implemented by Muslim Brothers.
Nimeiri observed that the influence of the Islamic movement, and its impact on public life, represented a threat to his regime, which was aware that the Islamic movement did not necessarily bring stability (Gasm El-Sayed, 1996, p. 104). Indeed, widespread discontent at the bad publicity resulting from the implementation of sharia, particularly reports of extreme brutality towards, and humiliation of, anyone considered to have fallen foul of its strictures, led Nimeiri to accuse the Islamic movement of conspiracy to topple his regime (Mahmoud, 1997, p. 2). Such tension, allied to the perceived widespread corruption of the regime, contributed to the escalation of civil war in the south of the country, and to the political and economic crises that led eventually to the people's uprising of April 1985 when trades unions joined forces with opposition political parties to organise a strike which weakened the government and its institutions, leading to the fall of the Nimeiri regime. The years of democratic government between 1985 and 1989 posed a potentially serious threat to the Islamic movement and the economic and religious gains it had recorded up to that point. A major turning point in the fortunes of the movement came in May 1985, when the Islamic Charter Front changed its name to the National Islamic Front, and, according to Turabi, was transformed into a new coalition between the movement and a number of tribal and popular figures which undertook to protect and preserve the Islamic movement's achievements in the face of a campaign by secular political parties and other groups to eradicate completely the Islamic legacy of the Nimeiri regime (Al-Mahboub, 2010, pp. 56–57).
The Islamic movement in power in the post-1989 period
Following the military coup of 1989, the National Islamic Front adopted a very hostile and aggressive attitude towards civic institutions such as trade unions, women's and student groups, political parties and civil society organisations. Democratic rights to free expression and association were curtailed. In their place, the NIF established hundreds of organisations to which it offered tax and customs exemptions, and which became vehicles for accumulating shares in privatised public bodies. Not surprisingly, the then-Minister of Finance, Abdelwahab Osman, was critical of these practices in his budget speech, identifying them as factors leading to the weakness of the government revenue base (El Nagar 2006, p. 76).
Alex de Waal described the Islamic movement's organisations in the Sudan thus:
they can act as trading companies, may assist in training and feeding the soldiers, and are active in proselytisation. Peace Camps run by Islamic agencies are an integral part of the government's counter-insurgency strategy. In some of the war zones, Islamic agencies have become virtually indistinguishable from the government. (de Waal 1997, p. 98)
Such observations concerning the role of Islamic organisations working in war zone areas act as a prelude to further enquiry into the quality of their services, as well as into who benefits from these services and at whose expense.
Al-Tayeb Zein Al-Abdin (2003), a Sudanese Islamist scholar, has divided these Islamic groups into voluntary agencies and national sects, on the one hand, and government institutions on the other. The former include the Ansar and Khatmiyyah sects, the modern Islamic movement known as the National Islamic Front, Muslim Brothers, Ansar Al Suna Al-Mahamedyyah, other Sufi groups, and sub-organisations and associations under the structures of the main groups. The government Islamic institutions fall under the Ministry of Guidance, Al-Zakat Chamber, Islamic studies sections of higher education institutions such as Omdurman Islamic, Al Koran Al-Kareem and International African Universities, the Islamic Education Department at the National Curriculum Centre in Bakht el-Rida, and the Religious Programme sections at Televisions and Broadcast. The Islamic regime's own copycat Cultural Revolution has had devastating effects on the education system, leading to an almost entire generation of inadequately educated individuals. Many of the newer of Sudan's 30 universities would not meet accepted international standards that qualify academic institutions for the status of university. Mohamed Saeed Al-Gadal (2004) observes, for example, that ‘Khartoum University has become the possession of a political party, because appointments and promotions occur according to the party loyalty.’
The NIF's alliance with the Nimeiri military regime, starting in 1971, facilitated its accumulation of wealth. Although outlawed at the time, NIF was allowed to operate freely, including in business, where it benefited from access to the resources of financial institutions like Faisal Bank. According to de Waal (1997, p. 98), the coup of 30 June 1989 ‘was the culmination of ten years of NIF financial dominance in Sudan and in government. The NIF was able to take that process to its logical conclusion.’ While some of the institutions and organisations which facilitated NIF expansion and the consolidation of its power and influence predated the 1989 coup, new ones were created after the coup. The most important of these are given below.
Relief and Islamic Mission (Dawa) organisations
The Islamic movement established a number of relief and advocacy organisations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The best-known ones are Islamic Mission (Dawa Islamiyyah) and the Islamic Relief Agency. A key reason for their establishment was to attract funding from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. A second reason for their existence was to provide vehicles for Islamic advocacy and social activism which were not directly NIF organisations. In reality, these and other relief, voluntary and Dawa organisations like them are under the direct and indirect control of the NIF. Thus the first chairperson of the Trustee Council of Dawa Islamiyyah, which specialises in service delivery and caters for internally displaced victims of natural and man-made disasters all over Sudan, was a military officer who worked for a long time in Saudi Arabia, and whose appointment ensured strong support from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the Emirates. Ten of the members of the Trustee Council were known Islamists and members of the NIF. Of the three others who were not NIF members, one was a former vice-chancellor of the University of Khartoum, while the other two were from the Muslim Brothers Party and Ansar Al Suna Al Mahamediyyah, respectively. Dawa Islamiyyah operates in the name of the National Islamic Front (Al-Mahboub 2010, p. 26).
Islamic student and youth movement
The Islamic student and youth movement, which encompasses members from both secondary and higher education institutions, represents the most dynamic vehicle for NIF's social, cultural, political and religious activities, as student unions in all universities were controlled by the NIF between 1974 and 1990. Furthermore, the NIF succeeded in involving this social group in its activities after graduation, by employing them in its economic and financial institutions, charities and political and security structures.
Islamic women and youth movement
The main women's and youth organs of the NIF were the National Women's Front, Nahda Pioneers Association (for women) and Youth-Building Organisation (for men). The National Women's Front was very active during the 1986 election campaign, organising political rallies, workshops and one-to-one contacts both in residential areas and places of employment on behalf of the NIF. Indeed, members of the National Women's Front participated actively in all political campaigns during the democratic interregnum between 1985 and 1989, when the NIF was represented in parliament by two female Members of Parliament (MPs). On the social front, Islamic women's organisations prepared and implemented projects and activities for families, widows, orphans, destitute female-headed households, female prisoners, displaced and street children, and female vendors. This big effort was closely co-ordinated with, and supported by, other Islamic organisations such as the Islamic Relief Agency and Dawa Islamiyyah. One of the largest such schemes involved group or mass marriage ceremonies of young couples attracted by cash and other inducements offered by the NIF during these Al-Zahra marriages, which were aimed at creating social units favourable to the NIF in all regions of the country. The other well-known project was Guntar Dahab, which involved collecting gold from well-off Sudanese women at home and abroad, and using this to fund Sudanese military forces fighting in the civil war against the South. Sudanese Television campaigned for this project as well.
Islamic trade and professional unions
As labourers were not well represented in the NIF, the Labourers' Front was considered one of the weakest of the NIF organs (Woodward 1990, pp. 210–300), particularly when compared to the Communist Party's successes. The NIF's weakness in infiltrating trade and professional unions continued until 1989 (El Nagar 2006, p. 59), when the coup of June that year saw an oppressive NIF regime banning unions and other democratic institutions. Most labour leaders who supported other political parties were either dismissed or imprisoned, while Islamic cadres were appointed to replace elected union officials, and unions were directed to support the new regime and its policies.
NIF's community-based organisations
NIF organisations and approaches did not encounter challenges at grassroots and community levels. Rural Muslims appeared to lack organisation and direction, while non-Muslims in camps for the displaced and in the South were poor and desperate for educational and health services, food and relief aid. The NIF political and social network reached into all aspects of life in rural and semi-urban areas. The coup of 1989 imposed new political structures throughout Sudan, including Popular Committees with wide-ranging mandates covering security, elections, economic activities, displaced camps, and so on. Thus the NIF programme for Comprehensive Daawa was well known all over the country, with its cultural, social and religious components. The latter, for example, involves Al Koran Al Kareem sessions for children at kindergarten and for female householders. These activities are undertaken in mosques and schools in almost every village. Other social activities focused, for example, on sport (particularly football, the most popular sport for men in Sudan), with sports teams being formed and supported by Islamic organisations. Attention was also devoted to mosques and their role in Islamic advocacy. Sheikhs were trained in advocacy to prepare them to both promote and defend NIF political, social and economic programmes, while mosques were built in every ministry and government institution, and NIF members advised to visit mosques and pray regularly. Regular attendance at mosque was considered by some government institutions as a main criterion for staff promotion.
Publication and media
In the area of publications, the NIF established a number of publication companies, centres and bookshops in Khartoum State, with the express purpose of producing, publishing and disseminating Islamic literature. On the media, the NIF allocated both human and financial resources to train and equip Islamic institutions with well-qualified Islamic staff and high-tech equipment, tools and technologies.
The failure of the regime and its project
What the foregoing suggests is that the NIF was prepared for, and had put in place, strategies for long-term political, social, religious and cultural change. Over the last two decades, the NIF has infiltrated Sudanese society and tried to mainstream its political agenda, often through Islamising markers of secularity and modernity such as schools, insurance and sports associations. This has produced an immature Islamic experiment in the country, one characterised by a lack of respect for democratic practices and institutions on the part of an NIF. However, many progressive forces believe that a tolerant Sudanese Islam operating as part of a pluralist democracy can effectively counter the NIF's brand of political Islam (Al-Zobier Ibrahim 1996, pp. 310–312, Hale 1997, pp. 11–12).
According to Ahmed (2007, p. 1), for example, ‘Abdelsalam Al Mahaboub, one of the leading Islamists in Sudan, confessed … that the Islamic movement had created a conflict due to its isolationism and alienation from the Sudanese society and the dilemma of viewing the whole society as the other or the enemy.’ In turn this has led El-Affendi (1999, p. 45) to suggest a new Islamic movement, whose main driving force is self-criticism, listening to and communicating with others. In any case, the effects of the spread of education, secularisation and globalisation are likely to contribute to a shrinking of the space for Islamism. This raises the interesting question of whether the Sudan, after all these years of Islamic experiment, is an Islamic state or a state with an Islamist government or regime. An Islamic state cannot easily be divorced from Islam, because Islamic principles are built into the system. The Islamist regime in Sudan, on the other hand, is far shallower and more easily undermined. Thus Sondra Hale has written how
[i]n Sudan Islamisation was a movement from above, not an autonomous movement; it was a method of consolidating state control by exerting cultural (religious) hegemony. Most of the lower to middle-class women I interviewed, for example, claimed to be religious, but distanced themselves from what they viewed as fanatical Islam. Muslim southerners, too, exhibited religious sentiment but resented state control over religion. Through the years, I have known Sudanese, both northern and southern, to view religion as a private matter. (Hale, 1997, pp. 11–12)
According to Hayder Ibrahim (1996, p. 312), the experience of the Islamic regime and the NIF's civilisation project represent a complete failure for the following reasons:
- 1.
The nature of the regime in Sudan, since the military coup of June 1989, has neither a constitutional basis nor an ethical, philosophical or logical rationale. It is an illegal and authoritarian regime which does not respect the rule of law, and which is neither recognised nor accepted by the Sudanese people. The regime, whose authority derives from a mixture of ideology and the power of the security and military apparatus, has little or no legitimacy.
- 2.
Since 1989, the Islamic movement's main concern is to control the political life in the country and to allocate all efforts and resources to maintain power. The state simply has been unable to achieve that which it has promised to achieve. These promises have been met with a discouraging performance. The state's policy performance can be characterised overall as a failure to pursue the regime's own declared goals. Despite all resources and assets, the Sudanese state failed to bring about the social control it sought.
- 3.
The Islamic state declared the war in the South a religious war, in order to mobilise all resources and to involve young Northerners, for the first time, in the longest civil war. This resulted in the escalation of the war and in the increase of poverty. The regime promoted a culture of violence, extended to the educational systems of all levels and even to songs for children in the primary schools. Belal and Nimat (2005, p. 60) report that the drop-out of students in elementary educational level reached 9.7% in 2000.
- 4.
The Islamic movement considered Al Ansar, the Umma Party members, its natural allies, and Al Khatmiyyah its potential partners, since both sects advocated for the Islamic system. Despite this network of allies, the Islamic movement failed to attract them sufficiently to establish an Islamic front ensuring the northern cultural and religious dominance.
Additional factors contributing to the crisis are an incompetent state bureaucracy and poor quality of public service delivery, conditions aggravated by the government's attitude toward social capital represented in humanitarian voluntary work. In a country of one million square miles, divided into 26 states and even more administrative districts, and characterised by an absence of capital at the local level, as well as limited local government autonomy in fiscal and non-fiscal matters, the ability of government to initiate local-level development projects is heavily compromised.
Sudan also lags behind in its accomplishments in scientific and technical education, with many high school students preferring general education rather than technical education. Ironically, the government favours support for higher education and overlooks basic education, and thus supports the rich and undermines the poor.
Military and security expenditure are extremely high. The World Bank reports that:
By 2000, defense and security expenditure was estimated to account for about 3% of GDP, while development expenditures stood at about 1.5% of GDP (and were biased toward capital-intensive investments in energy and subsidies for large-scale irrigation). (World Bank 2003)
Sudan has taken remarkable strides in domestic production of weapons for the purpose of internal control. Its impressive array of armaments and sophisticated war technologies comes at the expense of education, agriculture and health, for without training and scientific education, such systems often become irrelevant and useless.
As mentioned earlier, some Islamic reformists have critically reviewed the status of the Islamic movement and suggested an Islamist alternative. Abdelwahab El-Affendi, a former member of the National Islamic Front, described the ambivalence in the organisation's set-up:
On the one hand, Turabi had an inner circle of followers whom he addressed with complete frankness. And on the other hand, Turabi had a different message for the general public. That led to mixed results. First, it led to the emergence of a clique within his inner circle that claims to have better understanding for the Islamic doctrine than their peers have. Second, Turabi's inner circle began to develop and display low opinion about the rest of Muslims, as well as undermining the understanding of the religion and religious teachings. (El-Affendi 2006, p. 3)
Earlier, and commenting on human rights violations in Islam, El-Affendi, who would become both an active NIF member and press attaché at the Sudanese Embassy in London, had observed that:
[a] more controversial issue here is the role of states that are asked to back the action against thinkers and artists. There is a question about the legitimacy of these largely undemocratic states, which have no religious or popular legitimacy and no inclination to promote freedom of Islamic values. (El-Affendi 1999)
Regime violation and corruption
The Islamic regime's severe violation of human rights was reported from the onset. It restricted and banned the work of civil society organisations such as trade unions, opposition political parties, student unions and women's groups (Human Rights Watch 1996). It succeeded in damaging the capability of the society to express itself through its organisations and unions. All elections have been falsified. Both its military and authoritarian nature, and its religious ideology, mark the present regime as the most hostile and aggressive one since independence in 1956. That it continues to privilege selected elite interests reflects an absence of overt opposition from the grassroots, particularly the rural poor.
In the absence of such protests, a class of capitalists benefits from economic policies such as the privatisation of successful public enterprises, as well as from widespread corruption and mismanagement. Corrupt privatisation robs the government treasury of needed funds. Corruption of the legislature and the judiciary undermines the goals of democratic choices and impartial legal decision making. At the same time, the regime's obsession with security has created a range of young security operatives and opportunists who, utilising their security and political position in the regime, capitalise on the functioning of the market and civil society to benefit illegally from tax and custom exemptions.
Corruption is a symptom of bad governance and undermines any serious progress in state building. Al Watan newspaper (2006) reported, for example, that representatives of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), partner organisation of the National Congress (and representative of the Islamic movement) in the National Unity government, left a meeting of the National Council in Southern Darfur in protest because it was discussing financial allocations of 518 million Sudanese dinars to institutions and organisations belonging to the National Congress Party. Similarly, the Southern Darfur state government reportedly donated 50 million dinars for People's Defense, 150 million dinars to the Women's Union, 50 million dinars to the Youth Union, 100 million dinars to the Security Department and hundreds of millions to other Islamic organisations (Al Watan newspaper 2006). The SPLM protested, claiming that these organisations were not independent bodies but National Congress affiliates, and referred the case to the Constitutional Court for resolution (Al Watan newspaper 2006).
According to the Mo Ibrahim Index of national governance (2009)2, Sudan is rated 49th out of 53 African countries in areas such as commitment to participation and human rights. This is supported by the World Bank's governance indicators, which show low scores for voice and accountability, as well as a score of 2.2 out of 10 on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score of degree of corruption (Transparency International 2004, pp. 8–9). The Corruption Perceptions Index of 2005 ranks the Sudan 144 out of 158 countries (CPI of 2.1), with the accompanying report indicating that: ‘70 countries scored less than three, indicating rampant corruption that poses a grave threat to institutions as well as to social and political stability’ (Transparency International 2005, pp. 16–17). Between 2003 and 2005 Sudan scored 2.3, 2.2 and 2.1 on the Corruption Perceptions Index, showing how, under the Islamic regime, the country was rated as progressively more corrupt (Transparency International 2005).
Islamist use of, and control over, humanitarian aid has been criticised by international organisations, Christian Sudanese organisations and other Sudanese independent groups (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003). The Islamic government has shown preference not to local organisations, as claimed by Ghazi Salah Eddine Atabani, an influential NIF official defending government policy, but rather to Islamic organisations such as Daawa Islamiyyah and Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA), Committee for International Charity, Muwaffaq Al-Kheiriya and others (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003, p. 122). Throughout Islamic government rule, the only organisations allowed to work with internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees have been Islamic organisations, while institutions like churches, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and trade unions have been identified as sites of opposition to the regime. During periods of war and other crises, only religious organisations were allowed access to either affected areas and internally displaced people or international aid and assistance in northern Sudan.
In an interview with the secretary general of the Sudan Council of Churches in Khartoum in May 1996, Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan wrote that: ‘According to Rev. Enoch Tombe, the NGOs were in the service of the NIF which sought to prolong the war in order to be able to Islamise the South. Christian communities are bound to lose members in the Islamic hands which are protected by the government.’ According to Rev. Tombe: ‘The policy was part of a broader aim, the Islamisation of Africa, deriving from a duty to fill the vacuum motivated by the strong assumption that Africans have no religion and are pagans.’
The challenge facing an independent civil society
There are a number of factors that affect the functioning of civil society. First is the existence of space for members of an autonomous civil society to operate and fulfil their developmental and other roles. Related to this is the second, which concerns the power and influence of those sectors of civil society, like cultural and educational organisations and media institutions which are affiliated to the state and benefit from privileged access to resources, and their divisive effect on the rest of the sector. Third is the political dominance of the regime, or Altanzeem, which uses power as a self-serving tool for the sole interest of the ruling junta or group. Although some sections of civil society see the regime as criminal and immoral, others capitalise on their links with the regime and, in the process, compromise NGO norms and wider civil society values. Thus El Nagar (2006, p. 79), for example, observes that funds made available to Islamic organisations from Zakat (Zakat is the third of Islam's Five Pillars, which are known to all branches of Sunni Islam, and is a financial commitment to give up a fixed proportion of one's wealth for specified good reasons), and charity donations, for which they do not appear to have to account.
And yet, while there is a clear need for an assertive and representative civil society, it is not clear how best to guarantee its existence, autonomy or effectiveness. What does an independent civil society need to thrive, given the current political economy, notably the long history of injustice, neglect, violence, torture and violations of all types of human rights? An independent and active civil society should be at the forefront of the search for solutions to difficult social problems; tracing the progressive erosion of local indigenous culture and mores under pressure from globalisation impulses; presenting alternatives to existing and/or orthodox development policies and strategies; and, finally, highlighting the constraining effect of state socio-economic and other policies on voluntary initiatives, including the lack of government interest in mobilising local resources, supporting local talent and promoting integrity in public life. What, then, are the restrictions preventing civil society from fulfilling these roles?
Restrictions on voluntary work
Emergency Law, which has been in effect continuously since the coup of 1989, gives the government sweeping authority over society and control of its activities: restrictions on freedom of expression and association; censorship of printed materials; and arrest on the basis of suspicion. And this, despite the state's latest constitution of 2005 recognising the right to freedom of association and organisation: ‘Citizens shall have the right of association and organisation for cultural, social, economic, professional or trade union purposes, without restriction save in accordance with the law’. In addition, legislation governing NGO activity is under constant review as part of a never-ending attempt by the state to regulate the growth and influence of the non-state sector. Concern with internal security has already led to the introduction of legislation providing government with instruments for vetting and controlling NGOs, which are not consulted during preparation of the legislation. Furthermore, decisions concerning official NGO registration and/or authorisation are determined by political considerations rather than by a calculation of the (potential) contribution of the NGO sector as a whole to social and economic development.
Thus repressive state measures (including blocking official registration of ‘suspect’ or independent groups as non-profit organisations and thereby restricting their capacity to function effectively as civil society actors) continue to be openly enforced, even while the state provides financial and logistical support for NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs) affiliated to the government in secret. In many cases, disadvantaged groups have suffered disproportionately from these policies and practices, and individuals and organisations advocating social and political reforms have been especially targeted. In truth, the present mechanism for NGO registration appears to be aimed more at restricting rather than facilitating NGO activity. Unresolved tensions between the state and NGOs are likely to become heightened in the absence of a socio-political space for NGOs to operate legally and in a largely unhindered way. While government laws and structures are often rigid, hierarchical and autocratic, NGOs need legitimacy, recognition and acceptance, all of which are essential for their accountability and performance. Since 1989, the government has maintained a great degree of control over the secular independent voluntary sector, even as increasing numbers of NGOs, academics, development specialists, political and human rights activists have sought the reform of laws governing non-profit organisations.
The government does not appear to be moving towards any type of accommodation with these groups and, indeed, may not have to. Hundreds of suspected government opponents have been arrested throughout the country and detained without charge or trial. Most detainees were members of political parties or civil society organisations, including those devoted to human rights activism. There have been many cases of prisoners being detained without charge or trial for sufficiently long periods to qualify for the status of prisoners of conscience (that is, prisoners detained or imprisoned on the basis of their beliefs, colour, ethnic origin, language or religion that have not used or advocated violence). Human rights organisations have documented hundreds of cases of torture by government security officers, notably officers of the Interior Ministry's Internal and External State Security Directorate. There are many reports of severe beatings and of cruel and inhumane treatment of prisoners, which has on occasion led to death. Quoting from Jemera Rone (Human Rights Watch 1996, p. 57): ‘Dr Ali Fadl arrested on March 13, 1990, he was severely tortured in a ghost house and he died of internal haemorrhaging.’ The international community has noted that widespread human rights violations continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Amnesty International reported in July 2010 that Sudanese Security Service carries out a brutal campaign of arbitrary detentions, torture and mental and physical intimidation against opponents and critics of the government. The government has been relentless in pursuing and eliminating opponents to its rule, confiscating equipment and supplies, closing NGO offices, cultural centres and training and research institutions. Sudanese and international human rights reports document not only the violation of rights of journalists and women, but also the failure of government to admit responsibility and put on trial those responsible for torture and abuse.
Women and the state
Sudanese women have won significant gains since independence in 1956. They have the right to vote, hold prominent political positions and are Members of Parliament. The 1964 constitution states that: ‘All persons in the Sudan are free and equal before the law … No disability shall be attached to any Sudanese by reason of birth, religion, race, or sex’ (Ministry of Justice 1964). The 1973 constitution reiterates this: ‘The Sudanese have equal rights and duties irrespective of origin, race, locality, sex, language, or religion’ (Ministry of Justice 1973). And the 1998 constitution guarantees, yet again, that: ‘All people are equal before the courts of law. Sudanese are equal in rights and duties with regards to functions of public life; and there shall be no discrimination only by reason of race, sex or religious creed. They are equal in eligibility for public posts and offices not being discriminated on the basis of wealth’ (Ministry of Justice 1998).
Moreover, during the period between 1965 and 1989, a number of specific acts were issued in favour of women's equal rights. They include:
- •
Article 16, Part 6: Equality in Civil Service, Civil Service Act, 1973
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Article 9: Equal Pay for Equal Work, Public Service Act, 1973
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Article 80: Equal Pension and Gratuities, Social Insurance Act, 1974
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Article 6: National Training Act, 1976
- •
Maternity leave and other types of leave.
The state represents the setting within which other institutions operate. The government often plays proactive roles in reinforcing gender inequalities through policies and legislation, and by combining secular and customary or religious laws. The status of women is low. In indicators such as maternal mortality, literacy and primary enrolment, women in Sudan are far behind their counterparts in other developing countries. Under structural adjustment policies (SAPs), gender inequalities are perpetuated. According to Sudan Gender Profile (2004): ‘Female unemployment rate is 28% compared to 13% for male. Low employment opportunities, low salaries, increasing poverty forced women to join the informal sector.’ Females constitute 85% of the informal sector and they are young displaced women and rural and urban poor who lack skills and work under difficult conditions, and are often subject to harassment and intimidation.
The state has an interest in perpetuating the dominant gender ideology so as to fulfil its role as facilitator of market forces. In other words, the unpaid labour undertaken by women within the household elevates the living standards of the working class above that granted by wage alone, and provides the services of care and socialisation of children, who are the future labour force. These are services which can only otherwise be delivered less proficiently, and less cost effectively, to capital by the state. Indeed, the state is interested in the domestication and re-domestication of women, an interest which can be summarised in the following two points: (1) maintaining family integration secures the supply of manpower for production; and (2) women bearing the responsibility of domestic work and reproductive activities beyond their biological reproductive role have created an opportunity for the state to rely on them to shoulder extra activities which used to be the state's responsibility, but were terminated as a result of the implementation of SAPs in most third-world countries, i.e. social services such as health care for the elderly and the sick. The state is male-biased and patriarchal, and aims to control women's sexuality and freedom through the management of property. To this end it adopts oppressive measures against women to keep them domesticated or to re-domesticate those in public life (F. B. Mahmoud 2002, p. 283). It is not only the religious-minded who fear women's non-domestication: most of the educated middle classes, who may be living a Western lifestyle, often hold ideas that encourage control over women's freedom and their sexuality and match such control with social morality and affinity.
Conclusion
The rise of an Islamic movement in the Sudan can be viewed as part of the decline of the local community as the centre of social capital. Clearly, the Islamic movement has not brought into being the future envisioned by ordinary Sudanese people. Moreover, in Sudan as elsewhere, once Islamic regime discourse is appropriated as the language of an authoritarian regime, its ability to serve as an agent for progressive social change is surely compromised. With respect to the links between state and religion, it is high time for Islamists to recognise that their persistent attempt to impose political Islam cannot succeed in a country in which popular Islam is deeply rooted.
The regime promised to break the monopoly of power by the coalition of traditional, sectarian and secular forces, with the intention of leading a process of societal regeneration and renewal, before handing power back to the people. In reality, however, the outcome has been radically different. Political and economic crises continued unabated, civil war spread, internal strife became more common and, recently, the ruling NIF forces seem to have become wracked by intra-factional conflicts over power, which have weakened their political and ideological resolve. Under pressure from internal opposition, and faced with mounting challenges from external opposition and the international community, the regime seems to have consented to reform.
On the other hand, there are still social forces and community-based organisations which have asserted themselves, notably the silent and peaceful revolt against official structures and processes of injustice and instability. In other words, traditional forms and modern practices of social capital have been strengthened, despite the frustrations associated with a hostile macro-political environment. In any case, mutual co-operation in Sudan has historically taken the form of struggles to redress the uneven distribution of incomes and access to benefits and services, in which solidarity has given strength to those who have neither income nor assets.
Concern over the intractable nature of many of these constraints has led to growing interest in the contribution that civil society organisations and NGOs can make to development, particularly in the areas of community participation, social justice, human rights and social inclusiveness. In particular, interest is clearly growing in the extent to which there are practical complementarities between NGOs and government, and which NGO approaches might be incorporated into governmental programmes. Much of the interest in, and respect for, NGOs has been driven by host communities, which find them practical, participatory and honest. On the other hand, the lack of interest in NGOs on the part of government has been fuelled by suspicions about their loyalty, political affiliation and accountability. Despite these challenges, CSOs, NGOs and community-based organisations have succeeded in creating strategies to work with government at all levels and in different settings, both urban and rural. The establishment of partnerships and mechanisms of dialogue and communication, particularly with government technical departments, assures that even in the absence of democracy, and under brutal authoritarian regimes, NGOs can engage effectively and contribute to social and economic change, particularly those affecting the marginalised poor.