Abstract
It is a familiar story. A new leader assumes authority in a country that has recently discovered that it has fallen behind its neighbours in economic development. He brings in foreign expertise, announcing a series of modernizing reforms that adopt what is perceived as best development practice and promises much in the way of social benefits. These include the establishment of schools and competitive exams based upon a modern curriculum, the abolition of sinecure positions in government, and the expansion of a system of railways and banks. However the reforms threaten the interests of existing elites. Within four months of the start of the reforms, these elites stage a coup, imprison the executive and rescind the changes. The country faces years of political unrest, civil war and revolution, at great human cost, before reforms occur.
This is a version of a paper presented at the July 2011 International Economic Association World Congress at a session on ‘Institutions and the History of Economic Development’. I would like to thank Susan Athey, Jon Bendor, Michael Bordo, Gary Cox, Alex Debs, Jim Fearon, Avner Greif, Justin Grimmer, Steve Haber, Chad Jones, Keith Krehbiel, Timur Kuran, Philip Lipscy, Debin Ma, Helen Milner, Kris Mitchener, Dan Posner, James Robinson, Gérard Roland, Dick Sylla and Barry Weingast for very useful discussions. I am grateful to Nick Eubank and Fiona Wilkes for terrific research assistance.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson (2005a) ‘Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth’, in P. Aghion, and S. Durlauf (eds), Handbook of Economic Growth (Amsterdam: North-Holland), pp. 385–472.
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson (2005b) ‘The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change and Economic Growth’, American Economic Review, vol. 95, no. 3, pp. 546–579.
Alesina, A., R. Baqir and C. Hoxby (2004) ‘Political Jurisdictions in Heterogeneous Communities’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 112, no. 2, pp. 348–395.
Benmelech, E. and T. Moskowitz (2010) ‘The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: Evidence from US Usury Laws in the 19th Century’, Journal of Finance, vol. 65, no. 3, pp. 1029–1073.
Boycko, M., A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1997) Privatizing Russia (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Carruthers, B. (1999) City of Capital: Politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
Clinton, J. and A. Meirowitz (2004) ‘Testing Explanations of Strategic Voting in Legislatures: A Reexamination of the Compromise of 1790’, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 675–689.
Cox, G. W. (2011) ‘Sovereign Debt, Political Stability and Bargaining Efficiency’, mimeo, Stanford University.
Ellis, J. J. (2000) Founding Brothers (New York: Alfred Knopf).
Emperor Kuang Hsu (1900) The Emperor Kuang Hsu’s Reform Decrees, 1898, North China Herald Office, reprinted from the North China Daily News, Shanghai.
Engerman, S. L. and K. L. Sokoloff (2000) ‘Institutions, Factor Endowments and Paths of Development in the New World’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 217–232.
Fearon, J. D. (1996) ‘Bargaining over Objects that Influence Future Bargaining Power’, paper presented at the APSA Annual Meetings, Washington, DC.
Foley, J. P. (ed.) (1900) The Jeffersonian Cyclopedia: A Comprehensive Collection of the Views of Thomas Jefferson (New York and London: Funk and Wagnalls).
Goldsmith, R. W. (1983) The Financial Development of Japan, 1868–1977 (New Haven: Yale University Press).
Guiso, L., M. Haliassos and T. Jappelli (2003) ‘Household Stockholding in Europe: Where Do We Stand and Where Do We Go?’, Economic Policy, vol. 18, no. 36, pp. 123–170.
Haber, S., D. North and B. Weingast (eds) (2008) Political Institutions and Financial Development (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
Haber, S. and E. Perotti (2010) ‘The Political Economy of Finance’, Journal of Economic Literature.
Harootunian, H. D. (1960) ‘The Economic Rehabilitation of the Samurai Class in the Early Meiji Period’, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 433–444.
Hilt, E. and J. Valentine (2011) ‘Democratic Dividends: Stockholding, Wealth and Politics in New York, 1791–1826’, NBER Working Paper 17147 (Cambridge, MA: NBER)
Jansen, M. B. (2000) The Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University).
Jha, S. (2008a) ‘Shares, Coalition Formation and Political Development: Evidence from 17th-century England’, GSB Research Paper 2005 (Stanford: Stanford Graduate School of Business).
Jha, S. (2008b) ‘Trade, Institutions and Religious Tolerance: Evidence from India’, GSB Research Paper 2004 (Stanford: Stanford Graduate School of Business).
Jha, S. (in progress) ‘ “That Speculating Phalanx”: War Veterans, Finance and Nation-Building in the Early US Republic’, in progress.
Jha, S. and K. Mitchener (in progress) ‘Swords into Bank Shares: Finance, Conflict and Political Reform in Meiji Japan’, in progress.
Jha, S. and S. Wilkinson (2012) ‘Can Combat Experience Foster Organizational Skill: Evidence from Ethnic Cleansing during the Partition of South Asia’, forthcoming, American Political Science Review
Jones, B. and B. Olken (2005) ‘Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth since World War II’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 120, no. 3, pp. 835–864.
Kuran, T. and A. Singh (2010) ‘Economic Modernization in Late British India: Hindu-Muslim Differences’, ERID Working Paper 53 (Durham, NC: Duke University Department of Economics).
Matozzi, A. (2010) ‘Policy Uncertainty, Electoral Securities and Redistribution’, International Economic Review, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 45–71.
Merton, R. C. (1987) ‘A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Information’, Journal of Finance, vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 483–510.
Montalvo, J. G. and M. Reynal-Querol (2005) ‘Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict and Civil Wars’, American Economic Review, vol. 95, no. 3, pp. 796–816.
Moore, B. (1966) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Bostom: Beacon), 1993 edition.
Rabb, T. K. (1967) Enterprise and Empire: Merchant and Gentry Investment in the Expansion of England, 1575–1630 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Rajan, R. G. (2006) ‘The Persistence of Underdevelopment: Constituencies and Competitive Rent Preservation’, unpublished manuscript.
Sambanis, N. and J. Schulhofer-Wohl (2009) ‘What’s in a Line? Is Partition a Solution to Civil War?’, International Security, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 82–118.
Scott, W. R. (1912) The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720: The General Development of the Joint-Stock System to 1720, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Stasavage, D. (2003) Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: France and Great Britain, 1688–1789 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Sylla, R. (2002) ‘Financial Systems and Economic Modernization’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 277–291.
Sylla, R. (2008) ‘Comparing the UK and US Financial Systems, 1790–1830’, in J. Atack, and L. Neal (eds), The Evolution of Financial Markets and Institutions from the Seventeenth Century to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 290–338.
Sylla, R., R. E. Wright and D. J. Cowen (2009) ‘Alexander Hamilton, Central Banker: Crisis Management during the US Financial Panic of 1792’, Business History Review, vol. 83 (Spring), pp. 61–86.
Vlastos, S. (1989) ‘Opposition Movements in Early Meiji, 1868–1885’, in The Cambridge History of Japan: The Nineteenth Century, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Wood, G. (2009) Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815 (New York: Oxford University Press).
Wright, R. E. (2008) One Nation under Debt: Hamilton, Jefferson and the History of What We Owe (New York: McGraw-Hill).
Yamamura, K. (1967) ‘The Role of the Samurai in the Development of Modern Banking in Japan’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 198–220.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2012 International Economic Association
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Jha, S. (2012). Sharing the Future: Financial Innovation and Innovators in Solving the Political Economy Challenges of Development. In: Aoki, M., Kuran, T., Roland, G. (eds) Institutions and Comparative Economic Development. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137034014_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137034014_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-03403-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-03401-4
eBook Packages: Palgrave Economics & Finance CollectionEconomics and Finance (R0)