Abstract
For the last few decades, liberal democracies have been confronted with new challenges such as low turnout, high electoral volatility, the electoral success of populist movements and growing dissatisfaction with the political system. These challenges have persuaded scholars to develop new insights into the democratic linkage, hence the growing body of works focusing on the link between public opinion and public policies—from responsiveness to persuasion and policy feedback. Examining this literature, government opinion polls appear both as the central apparatus through with public opinion and public policies interact and as mostly a black box. In this article, I aim first to unveil the function and the role attributed by scholars to government opinion polling when investigating the democratic linkage, then to propose a review of the few empirical studies which have attempted to disentangle its use by diverse political authorities and finally to outline a research agenda. I would argue that scrutinizing opinion polling—Who is ordering polls? What kind of apparatus is involved? Which questions are being asked? When? What for? Who is using the results? For what purpose?—would offer us a better understanding of the democratic linkage, as this will reveal political leaders’ lay theories of democracy, how much they are shared and how they evolve over time.
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Notes
At least in some fields, see, for example, L. Birch’s PhD on the use of opinion polls when developing anti-tobacco policies (Birch 2010).
Again this practice is not well documented. See, however, an example in Rothmayr and Hardmeier (2002).
Except for the role played by opinion polls in political campaign which is better documented, see Hillygus (2011) for an American review.
From what we know, looking at the American and French cases, only between 5 and 20% of the polls produced by polling institutes are published (Field 1983: 204; Lehingue 2007: 43–44). The proportion of hidden polls commissioned by governmental elites is, however, probably different from one country to another, depending on transparency rules implemented at governmental level.
See, for example, the French Justice’s requirement that Nicolas Sarkozy provide access to the polls his staff commissioned during his presidency, following a claim by Raymond Avrillier. Also a similar Court judgement demanded of Angela Merkel in Germany in 2014 following a claim by Malte Spitz in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (Schnatterer forthcoming).
In some countries, norms are enforced relative to the transparency of the reports that are based on polls financed by public funds. See, for example, such norms in the Canadian case (http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/porr/Pages/porr.aspx). As far as Europe is concerned, all Eurobarometers’ questionnaires, results and reports are available through the Commission’s website after a few months of embargo (http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/general/index/).
Some authors use the term congruence as a synonymous (Monroe 1998). Others, however, consider that the term congruence designates both consistence, what they call “majoritarian congruence”, and co-variation, in their terms “co-variate congruence (Shapiro 2011). I therefore prefer not to use the term here in order to clarify the distinction between the two types of studies.
All studies conclude that public opinion plays a role in decision-making but they differ on the importance of such a role.
See Druckman and Lupia (2000) for a review of this literature from the end of the 1990s and Rottinghaus (2010), Druckman and Jacobs (2015) and Edwards (2016) for recent results relative to the American case. Again this literature almost exclusively focuses on the American case and in particular on the strategy of persuasion used by various presidents. For a French example, see president Sarkozy persuasion discourse in defence of nuclear power in Brouard et al. (2013). Note that in the normative literature, the political elite’s will to persuade appears twofold. When political leaders try to convince the general public knowing that they are acting in their best interest and argue that they are informing them, the will to persuade is accepted as being helpful to the good running of democracies. On the other hand, when political leaders try to convince the general public knowing that the decision they have made is not the wisest but has been made either to avoid facing a problem or be re-elected, the will to persuade is denounced as a falsification of the representative’s role [see the distinction made by Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) between true leadership and fake leadership and Disch (2011)].
See Campbell (2012) for a review of this literature.
See, for example, Kumlin and Rothstein (2005) on the Swedish welfare case, Mettler and Stonecash (2008) on the American welfare case and Shore (2014) for a European comparison. Note that if most studies focus on social policies, the effect of other universal policies is also questioned. See, for example, the work by Dupuy and Van Ingelgom (2016) who observe how EU environmental policy enhances support for the EU political system.
Her interviews with political elites at the constituencies’ level in America led Herbst (1998) to conclude that when trying to grasp public opinion, political elites refer much more to the latter than to the former.
To give only one example, L. Johnson suspended his relationship with the polls’ institute he was working with, O. Quayle, when he learned that Quayle communicated about their relationship (Jacobs and Shapiro 1999).
The European Commission has commissioned opinion polls, the Eurobarometers, very regularly since 1973. More than a thousand have been requested since then with a peak in 2009 (69 polls commissioned that year) (Belot et al. 2016).
See, however, Brown (2011) on how political elites resort to different kinds of public opinion when building penal public policies reform in the State of New York.
See as well some of the parliamentary staff interviewed by Herbst (1998: 48).
This was particularly obvious in R. Reagan’s speeches when he primed economic issues over foreign policy issues.
Birch (2010) claims that presidential use of public opinion is mainly strategic, whereas public administrations use it in more “conceptual” and “managerial” ways. Her study, however, concerns mainly health policies related to tobacco.
The French government’s information service (SIG) (Ollivier-Yaniv 2000), the German government (Schnatterer forthcoming) or the DG Communication of the European Commission all produce a systematic watch of different polls made public by the media.
See their website: http://www.pewresearch.org/.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank French Politics’ editors as well as Tinette Schnatterer for their useful comments. Once again, Anna Jeannesson’s English proofreading has been of invaluable help. All errors remain mine.
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Belot, C. Exploring the democratic linkage through the lens of governmental polling: a research agenda. Fr Polit 17, 211–226 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41253-018-0075-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41253-018-0075-8