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US elite power and the rise of ‘statist’ Chinese elites in global markets

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Abstract

The rise of Chinese ‘state capitalism’ such as expressed by the global expansion of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has been met with substantial suspicion on the part of the Western corporate and political establishment—including among Washington’s policy-making elite. The underpinning claim that the rise of SOEs would impair market mechanisms, we argue, is, however, theoretically problematic and empirically incorrect. Taking the example of the global oil and gas sector, the article illustrates that at firm level major corporations from rising powers, such as China, increasingly cooperate with Western firms, including with American oil majors. In that sense, Chinese firms participate in capitalist competition just as any Western firm. The roots of the assumed threat posed by China’s rise, we argue, must rather be situated in the distinctive nature of the state-capital nexus in the USA and China, respectively, and the configuration of elite networks underpinning this nexus. We will illustrate this by analysing the social networks in which directors of major Chinese and US oil firms are embedded, including the networks of corporate ties, affiliations with (transnational) policy planning bodies and state-business ties.

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Notes

  1. 16 Chinese NOC directors (with six of them having overlapping directorships between CNPC and PetroChina) and 24 American IOC directors.

  2. We do not incorporate affiliations with subsidiaries as separate entities in these analyses because it is inter-firm and not intra-firm relations that we are primarily interested in here.

  3. Only a handful are based in Switzerland (3), France (1), Jersey (1), Germany (1) and finally Mexico (1).

  4. Except Lui Hongru who has one corporate affiliation to a transnational US-based financial firm Greater China Securities and its subsidiary Etech Securities, and Chen Zhiwu who has a corporate affiliation with UK-based global investment management firm the Permal Group.

  5. While Houston Endowment Inc is a foundation and thus not a corporation, it does invest substantively in real estate and board membership of this organization can therefore appropriately be seen as a corporate affiliation.

  6. The individual policy planning affiliations are shown in the graph without a label in order to give an impression of the numbers while retaining readability of the figure.

  7. Although the OECD is an international organization and thus not a private planning body, it is certainly a key policy planning institute, especially since key corporate directors are involved as advisers and members for this institute forming a crucial link to policy making. We have therefore included it here.

  8. Jiang Jiemin was removed as SASAC Chairman in 2013 on the basis of charges of corruption and has been expelled from the CPC in 2014.

  9. After 2012, of course, Exxon Mobil's longtime CEO Rex Tillerson has been appointed US Secretary of State in the Trump administration.

  10. Although our findings elicit the need for a more systematic and in-depth analysis comparing different forms of state capitalism—or state-led development—both in the West and in Asia more broadly (see e.g. McNally 2012), this falls outside the scope of the present article which is primarily concerned with an empirical analysis of the impact of transnationalizing Chinese SOEs on US elite power structures.

  11. Telephone interview, Xiaojie Xu, CNPC consultant and former director overseas investments, 21 January 2010. Email interview, CNPC’s Director Petroleum Market Study, 14 June 2011. Interview, Professor Weihan Wang, 26 February 2010, Houston, USA.

  12. Ibid.

  13. A development that is also indicated by CNPC’s (and other Chinese NOCs) current organizational structure with PetroChina as a listed private entity within the state-owned CNPC.

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de Graaff, N., van Apeldoorn, B. US elite power and the rise of ‘statist’ Chinese elites in global markets. Int Polit 54, 338–355 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0031-2

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